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 Big Data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI) draw 
non-intuitive and unverifiable inferences and predictions 
about the behaviors, preferences, and private lives of 
individuals. These inferences draw on highly diverse and 
feature-rich data of unpredictable value, and create new 
opportunities for discriminatory, biased, and invasive 
decision-making. Data protection law is meant to protect 
people’s privacy, identity, reputation, and autonomy, but is 
currently failing to protect data subjects from the novel risks of 
inferential analytics. The legal status of inferences is heavily 
disputed in legal scholarship, and marked by inconsistencies 
and contradictions within and between the views of the Article 
29 Working Party and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
This Article shows that individuals are granted little 
control or oversight over how their personal data is used to 
draw inferences about them. Compared to other types of 
personal data, inferences are effectively “economy class” 
personal data in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). Data subjects’ rights to know about (Articles 13–15), 
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rectify (Article 16), delete (Article 17), object to (Article 21), or 
port (Article 20) personal data are significantly curtailed for 
inferences. The GDPR also provides insufficient protection 
against sensitive inferences (Article 9) or remedies to challenge 
inferences or important decisions based on them (Article 22(3)). 
 This situation is not accidental. In standing jurisprudence 
the ECJ has consistently restricted the remit of data protection 
law to assessing the legitimacy of input personal data 
undergoing processing, and to rectify, block, or erase it. 
Critically, the ECJ has likewise made clear that data 
protection law is not intended to ensure the accuracy of 
decisions and decision-making processes involving personal 
data, or to make these processes fully transparent. Current 
policy proposals addressing privacy protection (the ePrivacy 
Regulation and the EU Digital Content Directive) and 
Europe’s new Copyright Directive and Trade Secrets Directive 
also fail to close the GDPR’s accountability gaps concerning 
inferences.  
This Article argues that a new data protection right, the 
“right to reasonable inferences,” is needed to help close the 
accountability gap currently posed by “high risk inferences,” 
meaning inferences drawn from Big Data analytics that 
damage privacy or reputation, or have low verifiability in the 
sense of being predictive or opinion-based while being used in 
important decisions. This right would require ex-ante 
justification to be given by the data controller to establish 
whether an inference is reasonable. This disclosure would 
address (1) why certain data form a normatively acceptable 
basis from which to draw inferences; (2) why these inferences 
are relevant and normatively acceptable for the chosen 
processing purpose or type of automated decision; and (3) 
whether the data and methods used to draw the inferences are 
accurate and statistically reliable. The ex-ante justification is 
bolstered by an additional ex-post mechanism enabling 
unreasonable inferences to be challenged. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Big Data analytics and artificial intelligence (“AI”) draw 
non-intuitive and unverifiable inferences and predictions 
about the behaviors, preferences, and private lives of 
individuals. These inferences draw on highly diverse and 
feature-rich data of unpredictable value and create new 
opportunities for discriminatory, biased, and privacy-invasive 
profiling and decision-making.1 Inferential analytics methods 
are used to infer user preferences, sensitive attributes (e.g., 
race, gender, sexual orientation), and opinions (e.g., political 
stances), or to predict behaviors (e.g., to serve 
advertisements). These methods can be used to nudge or 
manipulate us, or to make important decisions (e.g., loan or 
employment decisions) about us. The intuitive link between 
actions and perceptions is being eroded, leading to a loss of 
control over identity and how individuals are perceived by 
others. Concerns about algorithmic accountability are often 
actually concerns about the way in which these technologies 
draw privacy-invasive and non-verifiable inferences that 
cannot be predicted, understood, or refuted.  
 
1 See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, 
Sandra Wachter & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the 
Debate, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2016, at 1–2. 
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Data protection law is meant to protect people’s privacy, 
identity, reputation, and autonomy, but it is currently failing 
to protect data subjects from the novel risks of inferential 
analytics. The broad concept of personal data in Europe could 
be interpreted to include inferences, predictions, and 
assumptions that refer to or impact an individual. If seen as 
personal data, individuals would be granted numerous rights 
under data protection law. However, the legal status of 
inferences is heavily disputed in legal scholarship, and 
marked by inconsistencies and contradictions within and 
between the views of the Article 29 Working Party2 and the 
European Court of Justice. It is crucial to note, however, that 
the question of whether inferences are personal data is not the 
most important one. The underlying problem goes much 
deeper and relates to the tension of whether individuals have 
rights, control, and recourse concerning how they are seen by 
others. 
 
2 It is worth noting that as of the implementation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) on May 25, 2018, the Article 29 Working 
Party has ceased to exist and has been succeeded by the European Data 
Protection Board (“EDPB”). See European Data Prot. Bd., The European 
Data Protection Board, Endorsement 1/2018 (May 25, 2018), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/news/endorsement_of_ 
wp29_documents.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H9A-RQR3]. One of the first acts of 
the EDPB was to adopt the positions and papers drafted by the Article 29 
Working Party pertaining to the GDPR. For a full list of adopted documents, 
see id. Only one set of guidelines produced by the EDPB between May 25, 
2018 and April 2019 are relevant to the topics addressed herein. See 
European Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 2/2019 on the Processing of Personal 
Data Under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the Context of the Provision of Online 




This Article therefore continues to focus on the opinions, guidelines, and 
working papers of the Article 29 Working Party, which remain a key source 
of interpretation for the GDPR and the preceding 1995 Data Protection 
Directive and have proven influential in standing jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice pertaining to data protection law. It is of course 
likely that in the future the EDPB will adopt additional positions in support 
of or contradictory to the views of the Article 29 Working Party, which may 
be relevant to the analysis carried out here. 
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This Article will show that individuals are granted little 
control and oversight over how their personal data is used to 
draw inferences about them. Compared to other types of 
personal data, inferences are effectively “economy class” 
personal data in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”). Data subjects’ rights to know about (Art. 13–15), 
rectify (Art. 16), delete (Art. 17), object to (Art. 21), or port 
(Art. 20) personal data are significantly curtailed when it 
comes to inferences, often requiring a greater balance with the 
controller’s interests (e.g., trade secrets or intellectual 
property) than would otherwise be the case. Similarly, the 
GDPR provides insufficient protection against sensitive 
inferences (Art. 9) or remedies to challenge inferences or 
important decisions based on them (Art. 22(3)). 
This situation is not accidental. In standing jurisprudence, 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)3 and the Advocate 
General (“AG”)4 have consistently restricted the remit of data 
protection law to assessing the legitimacy of the input stage 
of personal data processing, including rectification and 
erasure of inputs, and objecting to undesired processing.5 
Critically, the ECJ has likewise made clear that data 
protection law is not intended to ensure the accuracy of 
decisions and decision-making processes involving personal 
data, or to make these processes fully transparent. In short, 
data subjects have control over how their personal data is 
collected and processed, but very little control over how it is 
evaluated. The ECJ makes clear that if the data subject 
wishes to challenge their evaluation, recourse must be sought 
 
3 See Case C–28/08 P, European Comm’n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 
E.C.R. I–6055, ¶¶ 49–50; Case C–434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. 
Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-994, ¶¶ 54–55; Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M 
and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, 
¶¶ 45–47. 
4 Case C–434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
582, ¶¶ 54–58; Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838, ¶¶ 32, 54–60.  
5 See, e.g., Case C–553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders 
van Rotterdam v. M.E.E. Rijkeboer, 2009 E.C.R. I-293, ¶¶ 48–52. 
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through sectoral laws applicable to specific cases, not data 
protection law.6 
Conflict looms on the horizon in Europe that will further 
weaken the protection afforded to data subjects against 
inferences. Current policy proposals addressing privacy 
protection—the ePrivacy Regulation and the EU Digital 
Content Directive—fail to close the GDPR’s accountability 
gaps concerning inferences. At the same time, the GDPR and 
Europe’s new Copyright Directive aim to facilitate data 
mining, knowledge discovery, and Big Data analytics by 
limiting data subjects’ rights over personal data. And lastly, 
the new Trade Secrets Directive provides extensive protection 
of commercial interests attached to the outputs of these 
processes (e.g., models, algorithms and inferences). 
This Article argues that a new data protection right, the 
“right to reasonable inferences,” is needed to help close the 
accountability gap currently posed by “high-risk inferences,” 
meaning inferences drawn through Big Data analytics that 
are privacy-invasive or reputation-damaging, or have low 
verifiability in the sense of being predictive or opinion-based 
while being used for important decisions.7 In cases where 
algorithms draw “high-risk inferences” about individuals, this 
right would require the data controller to provide ex-ante 
justification to establish that the inference to be drawn is 
 
6 See supra note 3. 
7 “Important” in this context refers to the existence of “legal or similarly 
significant effects” resulting from a given decision. This notion is derived 
from Article 22(1) of the GDPR regarding automated decision-making. See 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 
O.J. (L119) art. 22(1). The precise scope of “legal or similarly significant 
effects” remains unclear in practice, though it will be clarified as the GDPR 
matures via legal commentary, national implementation, and 
jurisprudence. See generally Sandra Wachter, Normative Challenges of 
Identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, Profiling, Discrimination, 
and the GDPR, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 436 (2018); Sandra 
Wachter, The GDPR and the Internet of Things: A Three-Step Transparency 
Model, 10 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 266 (2018). 
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reasonable. This disclosure would address (1) why certain 
data form a normatively acceptable basis from which to draw 
inferences; (2) why these inferences are relevant and 
normatively acceptable for the chosen processing purpose or 
type of automated decision; and (3) whether the data and 
methods used to draw the inferences are accurate and 
statistically reliable. The ex-ante justification would be 
bolstered by an additional ex-post mechanism enabling 
unreasonable inferences to be challenged. A right to 
reasonable inferences must, however, be reconciled with EU 
jurisprudence and counterbalanced with intellectual property 
(“IP”) and trade secrets law, as well as with freedom of 
expression8 and Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights9—the freedom to conduct a business.  
Part II first examines gaps in current work on algorithmic 
accountability before reviewing the novel risks of Big Data 
analytics and algorithmic decision-making that necessitate 
the introduction of a right to reasonable inferences. For such 
a right to be feasible under data protection law, inferences 
must be shown to be personal data. Part III reviews the 
position of the Article 29 Working Party on the legal status of 
inferences. Part IV then contrasts this with jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice, which paints a more restrictive 
picture of the scope of personal data and the remit of data 
protection law. Part V then assesses the current legal 
protection granted to inferences under European data 
protection laws. With the legal status and limited protection 
granted to inferences established, Part VI then describes the 
aims and scope of the proposed “right to reasonable 
inferences.” Part VII then examines barriers likely to be 
encountered in the implementation of the proposed right, 
drawing from data protection law, as well as IP law and the 
 
8 See JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, SEARCH ENGINE FREEDOM: ON THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR THE LEGAL 
GOVERNANCE OF WEB SEARCH ENGINES 316–32 (2012); see also JORIS VAN 
HOBOKEN, THE PROPOSED RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN SEEN FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF OUR RIGHT TO REMEMBER (2013). 
9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. 
(C364) 1. 
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new EU Trade Secrets Directive. In Part VIII, the Article 
concludes with recommendations on how to re-define the 
remit of data protection law to better guard against the novel 
risks of Big Data and AI. In the same way that it was 
necessary to create a “right to be forgotten” in a Big Data 
world,10 it is now necessary to create a “right on how to be 
seen.” 
II. FROM EXPLANATIONS TO REASONABLE 
INFERENCES 
Recent years have seen a flurry of work addressing 
explainability as a means to achieve accountability in 
algorithmic decision-making systems.11 This work has taken 
many forms, including calls for regulation,12 development of 
 
10 See generally VAN HOBOKEN, THE PROPOSED RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, 
supra note 8; see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF 
FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
11 See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Joshua A. 
Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Tim 
Miller, Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social 
Sciences, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 2019, at 1; Brent Mittelstadt, Chris 
Russell & Sandra Wachter, Explaining Explanations in AI, in FAT* ‘19: 
CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY (FAT* ’19), 
JANUARY 29–31, 2019, ATLANTA, GA, USA 279 (2019); S. C. Olhede & P.J. 
Wolfe, The Growing Ubiquity of Algorithms in Society: Implications, 
Impacts and Innovations, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Aug. 6, 2018, 
at 8; Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to 
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General 
Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017); Sandra 
Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations 
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841 (2018); Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, 
Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation (Berkman 
Klein Ctr. Working Grp. on Explanation and the Law Working Paper, 2017); 
see also Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity 
in Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1 
(describing sources of algorithmic opacity). 
12 See, e.g., Marion Oswald, Algorithm-Assisted Decision-Making in the 
Public Sector: Framing the Issues Using Administrative Law Rules 
Governing Discretionary Power, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Aug. 6, 
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technical methods of explanation13 and auditing 
mechanisms,14 and setting of standards for algorithmic 
accountability in public and private institutions.15 These 
diverse streams of work are essential in the quest to increase 
AI accountability and fortunately have made much progress 
in legal, ethical, policy, and technical terms. Yet each is still 
united by a common blind spot: a legal or ethical basis is 
required to justify demands for explanations and determine 
their required content.16 As a result, much of the prior work 
on methods, standards, and other scholarship around 
explanations will be valuable in an academic or 
developmental sense, but will fail to actually help the 
intended beneficiaries of algorithmic accountability: people 
affected by algorithmic decisions. 
Unfortunately, there is little reason to assume that 
organizations will voluntarily offer full explanations covering 
the process, justification for, and accuracy of algorithmic 
decision-making unless obliged to do so. These systems are 
often highly complex, involve (sensitive) personal data, and 
 
2018, at 1, 3; Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 
(2017).  
13 See, e.g., Mittelstadt et al., supra note 11. 
14 See, e.g., Brent Mittelstadt, Auditing for Transparency in Content 
Personalization Systems, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 4991 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, 
Essay, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
189 (2017). 
15 See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2013(INL)), EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2017)0051, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0051+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
[https://perma.cc/9H5H-W2UE]; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON 
TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PREPARING 
FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 30–34 (2016); HOUSE OF 
COMMONS SCI. & TECH. COMM., HC 351, ALGORITHMS IN DECISION-MAKING 
24–31, 39–40 (2018) (UK); Corinne Cath, Sandra Wachter, Brent 
Mittelstadt, Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi, Artificial Intelligence 
and the ‘Good Society’: The US, EU, and UK Approach, 24 SCI. & 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 505 (2018). 
16 For an exploration of norms around explanation, see Doshi-Velez et 
al., supra note 11, at 3–6. 
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use methods and models considered to be trade secrets. 
Providing explanations thus imposes additional costs and 
risks for the organization.  
Where a general legal or ethical justification for 
explanations of algorithmic decisions does not exist,17 
requests will require alternative grounds to be successful.18 
This Article refers to these potential grounds for demanding 
information about an automated decision-making process as 
legal or ethical “decision-making standards.” Such standards 
define certain procedures that must be followed in particular 
decision-making processes and can be enshrined in individual 
rights, sectoral laws, or other regulatory instruments.  
Decision-making standards are not typically embedded in 
an absolute right that would require the full decision-making 
procedure to be disclosed; it remains, for example, within the 
private autonomy of the employer to make hiring decisions. 
Rather, decision-making standards provide grounds to 
demand limited explanations detailing the steps of a decision-
making process necessary to determine whether the 
procedures in question were followed. So, for example, a job 
applicant may have a right to certain standards being followed 
within that procedure, such as not basing the hiring decision 
on a protected attribute (e.g., ethnicity) because doing so 
would constitute discrimination.  
Nonetheless, granting explanations is only one possible 
way forward in making algorithmic decision-making 
accountable. Explanations can provide an effective ex-post 
remedy, but an explanation can be rendered only after a 
 
17 The GDPR’s right to explanation, even if legally binding, would be 
limited to decision-making based solely on automated processing with legal 
or similarly significant effects. These conditions significantly limit its 
potential applicability. See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 11, 
at 78; see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on 
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN, WP251rev.01, at 19 (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?doc_id=49826 (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
18 Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 11, at 4, for example, suggest that 
demands for explanation will not be justified unless accompanied by 
recourse for harm suffered.  
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decision has been made.19 An explanation might inform the 
individual about the outcome or decision and about 
underlying assumptions, predictions, or inferences that led to 
it. It would not, however, ensure that the decision, 
assumption, prediction, or inference is justified.20 In short, 
explanations of a decision do not equal justification of an 
inference or decision. Therefore, if the justification of 
algorithmic decisions is at the heart of calls for algorithmic 
accountability and explainability, governance requires both 
effective ex-ante and ex-post remedies. Individual-level rights 
are required that would grant data subjects the ability to 
manage how privacy-invasive inferences are drawn, and to 
seek redress against unreasonable inferences when they are 
created or used to make important decisions.  
A. The Novel Risks of Inferential Analytics and a 
Right to Reasonable Inferences 
The following Sections explain how European law is not 
equipped to protect individuals against the novel risks 
brought on by automated decision-making driven by 
inferential analytics. This Article argues that a new right—a 
right to reasonable inferences—might help to close the 
accountability gap currently posed by these technologies in 
Europe.21 
To explain why this new right is essential, it is first 
necessary to establish the source of risks in Big Data analytics 
and algorithmic decision-making systems. Automated 
decision-making, profiling, and related machine-learning 
techniques pose new opportunities for privacy-invasive, 
discriminatory, and biased decision-making based on 
 
19 See generally Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 11. 
20 See Miller, supra note 11, at 8; see also Mireille Hildebrandt, 
Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven Platforms, 2 GEO. 
L. TECH. REV. 252, 271 (2018). 
21 See Wachter, Normative Challenges of Identification in the Internet 
of Things, supra note 7, at 448; Wachter, The GDPR and the Internet of 
Things, supra note 7, at 267–71. 
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inferential analytics.22 Modern data analytics has access to 
unprecedented volumes and varieties of linked-up data to 
assess the behaviors, preferences, and private lives of 
individuals.23 Inferences can be used to nudge and manipulate 
us. The range of potential victims of these harms is diversified 
by the focus in modern data analytics on finding small but 
meaningful links between individuals,24 and constructing 
group profiles from personal, third-party, and anonymized 
data.25  
Numerous applications of Big Data analytics to draw 
potentially troubling inferences about individuals and groups 
have emerged in recent years.26 Major internet platforms are 
behind many of the highest profile examples: Facebook may 
be able to infer sexual orientation—via online behavior27 or 
 
22 See Mittelstadt et al., supra note 1, at 7–10. See generally Solon 
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 671 (2016). 
23 See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND 
THINK (2013). See also Brent Daniel Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, The 
Ethics of Big Data: Current and Foreseeable Issues in Biomedical Contexts, 
22 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 303, 304–06 (2016); Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375 
(2014). 
24 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: 
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2014); 
Peter Grindrod, Beyond Privacy and Exposure: Ethical Issues Within 
Citizen-Facing Analytics, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Dec. 28, 2016, 
at 10–12. 
25 See Alessandro Mantelero, From Group Privacy to Collective Privacy: 
Towards a New Dimension of Privacy and Data Protection in the Big Data 
Era, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 139, 145 
(Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi & Bart van der Sloot eds., 2017); Brent 
Mittelstadt, From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics, 30 
PHIL. & TECH. 475, 476 (2017). 
26 See, e.g., Christopher Kuner, Fred H. Cate, Christopher Millard & 
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Challenge of “Big Data” for Data Protection, 
2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 47 (2012). 
27 See José González Cabañas, Ángel Cuevas & Rubén Cuevas, 
Facebook Use of Sensitive Data for Advertising in Europe (Feb. 14, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.05030 [https://perma. 
cc/V2C8-FY3W]. 
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based on friends28—and other protected attributes (e.g., 
race),29 political opinions30 and sadness and anxiety31 – all of 
these inferences are used for targeted advertising. Facebook 
can also infer imminent suicide attempts,32 while third 
parties have used Facebook data to infer socioeconomic 
status33 and stances on abortion.34 Insurers are starting to 
use social media data to set premiums,35 which is troublesome 
because research suggests that a person’s social network can 
 
28 Carter Jernigan & Behram F.T. Mistree, Gaydar: Facebook 
Friendships Expose Sexual Orientation, FIRSTMONDAY.ORG (Oct. 5, 2009), 
https://firstmonday.org/ojs//index.php/fm/article/view/2611 
[https://perma.cc/AMK2-QB8U]. 
29 Annalee Newitz, Facebook’s Ad Platform Now Guesses at Your Race 




30 Jeremy B. Merrill, Liberal, Moderate or Conservative? See How 
Facebook Labels You, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/us/politics/facebook-ads-politics.html 
[https://perma.cc/QNU7-YCBZ]. 
31 Michael Reilly, Is Facebook Targeting Ads at Sad Teens?, MIT TECH. 
REV. (May 1, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604307/is-
facebook-targeting-ads-at-sad-teens/ (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). 
32 Josh Constine, Facebook Rolls Out AI to Detect Suicidal Posts Before 
They’re Reported, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/27/facebook-ai-suicide-
prevention/?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/QF62-WJEH].  
33 See Astra Taylor & Jathan Sadowski, How Companies Turn Your 
Facebook Activity into a Credit Score, THE NATION (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-companies-turn-your-facebook-
activity-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/V4V5-7H55]. 
34 See Sharona Coutts, Anti-Choice Groups Use Smartphone 
Surveillance to Target ‘Abortion-Minded Women’ During Clinic Visits, 
REWIRE (May 25, 2016), https://rewire.news/article/2016/05/25/anti-choice-
groups-deploy-smartphone-surveillance-target-abortion-minded-women-
clinic-visits/ [https://perma.cc/VE5A-D5S9]. 
35 Leslie Scism, New York Insurers Can Evaluate Your Social Media 
Use—If They Can Prove Why It’s Needed, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-insurers-can-evaluate-your-social-
media-useif-they-can-prove-why-its-needed-11548856802 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review).  
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be used to draw acute and intimate inferences about one’s 
personality.36 Tendencies to depression can be inferred 
through Facebook37 and Twitter38 usage; Google has 
attempted to predict flu outbreaks39 as well as other diseases 
and their outcomes40; and Microsoft can likewise predict 
Parkinson’s disease41 and Alzheimer’s disease42 from search 
engine interactions. Amazon’s Alexa might be able to infer 
health status based on speech patterns.43 Other recent 
 
36 See Kristen M Altenburger & Johan Ugander, Monophily in Social 
Networks Introduces Similarity among Friends-of-Friends, NATURE HUMAN 
BEHAVIOUR, Apr. 2018, at 284. 
37 See Megan A. Moreno et al., Feeling Bad on Facebook: Depression 
Disclosures by College Students on a Social Networking Site, 28 DEPRESSION 
& ANXIETY 447 (2011). 
38 See Moin Nadeem, Mike Horn, Glen Coppersmith & Sandip Sen, 
Identifying Depression on Twitter (July 25, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07384 [https://perma.cc/SKB6-
WT6K]. 
39 Donald R. Olson, Kevin J. Konty, Marc Paladini, Cecile Viboud & 
Lone Simonsen, Reassessing Google Flu Trends Data for Detection of 
Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza: A Comparative Epidemiological Study 
at Three Geographic Scales, PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY, Oct. 2013, at 
1.  
40 See Anthony Cuthbertson, Google AI Can Predict When People Will 
Die with ‘95 Per Cent Accuracy’, INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-ai-
predict-when-die-death-date-medical-brain-deepmind-a8405826.html 
[https://perma.cc/D7RR-Y2M4]; Alvin Rajkomar et al., Scalable and 
Accurate Deep Learning with Electronic Health Records, NPJ DIGITAL MED., 
May 8, 2018, at 2–4. 
41 See Ryen W. White, P. Murali Doraiswamy & Eric Horvitz, Detecting 
Neurodegenerative Disorders from Web Search Signals, NPJ DIGITAL MED., 
Apr. 23, 2018, at 1, 3; Liron Allerhand, Brit Youngmann, Elad Yom-Tov & 
David Arkadir, Detecting Parkinson’s Disease from Interactions with a 
Search Engine: Is Expert Knowledge Sufficient? 1 (May 3, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.01138 
[https://perma.cc/SF5A-4VTW].  
42 See White, Doraiswamy & Horvitz, supra note 41. 
43 James Cook, Amazon Patents New Alexa Feature That Knows When 
You’re Ill and Offers You Medicine, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/10/09/amazon-patents-new-
alexa-feature-knows-offers-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/V346-HFWE].  
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potentially invasive applications44 include Target’s prediction 
of pregnancy in customers,45 researchers inferring levels of 
user satisfaction with search results using mouse tracking,46 
and, finally, China’s far-reaching social credit scoring 
system.47  
None of these applications can claim to generate inferences 
or predictions with absolute certainty, and in several cases, 
they have suffered highly visible failures (e.g. Google Flu 
Trends).48 Many are likewise used solely for targeted 
advertising. Justification for these invasive uses of personal 
data is crucial from an ethical49 as well as legal50 viewpoint to 
 
44 For an interesting overview of applications that infer sensitive 
information, see Christopher Burr, Nello Cristianini & James Ladyman, An 
Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software Agents and Human 
Users, 28 MINDS & MACHINES 735 (2018). 
45 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-
habits.html [https://perma.cc/7Y84-6MWW]; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
CUKIER, supra note 23, at 57–58. 
46 Ye Chen, Yiqun Liu, Min Zhang & Shaoping Ma, User Satisfaction 
Prediction with Mouse Movement Information in Heterogeneous Search 
Environment, 29 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 
2470 (2017). 
47 Simon Denyer, China’s Plan to Organize Its Society Relies on ‘Big 




[https://perma.cc/Z3KP-KK2T]. For a discussion of the challenges of 
regulating uses of non-traditional data, such as data generated by Internet 
of Things devices, for credit and similar decisions, see Scott R. Peppet, 
Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014). 
48 See David Lazer, Ryan Kennedy, Gary King & Alessandro 
Vespignani, The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis, 343 
SCIENCE 1203 (2014). 
49 For ethical approaches to AI accountability and justification, see 
Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 31 PHIL. & 
TECH. 543, 548–52 (2018); Hildebrandt, supra note 20. 
50 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change? 
Enabling Big Data Through Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation, 17 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 315, 332 (2016) (considering moving away from 
consent-based data protection to governance of fair and ethical data uses); 
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avoid inferential analytics that are privacy-invasive or 
damaging to reputation, particularly when these inferences 
are poorly verifiable or affected individuals receive no benefit. 
It is thus increasingly common to deploy inferential analytics 
at scale, based solely on the ability to do so and the perceived 
accuracy of the method or a belief that efficiency or revenue 
will improve. 
From the perspective of the individual, the potential value 
and insightfulness of data generated while using digital 
technologies is often opaque. Counterintuitive and 
unpredictable inferences can be drawn by data controllers, 
without individuals ever being aware,51 thus posing risks to 
privacy52 and identity,53 data protection, reputation,54 and 
informational self-determination.55 As Tene and Polonetsky 
argue, “[i]n a big data world, what calls for scrutiny is often 
not the accuracy of the raw data but rather the accuracy of the 
 
see also Alessandro Mantelero, The Future of Consumer Data Protection in 
the E.U. Re-Thinking the “Notice and Consent” Paradigm in the New Era of 
Predictive Analytics, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 643, 653–55 (2014). 
51 See Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 23, at 312–13; Andrew D. Selbst 
& Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018). 
52 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1316–18 (2012); see also Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven 
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017). 
53 Luciano Floridi, The Informational Nature of Personal Identity, 21 
MINDS & MACHINES 549, 550 (2011); Mittelstadt, supra note 25, at 476. 
54 Sandra Wachter, Privacy: Primus Inter Pares―Privacy as a 
Precondition for Self-Development, Personal Fulfilment and the Free 
Enjoyment of Fundamental Human Rights (Jan. 22, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2903514 [https://perma.cc/R 
LB3-G6SC]. 
55 Urteil des Ersten Senats vom BVerfG [Volkszählungsurteil’], ’15, 
Dezember 1983, 1 BvR 209/83 (Ger.), https://openjur.de/u/268440.html 
[https://perma.cc/DRS7-HNRZ]; Judgement of German Constitutional 
Court, BVerfG · Urteil vom 15. Dezember 1983 · Az. 1 BvR 209/83, 1 BvR 
484/83, 1 BvR 420/83, 1 BvR 362/83, 1 BvR 269/83, 1 BvR 440/83 
(Volkszählungsurteil). For a critical voice on this subject see Jan Klabbers, 
The Right to Be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law, 
28 HUM. RTS. Q. 186 (2006). 
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inferences drawn from the data.”56 The Article 29 Working 
Party has recognised a similar challenge, arguing that, 
“[m]ore often than not, it is not the information collected in 
itself that is sensitive, but rather, the inferences that are 
drawn from it and the way in which those inferences are 
drawn, that could give cause for concern.”57 The European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has likewise expressed 
concern over the privacy risks of inferences and the need for 
governance.58 Similarly, NGOs and activist groups are aware 
of these concerns and have recently submitted numerous 
complaints to fight for more clarity on the legal and ethical 
acceptability of inferential analytics.59 
The unpredictability of the analytics behind automated 
decision-making and profiling can itself be harmful to 
individuals. As noted in jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECHR”)60, the use of untraditional data 
 
56 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 270 
(2013) (emphasis in original). 
57 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose 
Limitation, at 47, 00569/13/EN, WP203 (Apr. 2, 2013), 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6PC-825X]. 
58 See European Data Prot. Supervisor, EDPS Opinion on Online 
Manipulation and Personal Data at 5, 8–16, Opinion 3/2018 (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-
19_online_manipulation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KJ6-VSUD]. 
59 Johnny Ryan, Regulatory Complaint Concerning Massive, Web-Wide 
Data Breach by Google and Other “Ad Tech” Companies Under Europe’s 
GDPR, BRAVE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.brave.com/blog/ 
adtech-data-breach-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/3DFW-JZTX]; Our 
Complaints against Acxiom, Criteo, Equifax, Experian, Oracle, Quantcast, 
Tapad, PRIVACY INT’L (Nov. 8, 2018), http://privacyinternational.org/ 
advocacy-briefing/2426/our-complaints-against-acxiom-criteo-equifax-
experian-oracle-quantcast-tapad (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review); Privacy International Files Complaints Against Seven Companies 
for Wide-Scale and Systematic Infringements of Data Protection Law, 
PRIVACY INT’L (Nov. 8, 2018), http://privacyinternational.org/press-
release/2424/privacy-international-files-complaints-against-seven-
companies-wide-scale-and (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).  
60 For an overview on the jurisprudence on the right of privacy of the 
ECHR to 2017, see Council of Europe, Case Law of the European Court of 
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sources to make unpredictable and counterintuitive 
inferences about people can impact on the freedom of 
expression, the right to privacy and identity,61 and self-
determination of individuals.62 The ECHR has a long-
standing tradition of linking the right to personality to the 
right of privacy.63 This link suggests that, to remain in control 
of their identity in the face of uncertainty, data subjects may 
alter their behavior (e.g. self-censorship) when using digital 
technologies.64 Such chilling effects linked to automated 
decision-making and profiling undermine self-determination 
and freedom of expression and thus warrant more control over 
the inferences that can be drawn about an individual. Without 
greater control, inferences can operate as “an autonomy 
trap.”65 Therefore, there is also a public and collective interest 
in the protection of privacy.66 
 
Human Rights Concerning the Protection of Personal Data, T-PD(2017)23 
(2017), https://rm.coe.int/case-law-on-data-protection/1680766992 
[https://perma.cc/H4F2-9WVZ].  
61 For an in-depth discussion on identity and profiling, see PROFILING 
THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008); 
Antoinette Rouvroy, Privacy, Data Protection, and the Unprecedented 
Challenges of Ambient Intelligence, 2 STUD. ETHICS, L., & TECH. 1, 3–4 
(2008). 
62 Nora Ni Loideain, Surveillance of Communications Data and Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in RELOADING DATA 
PROTECTION 183, 199–200, 202–03 (Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes & Paul 
De Hert eds., 2014); Wachter, supra note 54, at 5. 
63 See generally Wachter, supra note 54. For a critical view on 
guidelines of the Council of Europe’s new privacy guidelines, see Alessandro 
Mantelero, Regulating Big Data. The Guidelines of the Council of Europe in 
the Context of the European Data Protection Framework, 33 COMP. L. & 
SECURITY REV. 584 (2017). 
64 PEN AMERICA, CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA SURVEILLANCE DRIVES U.S. 
WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR 3–4 (2013); Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: 
Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2769645 [https://perma.cc/FGW8-
WMVP]. 
65 Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the 
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of 
Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 35 (2002–03). 
66 See generally Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy as a Common Good in the 
Digital World, 5 INFO., COMM’N. & SOC’Y 382 (2002). 
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The tendency in mature information societies67 to create, 
share, sell, and retain data, profiles, and other information 
about individuals presents additional challenges. Persistent 
records can be created through inferential analytics, 
consisting of unpredictable and potentially troubling 
inferences revealing information and predictions about 
private life, behaviors, and preferences that would otherwise 
remain private.68 Compared to prior human and bureaucratic 
decision-making, the troubling change posed by the 
widespread deployment of Big Data analytics is that the 
profile or information “at the basis of the choice architecture 
offered” to individuals need not be held and used by a single 
third-party for a specific purpose, but rather “persists over 
time, travels with the person between systems and affects 
future opportunities and treatment at the hands of others.”69 
These tendencies contribute to the solidification of identity 
and reputation, undermining the individual’s right “to be 
allowed to experiment with one’s own life, to start again, 
without having records that mummify one’s personal identity 
forever.”70 Inferential analytics thus pose substantial and 
novel risks not only to identity, but to reputation and the 
choices offered to an individual by data-driven services. 
While the potential harms of inferences have been 
recognized by European legal scholars and policy-makers, 
data protection law and its procedural approach have not yet 
caught up. Data subjects receive little help in coming to terms 
with the informativeness of the data they provide to 
controllers, who are generally not legally obligated to disclose 
or justify their criteria and methods used to draw inferences 
and make decisions based upon them.71 Rather, the default 
procedural approach in European data protection law to 
 
67 Luciano Floridi, Mature Information Societies—a Matter of 
Expectations, 29 PHIL. & TECH. 1, 1 (2016). 
68 See generally Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 23. 
69 Mittelstadt, supra note 25, at 482. 
70 Luciano Floridi, Four Challenges for a Theory of Informational 
Privacy, 8 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 109, 112 (2006). 
71 See infra Part IV. See generally Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 56 
(arguing that decision-making criteria of companies should be disclosed). 
  
514 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
protect the privacy of individuals is to grant oversight and 
control over how personal data is collected and processed. In 
other words, data protection law focuses primarily on 
mechanisms to manage the input side of processing. As will be 
explained below,72 the few mechanisms in European data 
protection law that address the outputs of processing, 
including inferred and derived data, profiles, and decisions, 
are far weaker.  
In the age of Big Data analytics, a myopic focus on input 
data in data protection law is troubling. The outputs of 
processing pose risks to individuals, yet data subjects are 
granted far less control over how these outputs are produced 
and used. Currently, individuals are not guaranteed 
awareness of potentially problematic decision-making and 
will often lack a legal basis to examine the decision-making 
process for problems in the first place. This situation is a 
result of the uncertain legal status of inferences and the scope 
of applicable control mechanisms in data protection law. 
Transparency and consent mechanisms designed to manage 
input data are no longer sufficient; rather, the spread of 
inferential Big Data analytics requires a reaction in data 
protection law, by which meaningful control and choice over 
inferences and profiles are granted to data subjects.73 As 
Judge Posner eloquently argues, “A seldom-remarked 
corollary to a right to misrepresent one’s character is that 
others have a legitimate interest in unmasking the 
deception.”74 This Article argues that the introduction of a 
right to reasonable inferences is precisely the type of reaction 
required. 
 
72 See infra Parts IV, V. 
73 See Serge Gutwirth & Paul De Hert, Regulating Profiling in a 
Democratic Constitutional State, in PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 271 
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008); see also Ronald Leenes, 
Addressing the Obscurity of Data Clouds, in PROFILING THE EUROPEAN 
CITIZEN 293 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008) (also 
discussing the need for transparent decision-making processes). 
74 Richard A Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395 
(1978). 
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III. ARE INFERENCES PERSONAL DATA? 
To grant data subjects broadly applicable, non-sectoral 
rights over their inferences under data protection law, 
inferences must be seen as personal data. This Part defines 
inferences as information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person created through deduction or 
reasoning rather than mere observation or collection from the 
data subject. The type of inference discussed here are “high 
risk inferences” which are created or used by data controllers 
or third parties, are privacy-invasive or harmful to 
reputation—or have a high likelihood of being so in the 
future—or have low verifiability in the sense of being 
predictive or opinion-based while being used for important 
decisions.75 Several distinctions between “types” of personal 
data relevant to the legal status of inferences are evident in 
the GDPR itself as well as guidance issued by the Article 29 
Working Party. Article 4 of the GDPR defines personal data 
as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”76 Article 9(1) of the GDPR makes a further 
distinction between normal or non-sensitive personal data, 
and “special categories” of personal data that pertain to “racial 
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of 
genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual 
orientation[.]”77 Sensitive personal data incurs additional 
restrictions on processing under Article 9(2–4).78 If inferences 
are personal data, this distinction between sensitive and non-
 
75 See supra Section II.A; see also infra Part VI. 
76 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 4. 
77 Id. at art. 9(1). 
78 Id. at art. 9(2–4). 
  
516 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
sensitive types, and the higher standard of protection afforded 
to the former, will also apply. 
The Article 29 Working Party further distinguishes 
between provided and observed data on the one hand, and 
derived and inferred data on the other.79 Provided data 
includes any data that the data subject has directly provided 
to the data controller, for example the user’s name or email 
address.80 Observed data is also “provided by” the data 
subject, but indirectly or passively, including things such as 
location data, clicking activity, or unique aspects of a person’s 
behavior such as handwriting, keystrokes, or a particular way 
of walking or speaking.81 In contrast, derived (e.g. country of 
residency derived from the subject’s postcode) and inferred 
data (e.g. credit score, outcome of a health assessment, results 
of a personalization or recommendation process) are not 
“provided by” the data subject actively or passively, but rather 
created by a data controller or third party from data provided 
by the data subject and, in some cases, other background 
data.82 The Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines on data 
portability provide examples of personal data derived from 
non-traditional sources, such as data produced “from the 
observation of [a user’s] behaviour,” including clicking or 
browsing behavior and the inferences drawn from it.83 
Additionally, their guidelines on profiling and automated 
decision-making argue that “profiling . . . works [by] creating 
derived or inferred data about individuals – ‘new’ personal 
 
79 Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 8; Article 29 Data 
Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, 16/EN, 
WP242rev.01, at 9–11 (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44099 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
80 Id. at 9. 
81 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept 
of Personal Data, 01248/07/EN WP136, at 8 (June 20, 2007) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review).  
82 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 79, at 10–11. 
83 See id at 10, 10 n.20, 21. Note that inferences are not covered by 
Article 20, but rather by Article 15. 
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data that has not been provided directly by the data subjects 
themselves.”84 Clearly, if inferences can be considered 
personal data, they are of the latter type: derived or inferred.85 
A. Three-Step Model 
To determine whether data is “personal data,” the Article 
29 Working Party86 has proposed a three-step model. 
According to this model, the content, purpose, or result87 of 
the data (processing) must relate to an identifiable person 
either directly or indirectly.88 This approach allows for non-
personal data to be transformed into personal data through 
linkage to an identified individual.89 For example, the value 
of a house can become personal data used to assess 
individuals, such as the amount of their tax obligations.90 Due 
to technical affordances, some commentators have argued 
 
84 See supra note 17, at 9; see also note 79, at 9–10 (referring to 
“observed data” such as “activity logs, history of website usage or search 
activities”). 
85 See Martin Abrams, The Origins of Personal Data and its 
Implications for Governance (Nov. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510927 
 [https://perma.cc/9YZ5-FT96] (discussing the differences between derived 
and inferred data). 
86 See generally Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party supra note 81; for 
an overview of EU jurisprudence on the definition of personal data, see 
Nadezhda Purtova, The Law of Everything. Broad Concept of Personal Data 
and Future of EU Data Protection Law, 10 LAW INNOVATION & TECH 40 
(2018). 
87 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 79, at 10 
(defining purpose as “to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the 
status or behaviour of an individual”). 
88 See id. at 11. 
89 For an excellent overview of the concept of personal data, see Douwe 
Korff, Data Protection Laws in the EU: The Difficulties in Meeting the 
Challenges Posed by Global Social and Technical Developments (Eur. 
Comm’n. Directorate-General Justice, Freedom & Sec., Working Paper No. 
2, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638949 
[https://perma.cc/8JUL-5S6L]. 
90 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81, at 9. 
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that it is difficult to locate data that cannot potentially be 
transformed into personal data.91 
The third step of the model, ‘result’, is key to the legal 
status of inferences.92 The Article 29 Working Party argues 
that data being “likely to have an impact on a certain person’s 
rights and interests”93 is sufficient for it to be treated as 
personal data. In practice, this means that even if the data 
does not directly describe an identifiable person (“content”), or 
is not “used or . . . likely to be used . . . [to] evaluate, treat in a 
certain way or influence the status or behaviour”94 of the 
person (“purpose”), it can still be classified as “personal data” 
based on its potential impact on an identifiable person’s rights 
and interests (“result”).95 Information that is not directly 
readable from the data collected, but rather derived or 
inferred from it, can thus also be considered personal data.  
This conclusion is further supported by the usage of the 
term “any information” in Article 4(1) of the GDPR; identical 
language was used to define “personal data” in the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which the Article 29 Working 
Party has previously taken as evidence of legislators’ intent to 
have a very wide definition of “personal data”.96 They argue 
that personal data includes ‘subjective’ “information, 
opinions, or assessments”97 relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person in terms of content, purpose, or 
result. Further, such information does not need to be “true or 
proven.”98 This position is implicitly supported by the Article 
29 Working Party granting rights to data subjects “to access 
 
91 Stefan Ernst, Begriffsbestimmungen, in, DATENSCHUTZ-
GRUNDVERORDNUNG BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ (Boris Paal & Daniel A 
Pauly eds., 2018).  
92 See Korff, supra note 89, at 52–53 (arguing that profiles, understood 
as bundles of inferences and assumptions, should be treated as personal 
data). 
93 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81, at 11. 
94 Id. at 10. 
95 Id. at 10–11. 
96 Id. at 4. 
97 Id. at 6. 
98 Id. 
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that information and to challenge it through appropriate 
remedies,”99 for example by providing additional 
comments.100 Several other guidelines issued by the Working 
Party similarly argue that certain individual rights apply to 
inferred and derived data, which by definition means these 
must be personal data.101 
B. Subjectivity and Verifiability 
Inferences are often precisely these types of subjective and 
non-verifiable “information, opinions, or assessments”102 
created by a third-party through more than mere observation 
of the data subject. Several examples of such subjective or 
non-verifiable personal data are provided by the Article 29 
 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 6 n.5. 
101 See Guidelines, supra note 17, at 17–18. Guidelines clarifies that the 
rights to rectification, erasure, and restriction of processing apply to 
inferred and derived data. Id.; see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 
supra note 81, at 11. Here, following the text of Article 20(1) of the GDPR, 
they clarify that the right to data portability covers only data “provided by” 
the data subject: “a personalisation or recommendation process, by user 
categorisation or profiling are data which are derived or inferred from the 
personal data provided by the data subject, and are not covered by the right 
to data portability.” Derived and inferred data thus do not fall within the 
scope of data portability. In practice, this means that Art. 20 only covers 
data provided by the data subject or observed by the controller but not the 
profile itself or other inferred and derived data. This could be taken to 
suggest that derived and inferred data are not a type of personal data on 
the basis that an individual data protection right (Art. 20), which by 
definition applies to personal data, does not apply to these types of data. 
This interpretation is incorrect. Footnote 20 accompanying the preceding 
quote clarifies that although Art. 20 does not apply, Art. 15 and 22 still 
apply to inferred and derived data. By definition, for these other Articles to 
apply, the data being processed needs to be personal data. The Guidelines 
therefore endorse classifying inferred and derived data as personal data, 
albeit indirectly. These limits on data portability are sensible, as the right 
is designed as a competition tool, not a data privacy tool. See also Paul De 
Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Gianclaudio Malgieri, Laurent Beslay & 
Ignacio Sanchez, The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards User-
Centric Interoperability of Digital Services, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY 
REV. 193 (2018). 
102 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81, at 6. 
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Working Party. Concerning subjectivity, examples of 
subjective assessments are provided for several sectors: in 
banking, “assessment of the reliability of borrowers (“Titius is 
a reliable borrower”); in insurance (“Titius is not expected to 
die soon”) or in employment (“Titius is a good worker and 
merits promotion”).”103 Such subjective third-party 
assessments can be considered a type of inference, as the 
assessment involves inferring a non-observed characteristic 
or subjective opinion of the subject from data already held104 
Concerning non-verifiability, a second example is provided 
of a child’s drawing depicting her family and her mood 
towards them.105 Such a drawing, although created by the 
child, can allow for information about the behaviors of the 
child’s parents to be inferred. As a result, the drawing itself, 
and any information about her parents’ behavior inferred 
from it, is classified as the parents’ personal data. Such 
inferences are not necessarily verifiable, and are subjective 
due to interpretation being required to derive information 
about the parents’ behaviors.106 
Each of these examples shows that the Article 29 Working 
Party believes opinions and assessments, understood here as 
inferences, do not need to be objective or verifiable to be 
considered personal data. Several legal commentators have 
reached similar conclusions. Ernst, for example, argues that 
predictions and inferences about a data subject constitute 
personal data irrespective of their timeframe or whether they 
address the past, present, or future.107 By definition, 
predictions cannot be verified at the time they are made, but 
can nonetheless describe an identified or identifiable person. 
Klabunde similarly believes that assumptions and 
 
103 Id. 
104 For a discussion of opinions and assessments being classified as 
personal data under EU data protection law, see generally Korff, supra note 
89. 
105 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81, at 8. As 
such, the child’s parents can exercise their right of access in relation to the 
drawing. Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Ernst, supra note 91, at 14–18.  
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assessments are also personal data, irrespective of whether 
they are accurate or verifiable.108  
IV. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF JUSTICE 
While the legally non-binding guidelines of the Article 29 
Working Party clearly endorse the view that inferences are 
personal data, the legally binding jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is less generous in its 
interpretation. Even though the ECJ also believes in a broad 
interpretation of the concept of personal data, the Court has 
historically held a more restricted view of the scope of 
“personal data” and applicable rights.109 Two recent cases 
(YS. and M. and S.110, and Nowak111) are particularly relevant 
to determining the legal status of inferences and the remit of 
data protection law more broadly.  
A. Joined Cases C-141/12 and C-372/12: YS and M and 
S 
YS and M and S addressed whether an applicant has a 
right to access the legal analysis (or “information about the 
assessment and application”112) underlying a decision of legal 
residency. The ECJ’s judgement113 and the associated opinion 
 
108 Achim Klabunde, Begriffsbestimmungen, in DATENSCHUTZ-
GRUNDVERORDNUNG BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 7–8 (Eugen Ehmann & 
Martin Selmayr eds., 2017). 
109 For an in-depth overview of the ECJ’s concept of personal data, see 
Case C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] E.C.R. I-12971, ¶ 24; Joined Cases C-
465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others 
[2003] E.C.R. I-4989, ¶ 64; Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and 
Satamedia [2008] E.C.R. I-9831, ¶¶ 35, 37; Case C-524/06 Huber [2008] 
E.C.R. I-9705, ¶ 43; and Case C-553/07 Rijkeboer [2009] E.C.R. I-3889, ¶ 62. 
110 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
112 Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I- 2081, ¶ 40. 
113 For in-depth analyses of the judgment, see Evelien Brouwer & 
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Access to Personal Data and the Right to 
Good Governance During Asylum Procedures after the Cjeu’s YS. and M. and 
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of the Advocate General114 in this case suggest a troubling 
direction of travel for the protection of data subjects for three 
reasons: (1) the limited scope of personal data; (2) the limited 
rights of access and rectification; and (3) the view that data 
protection law does not aim to ensure accurate or lawful 
decision-making, and thus does not govern how inferences are 
drawn in decision-making processes.  
1. Inferences as Personal Data  
The ECJ ruled “that the data relating to the applicant for 
a residence permit contained in the minute [a document 
containing the reasoning of the case officer] and, where 
relevant, the data in the legal analysis contained in the 
minute are ‘personal data’ within the meaning of that 
provision, whereas, by contrast, that analysis cannot in itself 
be so classified.”115 This ruling indicates that only the 
personal data contained or used within the legal analysis, but 
not the analysis itself, is personal data subject to protection 
under the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Specifically, the 
ECJ noted that only the “name, date of birth, nationality, 
gender, ethnicity, religion and language of the applicant,”116 
or only data that is “about” the data subject are personal 
data.117 
This judgement is interesting because historically the 
Court has been predominantly asked to rule on the legal 
status of observations or verifiable data (e.g. “facts” about a 
person), not assessments or non-verifiable data.118 Examples 
 
S. Judgment, 17 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 259 (2015); Xavier Tracol, Back to 
Basics: The European Court of Justice Further Defined the Concept of 
Personal Data and the Scope of the Right of Data Subjects to Access It, 31 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 112 (2015); see also Purtova, supra note 86. 
114 See generally supra note 4. 
115 See Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I- 2081, ¶ 48. 
116 Id. ¶ 38. 
117 See Purtova, supra note 86, at 28. 
118 Of course, one must keep in mind that the Court can only rule on 
the cases referred to it, and thus the Court has no power to take views that 
fall outside the cases it considers.  
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of personal data named in prior judgements include 
“telephone [numbers], and information about his/her working 
conditions or hobbies,”119 “the surname and given name of 
certain natural persons whose income exceeds certain 
thresholds” as well as “their earned and unearned income,”120 
“IP addresses,”121 “fingerprints,”122 “record of working time . . 
. and . . . rest periods,”123 “data . . . collected by . . . private 
detectives,”124 “image of a person recorded by a camera,”125 
“tax data,”126 and “press releases.”127  
In contrast, in YS and M and S, the ECJ addressed 
whether legal analysis can be considered personal data. This 
determination is incredibly relevant for the legal status of 
inferences. A legal analysis is comparable to an analysis of 
personal data where new data is derived or inferred. Such 
analysis can consist of multiple inferences connected to an 
identified or identifiable individual (i.e. assessment of how the 
 
119 Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 
E.C.R. I-12992.  
120 Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy & Satamedia Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-09831. 
121 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-12006; Case 
C‑582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2016 E.C.R. I-779 
(stating that “all the information enabling the identification” does not need 
to be in the “hands of one person”). 
122 Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, 2013 E.C.R. I-
670. 
123 Case C-342/12, Worten–Equipamentos para o Lar SA v. Autoridade 
para as Condições de Trabalho (ACT), 2013 E.C.R. I-355. 
124 Case C‑473/12, Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) 
v. Geoffrey Englebert, 2013 E.C.R. I-715. 
125 Case C-212/13, František Ryneš v. Úřad pro Ochranu Osobních 
údajů, 2014 E.C.R. I-2428, ¶ 22.  
126 Case C-201/14, Smaranda Bara and Others v. Preedintele Casei 
Naionale de Asigurări de Sănătate, 2015 E.C.R. I-638, ¶ 29. 
127 LARAINE LAUDATI, EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE, SUMMARIES OF EU 
COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO DATA PROTECTION 2000–2015, at 32 (2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/caselaw_2001_ 
2015_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLF9-XBMG] (discussing Case T-259/03, 
Kalliopi Nikolaou v. Comm’n of the European Communities, 2007 E.C.R. I-
254). 
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law applies to a case), leading to a final opinion, result, or 
inference (i.e. the applicant does not meet the required 
standards of residency), and followed by a decision or action 
(i.e. denial of legal residency). Three issues arose: (1) is the 
legal analysis, and the inferences drawn within it, personal 
data, (2) are the final opinions, results, or inferences about an 
identifiable individual resulting from the analysis personal 
data; and (3) is the consequent decision or action personal 
data? The ECJ’s judgement makes clear that the first question 
must be answered in the negative, meaning the analysis and 
constituent inferences are not considered personal data.128 
The ECJ, as opposed to the AG, does not distinguish between 
the legal analysis and the resulting opinions, results, or 
inferences created in the processing.129 As a result, no answer 
is provided to the second question. Finally, the ECJ does not 
address the third question. 
An alternative view, potentially inspired by the AG’s 
distinction between medical analysis and results,130 could be 
that the analysis is not equivalent to inferences, but rather 
the reasoning or logic that leads to the inference. First, it must 
be noted that this distinction only appears in a footnote in the 
opinion131 and was not taken up by the ECJ in this case or in 
the Nowak case.132 Second, the reasoning leading to an 
inference might be better conceived as a cognitive process, 
while the analysis is regarded as the recorded output of the 
reasoning. It is difficult to imagine the reasoning or logic in a 
“legal analysis” not involving the creation of inferences about 
the applicant’s case. Even if one wishes to argue that this is 
not the case, meaning the legal analysis is merely the 
reasoning leading to inferences, the outcome of this Article’s 
argument would not change as the problems remain the same. 
Regardless of how broadly one defines “inference,” the rights 
 
128 Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶ 39, 48.  
129 Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838, at ¶ 49 n.40.  
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 See infra Section IV.B.1.  
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granted over inferred or derived personal data are very 
limited.133 The main concern addressed by this Article 
remains the limited rights, control, and recourse given to 
individuals over inferences, or how they are analyzed and 
assessed by third parties. 
In this regard the judgement followed the opinion of the 
Advocate General (AG).134 The AG defines legal analysis as 
“the legal classification of facts relating to an identified or 
identifiable person . . . and their assessment against the 
background of the applicable law,”135 or “the reasoning 
underlying the resolution of a question of law.”136 Based on 
this definition, legal analysis cannot be considered personal 
data, as she argues that “only information relating to facts 
about an individual can be personal data,”137 and thus a “legal 
analysis is not itself personal data.”138 
To unpack the distinction between facts (as personal data) 
and analysis, the AG used the example of information 
describing a person’s weight. Allowing that “facts” can be 
described in “objective” (e.g. kilos) or “subjective” (e.g. 
“underweight,” “obese” terms,139 she argued that that “the 
steps of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached that a 
person is ‘underweight’ or ‘obese’ are not facts, any more than 
legal analysis is.”140 As a result, legal analysis, and more 
broadly “the steps of reasoning by which [a] conclusion is 
reached”141 about an individual, cannot be considered 
personal data.142 
 
133 See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B.2, and Part V. 
134 Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838. 
135 Id. ¶ 54.  
136 Id. ¶ 59. 
137 Id. ¶ 56. 
138 Id. ¶ 61. 
139 For a discussion of objective and subjective communication of facts, 
see id. ¶ 57.  
140 Id. ¶ 58. 
141 Id. ¶ 58. 
142 Id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
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The distinction made here between describing a person as 
underweight or obese and “the steps of reasoning by which the 
conclusion is reached”143 is important for answering the 
second question. Elsewhere in the opinion, the AG suggests 
that it is unhelpful “to distinguish between ‘objective’ facts 
and ‘subjective’ analysis,”144 as “[f]acts can be expressed in 
different forms, some of which will result from assessing 
whatever is identifiable.”145 Assessments themselves, insofar 
as they can be considered a subjective expression of a fact, 
may therefore be considered personal data. Supporting this, 
the AG admits that she cannot “exclude the possibility that 
assessments and opinions may sometimes fall to be classified 
as [personal] data.”146 In this example, the AG clearly 
distinguishes between facts or outputs of an assessment 
process (i.e. an “assessment” or “opinion”), and the process 
itself (i.e. the “reasoning”).147  
The positions taken by the ECJ and AG in YS and M and 
S appear to be at odds with the view of the Article 29 Working 
Party.148 According to their three-step model, personal data is 
not limited to data about an identified or identifiable 
individual. Rather, data that has the purpose to assess the 
data subject or results in having an effect on the data subject 
must also be considered personal data. In her opinion, the AG 
even refers to the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines on the 
concept of personal data (which she notes are not legally 
binding). She explains that the Article 29 Working Party 
document only attributes personal data status to “results of a 
medical analysis,”149 but leaves open how the analysis or 
reasoning leading to the assessment should be classified. 
 
143 Id. ¶ 58.  
144 Id. ¶ 57.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 See id ¶¶ 57–59. (“However, the steps of reasoning by which the 
conclusion is reached that a person is ‘underweight’ or ‘obese’ are not facts, 
any more than legal analysis is,” and “[t]he explanation itself is not 
information relating to an identified or identifiable person.”). 
148 See supra Part III.  
149 Id. ¶ 49, n.40 (emphasis in original).  
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Interestingly enough, the AG also leaves open how results of 
the analysis (the second question) should be classified, even 
though it seems highly unlikely that the outputs of analysis 
underlying a residency decision (i.e. inferences about the 
application) and the decision itself are not considered personal 
data. 
The AG’s definition of personal data as “facts about an 
individual,”150 and the irrelevance of whether such facts are 
stated in objective or subjective terms, suggests that the she 
views verifiability as a necessary component of personal data. 
A troubling sort of test for personal data based upon 
verifiability can be inferred, wherein assessments and 
opinions can be classified as personal data only if they meet 
some unnamed threshold, or are sufficiently based upon 
verifiable facts to be considered a “subjective statement” of 
these facts. Where this threshold lies remains unclear. 
2. Remit of Data Protection Law  
Another troubling aspect of the ruling is the position taken 
by the ECJ on the remit of data protection law. The ECJ 
argued that the purpose of data protection law is not to assess 
the accuracy of decision-making processes involving personal 
data. On this basis, the applicants’ requests for access were 
denied, as their intention was to assess the accuracy of an 
assessment of personal data. Rather than being provided by 
data protection law, the ECJ argued that other laws 
applicable to the specific case should be consulted to assess 
whether the decision-making procedure is accurate. 
Specifically, the ECJ stated that:  
In contrast to the data relating to the applicant for a 
residence permit which is in the minute and which 
may constitute the factual basis of the legal analysis 
contained therein, such an analysis . . . is not in itself 
liable to be the subject of a check of its accuracy by 
that applicant and a rectification under Article 12(b) 
of Directive 95/46 . . . extending the right of access of 
the applicant for a residence permit to that legal 
 
150 Id. ¶ 56. 
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analysis would not in fact serve the directive’s purpose 
of guaranteeing the protection of the applicant’s right 
to privacy with regard to the processing of data 
relating to him, but would serve the purpose of 
guaranteeing him a right of access to administrative 
documents, which is not however covered by Directive 
95/46.151 
YS and M and S is not the first time that the ECJ has 
claimed that data protection law (when personal data is 
processed by community institutions and bodies), and the 
right of access in particular, is not designed to provide access 
to or facilitate assessments of the accuracy for decision-
making processes.152 In European Commission v. Bavarian 
Lager, the ECJ ruled that:  
. . . when examining the relationship between 
Regulations Nos 1049/2001 and 45/2001 for the 
purpose of applying the exception under Article 4(1)(b) 
of Regulation No 1049/2001 to the case in point, it 
must be borne in mind that those regulations have 
different objectives. The first is designed to ensure the 
greatest possible transparency of the decision-making 
process of the public authorities and the information 
on which they base their decisions. It is thus designed 
to facilitate as far as possible the exercise of the right 
of access to documents, and to promote good 
administrative practices. The second is designed to 
ensure the protection of the freedoms and 
fundamental rights of individuals, particularly their 
private life, in the handling of personal data.153  
In YS and M and S, the ECJ referred to Bavarian Lager 
and explained the overall aim, remit and purpose of data 
protection law 
Regulation No 45/2001 is not designed to ensure the 
greatest possible transparency of the decision-making 
 
151 Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 45–46.  
152 See Case C-28/08 P, European Comm’n v. Bavarian Lager, 2010 
E.C.R. I-6055.  
153 Id. ¶ 49. 
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process of the public authorities and to promote good 
administrative practices by facilitating the exercise of 
the right of access to documents. That finding applies 
equally to Directive 95/46, which, in essence, has the 
same objective as Regulation No 45/2001.154  
Thus, data protection law in general, and the right of 
access in particular, are not designed to provide full 
transparency in decision-making involving personal data, or 
to guarantee “good administrative practices.”155  
These particular limits on the right of access are not one-
off. In College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam 
v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, the ECJ ruled that the right of access is 
limited to providing information regarding the scope of data 
undergoing processing (which is necessary to rectify or erase 
this data), to verify the lawfulness of processing, or to object 
to processing.156 They covered similar territory in YS and M 
and S, arguing that full access to personal data does not need 
to be granted under the right of access.157 Rather, as the ECJ 
held in YS and M and S, “it is sufficient that the applicant be 
in possession of a full summary of those data in an intelligible 
form, that is to say a form which allows that applicant to 
become aware of those data and to check that they are 
accurate and processed in compliance with that directive[.]”158  
The AG, like the ECJ, views the remit of data protection 
law in a very limited way. She views legal analysis as not 
falling “within the sphere of an individual’s right to 
privacy,”159 and cannot see a “reason to assume that that 
individual is himself uniquely qualified to verify and rectify it 
 
154 Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶ 47. 
155 Id. 
156 Case C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van 
Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, 2009 E.C.R. I-3889, ¶¶ 51–52. 
157 Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶ 44. 
158 Id. ¶ (70)2. 
159 Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en, 2013 E.C.R. I-838, ¶ 60. 
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and ask that it be erased or blocked.”160 She does admit that 
data subjects have a valid interest in “knowing exactly what 
circumstances were relevant to the decision taken,”161 but 
believes this interest does not fall under the scope of data 
protection law because it does not “cover opinions and other 
measures taken during the preparation and investigation” of 
a case.162 Instead, review of “the decision for which . . . legal 
analysis was prepared”163 should be left to a relevant 
“independent judicial authority.”164 Data subjects are thus 
seen to have a valid interest in the accuracy of decisions taken 
about them, but lack an equivalent right of review. 
This is a very troubling view and relates to the discussion 
above of legal and ethical decision-making standards.165 First, 
a legal analysis contains the (interim) inferences, 
assumptions or opinions underlying final inferences and 
subsequent decisions. Excluding access and review of such 
analysis from the scope of data protection law means data 
subjects are unable to assess how potentially highly impactful 
inferences and decisions are made about them,166 unless 
relevant sectoral laws allow them to do so.  
Second, requiring only a summary of personal data 
undergoing processing to be shared with the data subject via 
the right of access severely limits the data subject’s ability to 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. ¶ 36. 
162 Id. ¶ 32. 
163 Id. ¶ 60. 
164 Id. 
165 See supra Part II. 
166 See Douwe Korff, The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation: 
Suggested Amendments to the Definition of Personal Data, EU LAW 
ANALYSIS (Oct. 15, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/10/the-
proposed-general-data-protection.html [https://perma.cc/SRY9-JDW8]; 
Robert Madge, Five Loopholes in the GDPR, MEDIUM (Aug. 27, 2017), 
https://medium.com/mydata/five-loopholes-in-the-gdpr-367443c4248b 
[https://perma.cc/L8EM-8YPM]; Steve Peers, Data Protection Rights and 
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assess lawfulness of data processing and the accuracy of their 
personal data used to make the decision.  
Third, the limited remit of data protection law is alarming. 
It might be the case that generally applicable decision-making 
standards exist in the public sector based on democratic 
legitimacy,167 but comparable broadly applicable standards 
are less likely to govern the private sector. Even though the 
decision-making autonomy of private entities is bound by 
certain laws (e.g. anti-discrimination law), companies are less 
likely than the public sector to have legally binding 
procedures or rules they need to follow when making 
decisions. The spread of Big Data analytics and the resulting 
increase in the capacity of data controllers to infer information 
about the private lives of individuals, modify and solidify their 
identity, and affect their reputation, suggest that a higher 
level of protection is required than has previously been the 
case for human and bureaucratic decision-making. 
Thus, according to the ECJ, when a private company draws 
inferences from collected data or makes decisions based on 
them, even if the final inferences or decisions are seen as 
personal data, data subjects are unable to rectify them under 
data protection law. Data subjects also lack access to the 
reasoning underlying the decisions, which is not considered 
personal data, as well as means to rectify the analysis under 
data protection law. 
B. Case C-434/16: Nowak 
The ECJ’s view in YS and M and S seems to be partly at 
odds with its later ruling in Peter Nowak v. Data Protection 
Commissioner168 in December 2017. In the case, an exam 
candidate (Mr. Nowak) requested to exercise his right of 
access and “correction” in relation to his marked exam 
script.169 As with YS and M and S, the case centered on the 
 
167 See generally De Hert & Gutwirth, supra note 73, at 271, 276–77. 
168 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 60; see also Purtova, supra note 86, at 66–67. 
169 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
582, ¶¶ 9–13.  
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question of whether opinions and assessments, in this case an 
exam script and the comments of an assessor, constitute 
personal data.  
1. Inferences as Personal Data  
The ECJ determined that both the exam script and 
comments of the assessor are the candidate’s personal data. 
In making this determination, the ECJ referred to a broad 
definition of personal data, which includes data “in the form 
of opinions and assessments, provided that it ‘relates’ to the 
data subject.”170 Specifically, the Court determined that an 
opinion or assessment that is “linked to a particular person” 
by “reason of its content, purpose or effect” counts as personal 
data.171 Both the answers provided by the candidate and the 
comments made by an assessor on the exam script were 
deemed personal data on this basis.172 The ECJ argued that 
the assessment, comments and evaluation of the candidate 
can have an “effect” on him and his private life, and are thus 
his personal data.173 It is worth noting, however, that exam 
questions were not considered the candidate’s personal 
data.174 
The AG held a similar view, arguing that “the personal 
data incorporated in an examination script is not confined to 
the examination result, the mark achieved or even points 
scored for certain parts of an examination. That marking 
merely summarises the examination performance, which is 
recorded in detail in the examination script itself.”175 
The ECJ also considered whether the interests of other 
parties can influence the classification of data as personal 
data. They responded in the negative, arguing that the fact 
 
170 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 34.  
171 Id. ¶¶  34–35.  
172 Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. ¶ 58.  
175 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
582, ¶ 27. 
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that the assessment of the assessor also constitutes his or her 
personal data cannot block classification of the assessment as 
the candidate’s personal data.176 Further, both the ECJ and 
AG argued that the fact that certain rights like the right of 
access or rectification might be exercised due to the 
classification of the exam answers and the comments as 
personal data is, in fact, irrelevant to making such a 
classification, even if their exercise would otherwise be 
thought undesirable.177 The status of personal data should 
therefore not be denied based on the data subject potentially 
exercising the right of rectification in an unintended way (i.e. 
correcting answers after the fact).  
2. Remit of Data Protection Law  
While the ECJ acknowledged in Nowak that opinions and 
assessments can be personal data, they did however note that 
the ability to fully exercise relevant individual data protection 
rights does not automatically follow from this classification. 
Rather, the ECJ argued that the scope of the rights attached 
to personal data have to be interpreted teleologically, with 
reference to both the aims of data protection law and the 
purpose for which the data was collected and processed.178 In 
other words, the scope of data protection rights must be 
interpreted contextually, or with reference to the specific 
purposes for which data was collected, and the broader aims 
of data protection law. This means that the reason for which 
this data is collected defines the data protection rights. In this 
context, someone was asking to be assessed, and therefore the 
situation is inherently antagonistic, which means that the 
data subject cannot rectify how they are being assed, apart 
from ensuring that their input data was complete. 
 
176 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 44. 
177 Id. ¶ 46; Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 
E.C.R. I-582, ¶¶ 31, 34. 
178 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 53. 
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For an exam script, the rights of access and rectification 
should not result in the candidate being allowed to correct 
answers a posteriori.179 A sensible use of the right of 
rectification in this context allows the candidate to discover 
whether 
by mistake, the examination scripts were mixed up in 
such a way that the answers of another candidate 
were ascribed to the candidate concerned, or that some 
of the cover sheets containing the answers of that 
candidate are lost, so that those answers are 
incomplete, or that any comments made by an 
examiner do not accurately record the examiner’s 
evaluation of the answers of the candidate 
concerned.180 
Thus, the right of rectification was not taken to cover the 
content of the assessor’s comments, which can be understood 
as a type of inference about the candidate’s performance based 
on his answers.181  
The AG’s opinion aligned closely with the ECJ on the 
teleological interpretation of data protection rights. The AG 
argued that allowing the candidate to rectify answers after 
 
179 Id. ¶ 51–52.  
180 Id. ¶ 54. 
181 Id. ¶ 56 (“In so far as written answers submitted by a candidate at 
a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with 
respect to those answers are therefore liable to be checked for, in particular, 
their accuracy and the need for their retention, within the meaning of 
Article 6(1)(d) and (e) of Directive 95/46, and may be subject to rectification 
or erasure, under Article 12(b) of the directive, the Court must hold that to 
give a candidate a right of access to those answers and to those comments, 
under Article 12(a) of that directive, serves the purpose of that directive of 
guaranteeing the protection of that candidate’s right to privacy with regard 
to the processing of data relating to him (see, a contrario, judgment of 17 
July 2014, YS and Others, C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, 
paragraphs 45 and 46)[.]”). This could give the impression that the 
assessment also falls under the right of rectification. However, considering 
the examples provided for a sensible use of rectification, see Case C-434/16, 
Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-994, ¶ 45, and the general 
goal of data protection—assessing the lawfulness of data processing—it is 
inconceivable that the right to rectification would also apply to the 
comments of the assessor. 
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completing the exam would be nonsensical, as the purpose for 
which the data was collected was to evaluate the candidate’s 
performance.182 Rather, to be sensible, the right to 
rectification must be limited to assessments of whether the 
“script inaccurately or incompletely recorded the examination 
performance of the data subject. For example . . . [if] the script 
of another examination candidate had been ascribed to the 
data subject, which could be shown by means of, inter alia, the 
handwriting, or if parts of the script had been lost.”183 
While the AG acknowledged that assessments (i.e. the 
assessor’s comments) can be personal data,184 she remained 
dubious about the applicability of “a right of rectification, 
erasure or blocking of inaccurate data, under data protection 
legislation, in relation to corrections made by the 
examiner.”185 This narrower view is based on the AG’s doubt 
“that comments made on the script could in fact refer to 
another script or not reflect the examiner’s opinion,”186 as “[i]t 
is precisely that opinion that the comments are meant to 
record.”187 Rectification would therefore be inappropriate, as 
“such comments would not be wrong or in need of correction 
even if the evaluation recorded in them were not objectively 
justified.”188 Here, the AG again indicates that the remit of 
data protection law is not to assess the justification behind an 
assessment or decision, in this case the mark on an exam 
script. 
In contrast to the right to rectification, the ECJ 
acknowledged that the right of access must be granted 
 
182  Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
582, ¶ 35. 
183 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 36.  
184 It is interesting to note the AG even points at the similarities 
between legal analysis and comments, and points towards the tension 
between interpretations in YS and M and S and Nowak, but ultimately 
refuses to address it. See id. ¶ 58–59.  
185 Id. ¶ 54. 
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“irrespective of whether that candidate does or does not also 
have such a right of access under the national legislation 
applicable to the examination procedure.”189 The ECJ did, 
however, explain that the right of access can be restricted by 
Member State laws or when the rights of freedoms of others 
are concerned.190 This caveat reflects the ECJ’s belief that the 
actual protection afforded by the right of access (and by 
extension, other data protection rights) must be determined 
contextually.191 
These limitations on the rights of rectification and access 
align with several of the ECJ’s prior decisions, which state 
that the remit of data protection law is not to ensure the 
accuracy of decision-making processes.192 Other data 
protection rights not involved in the case were also addressed 
in the ECJ’s judgement. The right of erasure was determined 
to be applicable to examination answers and the examiner’s 
comments after an appropriate period of time.193 The ECJ also 
explained that the candidate might have an interest that this 
data is not “being sent to third parties, or published, without 
his permission.”194 
In short, in Nowak the ECJ and AG seemingly broadened 
the scope of personal data to include opinions and 
assessments but followed their previous opinions in that only 
limited rights are granted over assessments (e.g. opinions, 
 
189 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 56.  
190 Id. ¶¶ 60–61. 
191 Id. ¶¶ 60–61. Specifically, the ECJ suggests that “Member States 
may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and 
rights provided for in, inter alia, Article 6(1) and Article 12 of that directive, 
when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard the 
rights and freedoms of others.” Id. ¶ 60. The scope of rights is thus subject 
to restriction on the basis of purpose- or case-specific risks to the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
192 See Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 45–47; Case C-28/08 
P, European Comm’n v. Bavarian Lager, 2010 E.C.R. I-06055, ¶ 49. 
193 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 55.  
194 Id. ¶ 50. 
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inferences). Further, data protection law was seen to not have 
the aim to evaluate whether these assumptions are accurate. 
Data subjects lack a right to rectify the comments (interim 
inferences) or the results of exams (final inferences) or exam 
questions.195 Rather, other applicable laws and remedies need 
to be consulted, for example through examination 
procedures.196 Finally, the remit of data protection law was 
again limited to discovery of the scope of data being processed, 
and to assess whether the processing is lawful. Assessment of 
the accuracy of inferential analytics and decision-making 
processes remains outside its scope.197 
Owing to the fact that the rights in the GDPR have to be 
interpreted teleologically, it is not unthinkable that future 
jurisprudence will grant the right to rectification in relation 
to the content of assessments and inferences. However, in 
many cases people will request an assessment (e.g. to obtain 
employment, insurance, or a loan). In such cases the aim of 
processing will be to evaluate the person, which is often an 
inherently antagonistic situation in which a right to rectify 
one’s assessment would defeat the purpose or telos of the 
assessment. Paired with the freedom of expression and 
freedom of contract, and following the ECJ’s current 
thinking,198 right to rectify inferences seems unlikely to be 
granted in such cases. 
C. Lessons from Jurisprudence of the ECJ 
The ECJ’s rulings in YS and M and S and Nowak reveal a 
significant amount about how inferences are treated in data 
protection law based on the scope of “personal data” and the 
law’s remit. The two judgements differ in their definition of 
personal data. In YS, and M and S the ECJ clearly interprets 
personal data in a limited way. Name, gender, and similar 
“facts” about a person are considered personal data, while 
 
195 Id. ¶¶ 51–55. 
196 See id.  
197 See id. ¶ 57; Case C-553/07, College van burgemeester en 
wethouders van Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, 2009 E.C.R. I-03889, ¶ 49. 
198 See supra Part IV. 
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opinions, reasoning and assessments that underlie decisions 
are not.199 The AG even went so far as to argue that only 
(verifiable) facts constitute personal data.200 In contrast, the 
ECJ determined in Nowak that opinions and assessments (i.e. 
comments of the assessor and underlying reasons for the 
mark) are personal data.201 
Both court decisions leave open whether the result of an 
assessment (e.g. the final inference, a mark) and the 
subsequent decision (e.g. to fail someone at an exam, to refuse 
legal residency) are personal data. However, in both cases it 
seems inconceivable that the final assessment and decision, 
for example the decision to refuse residency or to fail someone 
at an exam, is not personal data. This seems to be especially 
true since the ECJ in Nowak202 used the same terminology as 
the Article 29 Working Party’s three-step definition of 
personal data, which includes the output data.203  
Despite the seeming widening of the scope of the definition 
of personal data in Nowak to include inferences, this shift 
lacks power. Only limited rights over inferences are granted. 
Further, evaluation of assessments and decisions is said to be 
outside of the intended purpose of data protection law. In 
Nowak, the ECJ noted that data protection rights do not 
automatically apply, but must be interpreted according to the 
purposes for which the data was collected.204 So, for example, 
the right of access might conflict with the right to privacy of 
 
199 Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 38–39.  
200 Joined Cases C-141/12 & C-372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838, ¶ 56.  
201 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994. 
202 Id. 
203 This was even recognized by the Advocate General in YS and M. 
and S. She referred to the view of the Article 29 Working Party that the 
results of a medical analysis (regardless of verifiability) are personal data. 
See Joined Cases C-141/12 & C-372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838.  
204 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 53. 
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the assessor,205 or using the right to rectification to correct 
answers after the fact would undermine the purpose of the 
exam to assess the candidate’s performance, and thus the 
answers cannot be corrected.206 The same holds true for the 
examiner’s comments and assessment.207  
This view parts with the position adopted by the Article 29 
Working Party, according to which inferred and derived data 
enjoy the full protection of individual rights enshrined in 
Articles 15–18 and Article 21 of the GDPR.208 Specifically, the 
Working Party appears to fully extend certain individual 
rights of the GDPR to derived and inferred data, including 
non-verifiable predictions.209 This much is explicitly stated in 
relation to the Article 16 right to rectification, which is said to 
apply to “the ‘input personal data’ (the personal data used to 
create the profile) and the ‘output data’ (the profile itself or 
‘score’ assigned to the person)”, which is personal data 
relating to the person concerned.210 The rights of access 
(Article 15), erasure (Article 17), restriction of processing 
(Article 18), and objection to processing (Article 21) are also 
said to apply.211 Art. 18 is explicitly said to apply to any stage 
of the profiling process.212  
The Article 29 Working Party’s position appears to assume 
that data protection law aims to ensure accurate decision-
making, which would allow inferences to be fully accessed, 
corrected, and erased (for example, if thought to be 
irrelevant). However, this view runs against the ECJ’s 
decisions in Bavarian Lager, YS and M and S, and Nowak, 
and the AG in YS and M and S and Nowak.213 The rulings 
and opinions in these cases clarify that the remit of data 
 
205 Id. ¶¶ 44, 55, 61. 
206 Id. ¶¶ 51–53. 
207 Id. ¶¶ 54–55. 
208 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 17–19. 
209 Id. at 18. For an example of a profiling containing the prediction 
that a patient will suffer from heart disease, see id. 
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 17–19. 
212 Id. at 18. 
213 See supra Sections IV.A–B. 
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protection law is not to assess the accuracy of the reasoning 
behind decisions and assessments, or the accuracy of decisions 
and assessments themselves. Rather, other laws and 
governance mechanisms that are applicable to the specific 
case (e.g. an appeal process for residency or exam decisions) 
need to be consulted.  
Moreover, the ECJ in Bavarian Lager and YS and M and 
S and the AG in YS and M and S and Nowak made it very 
clear that data protection law does not guarantee lawful 
decision-making (e.g. a right to good administration or correct 
marking).214 The ECJ in Nowak did not disagree, even though 
reference was made to all these views. The limited way in 
which the right to rectification applies to the comments of the 
assessor was even mentioned by the ECJ in its judgment.215 
Based on these considerations and the examples of 
rectification that the court provided,216 its agreement is 
implicit. In general, the ECJ in Nowak even noted how the 
GDPR allows broader exemptions to the right of access217 and 
that Article 16 only aims to verify that the data undergoing 
processing is complete and accurate.218  
The scope of Article 16 makes sense in this regard. It would 
be an odd situation if data protection authorities were 
competent to rule on the accuracy of immigration cases or 
examination disputes. In these cases, procedures are in place 
 
214 The ECJ and AG’s views of the remit of data protection law also 
contrasts with the Article 29 Working Party’s concerns with biased and 
discriminatory decision-making in automated processing. The ECJ 
seemingly does not believe that such concerns fall within the scope of the 
GDPR. Admittedly, the judgments reviewed here were made prior to the 
GDPR coming into force in May 2018. However, in Nowak the GDPR was 
already acknowledged, so the ECJ’s views have arguably already taken it 
into account. In fact, the ECJ stated that the new framework has even more 
generous clauses to restrict data access than the old Directive. See Case C-
434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-994, ¶¶ 44, 59, 
61–62. 
215 Id ¶ 54.  
216 Id.  
217 Id ¶ 61. 
218 Id ¶ 54. 
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to deal with complaints (e.g. an examination procedure219 or a 
higher court220). However, the same cannot always be said for 
inferences that the private sector draws. It is often left to the 
private autonomy of industry to assess and evaluate people. 
Companies are relatively free in how they assess people, 
except where there are laws (e.g. anti-discrimination law) that 
limit this freedom.  
However, because the data protection rights and the scope 
of personal data have to interpreted teleologically, it is not 
impossible that data subjects might have rights to rectify 
assessments in the future. This will depend on the context. 
However, often people will ask to be assessed by others (e.g. 
for credit or loan applications) and therefore this is an 
inherent antagonistic situation where the self-perception of 
the data subject (e.g. being a reliable borrower) will not trump 
the assessment of a bank as making such a determination can 
fall within their private decision-making autonomy, freedom 
of contract, or even free speech.  
As discussed in Part II, due to companies’ widespread 
implementation of inferential analytics for profiling, nudging, 
manipulation, or automated decision-making, these “private” 
decisions can, to a large extent, impact the privacy of 
individuals. Thus, a dialogue is necessary to determine the 
point(s) at which the right to privacy weighs more than the 
private autonomy of decision-makers, and individuals should 
have a right to be reasonably assessed.  
At first glance, the ECJ’s broadening of the scope of 
personal data in Nowak compared to preceding jurisprudence 
seems to move toward higher protection standards for 
inferences.221 However, if the rights in the GDPR (e.g. Articles 
15–17) do not apply to inferred and derived data at a level 
comparable to data provided by the data subject, it cannot be 
concluded that standards for protecting inferences have 
 
219 See supra Section IV.B. 
220 See Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 45–47. 
221 See generally Purtova, supra note 86 (arguing that the data 
protection law becomes the law of everything due to the scope of “personal 
data”). 
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actually improved.222 While it appears that inferences are 
“economy-class” personal data, this conclusion is not yet fully 
justified. First, the implementation of individual rights in the 
GDPR and related European law with regards to inferences 
must be examined—it must be determined whether data 
subjects will be able to assess the accuracy or reasonableness 
of inferential analytics and related decision-making processes. 
This will be the focus of the next Part. 
V. PROTECTION AGAINST INFERENCES UNDER 
DATA PROTECTION LAW 
While the ECJ and the Article 29 Working Party disagree 
on how many data protection rights enshrined in the GDPR 
apply to inferences, other European data protection 
frameworks (i.e. the GDPR,223 Directive on the supply of 
digital content224 and the ePrivacy Regulation225) are also 
relevant to determine the full legal status of inferences in data 
protection law. This Part reviews the rights available to data 
 
222 For a general discussion, see Hildebrandt, supra note 20 (expressing 
concern that data subjects have no control over inferences). 
223 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119). 
224 Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply 




225 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of 
Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 
COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017). For an assessment of the proposal, see 
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Joris van Hoboken, Ronan Fahy, Kristina 
Irion & Max Rozendaal, An Assessment of the Commission’s Proposal on 
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subjects to manage how inferences are drawn and used to 
make decisions. In short, these frameworks offer insufficient 
protections against inferences.  
A. The Right to Know About Inferences 
Transparency rights can help individuals to know when 
and what inferences are drawn. Data subjects possess 
multiple transparency rights (Articles 13–15) under the 
GDPR, which aim to provide information about the scope and 
purposes of personal data collection and processing. In 
relation to inferences, transparency rights would inform data 
subjects about the existence and processing of inferred and 
derived personal data, or data that the data subject has not 
directly provided.226 This type of oversight is an essential 
prerequisite for exercising other rights granted by the GDPR. 
Unfortunately, the GDPR’s notification duties (Articles 13–
14) are unlikely to fulfill this aim. 
Article 13 describes numerous notification requirements 
for data controllers when they collect personal data directly 
from the data subject. At the time data is collected, the 
controller must provide the data subject with information 
about the purposes for which the data will be processed, and 
any potential third-party recipients or category of 
recipients.227 Given this timeline, Art. 13 by definition covers 
only data provided by the data subject, including observed 
data.228 Subsequently inferred or derived data thus cannot be 
included in the disclosure to the data subject as it has not yet 
been created. 
In contrast, Article 14, which addresses notification 
requirements for personal data obtained from a third party, 
may be more helpful. Within one month of receiving data from 
 
226 Concerning Article 15, see Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, supra note 79, at 10 n.20. 
227 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 13(1). 
228 Id. at 10. 
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a third party, controllers are required to disclose several 
pieces of information to the data subject: the categories of 
personal data collected, intended purposes of processing, 
recipients or categories of third-party recipients, the data 
controller’s or third party’s legitimate interests justifying 
processing (e.g. direct marketing),229 and “from which source 
the personal data originate, and if applicable, whether it came 
from publicly accessible sources.”230 In practice, a data 
controller receiving inferred data (e.g. credit scores) from a 
third party would need to provide all the above information at 
the point the data is obtained.  
These requirements leave open several gaps in relation to 
inferences. Even where Article 14 applies, the data controller 
only needs to inform data subjects about the categories of data 
involved. “Categories of personal data” is not defined in the 
GDPR, but it suggests that data controllers do not need to 
reveal details of the specific data they have received. Rather, 
providing abstract categories or a list of types of data is 
sufficient, meaning data subjects will not be aware of the 
specific data being processed.231 Additionally, data subjects 
will not always receive a disclosure from each controller 
handling their data. If the controller transferring the data 
included information about (categories of) potential third-
party recipients in the original disclosure to the data subject, 
the recipient controller is not required to make an additional 
 
229 It is very important to note that “direct marketing” (Recital 47) is 
considered such a legitimate interest, which means data controllers do not 
require the data subject’s consent. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1, 9. 
230 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 14. 
231 Rainer Knyrim, Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Daten, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 26–27 
(Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds., 2017). 
  
No. 2:494] A RIGHT TO REASONABLE INFERENCES 545 
disclosure regarding the transfer.232 Finally, disclosures are 
not required if they are “impossible or would involve a 
disproportionate effort, in particular for processing for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes[.]”233 The 
notion of “disproportionate effort” is particularly problematic, 
as the GDPR does not clarify its meaning beyond noting that 
the quantity of data subjects needing to be informed can be 
relevant.234 Each of these gaps indicates that the data subject 
will not necessarily be informed when and what kind of 
inferred or derived data has been obtained from a third party. 
Articles 13–14 leave open one final, very significant 
loophole that can result in data subjects being unaware of 
inferences drawn about them. In cases where inferred or 
derived data are not obtained via a third party, but rather 
created by the data controller itself, notification duties will 
never be triggered because the data is not gathered from the 
data subject (as necessary under Article 13) or a third party 
(as necessary under Articles 14). Controllers can thus avoid 
notification duties by drawing inferences themselves. 
Article 15’s right of access may provide a solution when the 
data subject lacks information about inferred and derived 
data being held for any of the above reasons. According to the 
Article 29 Working Party guidelines on the right to data 
portability235 and on profiling236, the right of access (Article 
15) applies to inferred and derived data, including profiles 
built from such data by the data controller. Article 15 allows 
 
232 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 14(5)(a); see also Knyrim, supra note 231, at 6–7. 
233 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 14(5)(b). 
234 Id. at 12. 
235 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 79, at 10 n.20. 
236 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 17, at 17. 
  
546 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
the data subject to request—at any time—information about 
the purposes of the processing, the categories of personal data 
held, the recipients or categories of recipients, and the source 
of the data obtained.237  
Of course, the data subject must know the identity of the 
relevant controller to make such a request in the first 
instance, which poses an additional barrier. And even when 
such a request is lodged, the data subject may only be 
informed about the categories of data held, not specific details. 
However, the data subject may nonetheless be able to gain 
access to these details by requesting a copy of all data 
undergoing processing.238 This disclosure would include 
derived and inferred data if the definition of personal data 
provided by the Article 29 Working Party is followed, and to a 
lesser extent if the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice is followed.239 
While promising, Art. 15(3) is not an absolute right. 
Obtaining such a copy must “not adversely affect the rights 
and freedoms of others,”240 which according to Recital 63 
includes “trade secrets or intellectual property and in 
particular the copyright protecting the software.”241 As a 
result, inferred and derived data, even if considered personal 
data, may not need to be disclosed if disclosure could infringe 
IP law and trade secrets. This view of the limited scope of 
Article 15 is supported—even if not related to trade secrets—
by the ECJ’s judgment in YS and M and S, which confirms 
that only a summary of personal data undergoing processing 
 
237 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 43. It is worth noting that the 
requirement to provide information about the purposes of processing does 
not include information about the legal basis for processing. 
238 See id. at art. 15(3). 
239 See supra Parts III, IV. 
240 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 15(4). 
241 Id. at 12; see also infra Part VII. 
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needs to be provided.242 Further, “rights and freedoms of 
others” also indicates that Art. 15 should not affect the right 
to privacy of other data subjects (i.e. third-party privacy). The 
ECJ confirmed as much in the Nowak ruling, stating that the 
GDPR has more generous clauses to restrict the right of access 
using Article 15(4) and Article 23243 to protect the privacy of 
others (in Nowak, the examiner)244 and other public interests.  
The ECJ has thus revealed through these judgments that 
the right of access, particularly when addressing inferred and 
derived data, requires a balance of the interests of the data 
subject making the request, data controllers, and other data 
subjects they serve, as well as other relevant public interests. 
As a result, even the right of access may not guarantee 
oversight of inferences. 
One other potential source in European law for a right to 
know about inferences is worth noting. A new consumer 
protection package (“new deal”) is currently under 
negotiation, which may require online marketplaces to inform 
consumers “about the main parameters determining ranking 
of the offers” presented to them.245 Such disclosures may need 
to include information about inferences drawn about the user 
that underlie the rankings. While promising, it is still very 
early in the legislative process, so little more can be said about 
the package’s potential at this point. 
Data subjects thus face several barriers to oversight over 
inferences drawn about them. Assuming these barriers are 
overcome, the GDPR provides several other rights that can be 
exercised by the data subject: rectification (Article 16), 
 
242 Joined Cases C-141/12 & C-372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶ 70(2). 
243 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶¶ 59, 61. 
244 Id ¶ 44.  
245 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: A New Deal 
for Consumers, at 5, COM (2018) 183 final (Apr. 11, 2018). For a discussion 
of the relationship between consumer and data protection rights, see Natali 
Helberger, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius & Agustin Reyna, The Perfect 
Match? A Closer Look at the Relationship Between EU Consumer Law and 
Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1427 (2017). 
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erasure (Article 17), objection to processing (Article 21), and 
contesting automated decision-making, including profiling 
(Article 22(3)).246 Together, these rights can provide data 
subjects with meaningful control over inferences that may 
breach their privacy or damage their reputation. However, 
several further barriers may limit the degree to which these 
rights can be exercised in relation to inferred and derived 
data. 
B. The Right to Rectify Inferences 
Article 16 grants data subjects the right to rectify 
inaccurate personal data or complete incomplete data “by 
means of providing a supplementary statement,” the scope of 
which takes into account the purpose of the processing.247 
Rectification implicitly relies upon the notion of verification, 
meaning that a record can demonstrably be shown to be 
invalid (i.e. inaccurate or incomplete) and thus “corrected” by 
the data subject. The right is easy to implement when the data 
that is used or the inferences that are drawn have a factual 
basis, or in other words are verifiable (e.g. name, date of birth, 
marital status, income). For data provided by the data subject, 
some form of ground truth can be appealed to that 
demonstrates the flaw in the data held, be it the data subject’s 
account of events, additional observations or records, or some 
other piece of information.  
However, inferences can also be probabilistic assumptions 
that cannot be verified currently, or perhaps ever.248 While 
some inferences can be verified through “ground truth,” for 
example by asking the data subject whether her predicted 
income range is correct, others are inherently subjective (e.g. 
the data subject is a “high-risk borrower”) or predictive (e.g. 
 
246 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) arts. 16, 17, 21, 22(3). 
247 Id. at art. 16. 
248 See supra Section III.B. 
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the data subject will apply for a mortgage within the next two 
years) and thus cannot be verified as such.  
This distinction between verifiable and non-verifiable 
inferences has been linked to the applicability of the right to 
rectification to inferred and derived data, and the definition of 
personal data more broadly. Some argue that only data that 
can be verified counts as personal data and thus falls within 
the scope of the right to rectification, excluding unverifiable 
inferred data.249 In contrast, Kamann and Braun suggest that 
the right to rectification should not exclude inferences which 
cannot be verified, as the verifiability of an inference does not 
determine its effects on the data subject.250  
A comparable position is taken by the Article 29 Working 
Party, which has argued that the definition of personal data 
does not depend on verifiability.251 Going further, the 
Working Party explicitly attributes the right to rectification to 
opinions and assessments, using the example of a profile that 
predicts heart disease to which the subject could provide 
supplementary information.252 Even though this profile is not 
verifiable, it is still considered the patient’s personal data, at 
a minimum because it refers to an identifiable individual and 
can clearly impact his or her life. As a result of the “risk of 
inaccurate inferences” being drawn by controllers without 
input from data subjects, “it is also crucial that data 
 
249 Gianclaudio Malgieri, Property and (Intellectual) Ownership of 
Consumers’ Information: A New Taxonomy for Personal Data, 4 PING 
PRIVACY IN GER. 133, 144 (2016) (“This, however, is a restrictive view on 
such data: they can constitute a complex list of information units (number 
and type of potential future illnesses; number and type of future car 
accidents or future professional misconducts; possible age of death; financial 
status at the end of one’s professional career, etc.) and all these pieces of 
information could be defined as personal data if and only if they were ‘true’ 
or certain.”).  
250 Hans-Georg Kamann and Martin Braun, Recht auf Berichtigung, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 20–21 
(Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds., 2017). 
251 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 79, at 6; 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 17, at 17–18. 
252 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 17, at 18. 
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subjects/consumers are able to correct or update their profiles 
if they choose to do so.”253  
The European Court of Justice has similarly (but not 
consistently) argued that opinions and assessments can 
constitute personal data.254 However, as argued above, the 
ECJ does not see the remit of data protection law as 
guaranteeing the accuracy of decision-making. This view has 
major implications for legal protections against inferred data. 
It means that inferred data (assessments or opinions) and the 
underlying reasoning behind inferred data—even if 
considered personal data and objectively wrong—cannot be 
rectified under data protection law and can only be contested 
if there is a procedure in place to contest the evaluation.255 
As discussed above256, the ECJ advocates for a teleological 
approach for the application of the right to rectification. 
Future jurisprudence could thus hold that the right does apply 
to inferences in certain cases. However, such cases would 
likely require a non-adversarial relationship where the 
interests of the assessor (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of 
contract, right to conduct a business) do not outweigh the 
interests of the assessed person (e.g. right to privacy, identity, 
reputation). 
C. The Rights to Object to and Delete Inferences 
The right to erasure may also serve as a remedy against 
inferences with which the data subject disagrees.257 According 
to Article 17(1),258 the data subject can request deletion of 
 
253 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 57, at 47. 
254 See supra Sections III.B–C. 
255 See Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. 
I-994 (“Any objections to the comments would consequently have to be dealt 
with as part of a challenge to the evaluation of the script.”). 
256 See supra Section IV.B. 
257 For a discussion of why the right to be forgotten is essential in the 
connected world, see generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 10. 
258 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 17(1). 
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personal data inter alia where (1) processing is no longer 
necessary; or (2) consent is withdrawn and no other legal 
grounds or legitimate interests exist;259 or (3) an objection to 
processing is entered that is not trumped by compelling 
legitimate grounds of the data controller.260  
Concerning point (2), from the controller’s perspective, one 
potential source of legitimate interests is found in Article 16 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the freedom to 
conduct a business.261 The GDPR does not prescribe a specific 
balance between data subjects’ right to erasure and the 
legitimate interest of controllers. The Article 29 Working 
Party in relation to the 1995 Data Protection Directive has 
named, among others, “conventional direct marketing and 
other forms of marketing or advertisement,” “prevention of 
fraud, misuse of services, or money laundering,” “physical 
security, IT and network security,” “processing for historical, 
scientific or statistical purposes,” and “processing for research 
purposes (including marketing research)”262 as areas where 
the data subject’s interests may not prevail.  
Concerning point (3), Article 21 grants data subjects the 
right to object to or stop data processing if the processing is 
based on Article 6(1)(e) (public interest or official authority) or 
6(1)(f) (legitimate interests), which includes inferring or 
 
259 For an explanation of the concept of “legitimate interests,” see 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of 
Legitimate Interests of the Data Controller Under Article 7 of Directive 
95/46/EC, 844/14/EN WP 217 (Apr. 9, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp217_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3P5-GUL2]. 
260 On the challenges of implementing the right to be forgotten for AI 
systems, see Eduard Fosch Villaronga, Peter Kieseberg & Tiffany Li, 
Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the Right 
to Be Forgotten, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 304 (2018). 
261 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364), art. 16. On the freedom to conduct a business as a type of legitimate 
interest, see Norbert Nolte & Christoph Werkmeister, Recht auf Löschung 
(“Recht auf Vergessenwerden”), in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO 
(EU) 2016/679, at 47–48 (Peter Gola ed., 1st ed. 2017).  
262 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 259, at 
25, where some of the most common legitimate interests are listed. 
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deriving new data from existing records.263 In the case of 
profiling for direct marketing purposes (Article 21(2)),264 an 
objection is guaranteed to be successful, meaning new 
inferences cannot be generated. It is worth noting that if 
direct marketing expands to include extensive profiling and 
tracking, then prior consent under Article 7 of the GDPR must 
be sought which can subsequently be withdrawn at any 
point,265 unless data controllers can claim an alternative 
legitimate basis.266 Any other purpose than direct 
marketing267 must be weighed against the “compelling 
 
263 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 21. 
264 Article 21(2) and Recital 70 of the GDPR mention profiling for 
marketing purposes. See id.; see also id. at 13. In cases where profiling for 
marketing purposes amounts to online behavior marketing the Article 29 
Working Party believes that this cannot be done without consent. See 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 259, at 26, 45–47; 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online 
Behavioural Advertising, 00909/10/EN WP 171 (June 22, 2010), 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2010/wp171_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ULD-2HQL]; 
Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius, Personal Data Processing for Behavioural 
Targeting: Which Legal Basis?, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 163 (2015). For a 
different view in the U.K., see INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, DIRECT 
MARKETING: DATA PROTECTION ACT PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS, 20180306 Version: 2.3, at 14, 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1555/direct-
marketing-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RZV-929D]. 
265 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 259, at 26, 45–47; 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 264. 
266 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 21(1)(b). 
267 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of 
Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 
COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017). According to Article 4(1)(f) of the 
current draft of the e-Privacy Regulation, a lex specialis to the GDPR, “direct 
marketing communications” means any form of advertising, whether 
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legitimate grounds” of the data controller.268 Again, it 
remains unclear what such “compelling legitimate grounds” 
would look like.269 However, if it is determined that the data 
subject has a stronger interest that allows processing to be 
stopped or consent is successfully withdrawn, Article 17 can 
then be effectively invoked to delete the inference.  
Unsurprisingly, this has been a point of much discussion 
historically and now in relation to the GDPR, concerning both 
the right to erasure and other rights of the data subject. In 
recent commentary on the GDPR and handling of 
pseudonymised data, Nolte has argued that data controllers 
can use their legitimate interest to deny a request for deletion 
if the data is necessary for the “technical development” of their 
 
written or oral, sent to one or more identified or identifiable end-users of 
electronic communications services, including the use of automated calling 
and communication systems with or without human interaction, electronic 
mail, or SMS. The question remains whether personalized ads are 
considered “direct marketing,” and therefore covered by the latest draft of 
the e-Privacy Regulation. The Article 29 Working Party has urged to expand 
the scope to include behavioral advertisements as the current draft seems 
too narrow. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 01/2017 on the 
Proposed Regulation for the ePrivacy Regulation (2002/58/EC), 17/EN 
WP247 (Apr. 4, 2017), at 20–21. 
268 Very often data controllers use consent for data processing, as 
lawfulness is easier to prove using Article 7. However, after withdrawing 
consent, the controller can continue processing if the same purpose is also 
covered under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest). See Nolte and 
Werkmeister, supra note 263, at 13–15. This view seems to be partly at odds 
with the Article 29 Working Party’s view that “swapping” between legal 
basis (i.e. from consent to legitimate interest) should not be allowed. They 
do, however, acknowledge that another lawful basis can justify further 
processing if this option is determined before data processing starts. See 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on Consent Under 
Regulation 2016/679, 17 EN, WP259 rev.01 (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=623051 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
269 Pointing at this loophole, see Wachter, supra note 21; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, supra note 17, at 18, stating that 
“compelling legitimate grounds” are not defined. 
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“app.”270 Requests for deletion may thus only be successful if 
the data controller no longer requires the data.271  
Concerning inferences specifically, some commentators 
have cast doubt on the applicability of the right to erasure to 
inferences. Some scholars appear to suggest that Article 17 
will not apply to inferences altogether,272 while others argue 
that the financial expenditure of a data controller to create 
inferences will trump the data subject’s request for 
deletion.273 
These positions stand somewhat in contrast to prior 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. The ECJ 
ruled in Nowak that the right of erasure applies to 
examination answers, examiner’s comments,274 and 
potentially even results275 (i.e., provided and inferred data as 
well as the reasons for the inferences), although the right 
 
270 Nolte & Werkmeister, supra note 261, at 17–18. 
271 Id. 
272 Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 
‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 
16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 68–69 (2017–18). Edwards and Veale believe 
that Article 17 is not designed to cover observed data, but they do not offer 
support. They also assume a complementary relationship between Article 
17 and Article 20, which implies that inferred data would not be covered 
under Article 17 (as is the case with Article 20). The existence of such a 
relationship is, however, highly doubtful, as Article 20 states: “The exercise 
of the right referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without 
prejudice to Article 17.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 45. 
273 Gianclaudio Malgieri, Trade Secrets v. Personal Data: A Possible 
Solution for Balancing Rights, 6 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 102, 115 (2016) (“The 
denial of access to some data, though creating an information asymmetry 
between consumers and companies, is necessary to respect economic 
freedom and freedom of the intellectual property of businesses.”). 
274 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 55. 
275 The Court did not state this explicitly, but it is reasonable to infer 
this from their position if the answers and comments can be deleted, 
provided other laws do not prohibit this. Id.  
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must be counterbalanced against other laws276 (e.g., longer 
storage period of exam questions and comments).  
Denying the right to erasure based on commercial interests 
and financial costs alone seems to erode the right to an empty 
shell, as these constraints will arguably apply to most data 
processing by commercial entities. Taken together, data 
subjects would only be allowed to delete personal data that 
they have provided, and only if this does not conflict with the 
business interests of the data controller. Further, inferences 
would face a higher bar than data provided by the data subject 
due to the additional costs to the data controller to generate 
the data. This approach seems to miss the balancing act 
required by the ECJ.277 
An additional problem remains with the right to erasure. 
Even if the inferred data is deleted, the data controller might 
already have shared it with other third parties. Data 
controllers have limited obligations to inform third parties 
about deletion. Article 19 requires disclosure “to each 
recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, 
unless this proves impossible or involves disproportionate 
effort,”278 or if the data was made publicly available by the 
controller, in which case “reasonable steps” have to be taken 
to inform other controllers who process these data that 
deletion had been requested.279 The latter case is unlikely to 
apply to inferences, as profiles and inferences are not 
routinely made public. However, in both cases (Article 19 and 
Article 17(2)), even if inferences are deleted by one data 
controller, these deleted inferences could still be in use by 
 
276 Id. ¶¶ 55, 60. 
277 Id. ¶ 60. Regarding the view that privacy and business interests 
must be balanced, see Case T-353/94, Postbank NV v. Comm’n of the 
European Cmtys., 1996 E.C.R. II-921; see also Case T-198/03, Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt AG v. Comm’n of the European Comtys., 2006 E.R.C. II-1429. 
278 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 19. If the data subject requests it, 
data controllers must disclose with whom the data was shared, provided 
that Article 17 was successfully levied. See id. 
279 Id. at art. 17(2). 
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third parties with whom they were shared. Data subjects bear 
the burden of identifying and requesting deletion with these 
third parties. These tasks may not be simple as the GDPR’s 
notification duties (Article 13–14), and right of access (Article 
15) give data controllers the option to disclose only categories 
of recipients with whom personal data has been or will be 
shared, as opposed to a list of specific recipients.280 
Finally, even though “disproportionate effort” cannot be 
invoked by data controllers to deny a deletion request,281 
Article 11(2) allows exceptions from Articles 15 to 20 in cases 
where the data controller can prove not to be “in a position to 
identify the data subject.”282 Therefore, in cases where the 
data controller has de-identified the personal data (which is 
often the case in Big Data analytics), the controller does not 
need to re-identify the data in order to allow the data subject 
to exercise his or her rights.  
It could be argued that other European laws relevant to 
data processing may provide a right to delete inferences. The 
current draft of the EU ePrivacy Regulation (EPR), however, 
does not offer additional support to delete inferences.283 The 
framework states that “listening, tapping, storing, 
monitoring, scanning or other kinds of interception” 
(including monitoring of browsing behaviors284) shall not be 
 
280 See infra Section V.A. 
281 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 17; see also Nolte & Werkmeister, 
supra note 261, at 31–33. 
282 Id. at art. 17(2). 
283 See Proposal for a Regulation, supra note 225. For commentary on 
the current draft of the ePrivacy Regulation, see Frederik Zuiderveen 
Borgesius & Wilfred Steenbruggen, The Right to Communications 
Confidentiality in Europe: Protecting Trust, Privacy, and Freedom of 
Expression (Mar. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3152014 [https://perma.cc/DV27-8VYQ].  
284 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of 
Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), at 
14–15, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017). 
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allowed unless explicitly permitted under the regulation.285 
Consent to the processing of content data286 or metadata287 
for one or more specified purposes is valid under this regime 
following the requirements for consent under Article 7 
GDPR.288  
According to Article 7 of the EPR, metadata and 
communication data must be erased or anonymized after the 
“receipt of electronic communication content,” or if the 
metadata “is no longer needed for the purpose of the 
transmission of a communication.” 289 Of course, if the data 
subject has given consent to further use of this data for other 
purposes, the data does not need to be deleted. However, even 
if consent is withdrawn, Article 7 of the EPR only refers to 
provided data (or content data, e.g. text, voice, videos, images, 
and sound) and observed data (metadata), but not derived or 
inferred data.290 It will thus be unlikely to provide alternative 
means for data subjects to delete inferences drawn about 
them. 
 
285 Id at art. 5. 
286 Id. at art. 6(3)(a)–(b). 
287 Id. at 6(2)(c). 
288 Id. at art. 9(3). The consent requirement covering both content data 
and metadata is also coupled with the “necessity requirement” as described 
in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 7(4). This means that the 
evaluation of content and metadata is only valid if necessary for the purpose 
and cannot be fulfilled using anonymous data. 
289 Id. at art. 7. 
290 Id. at art. 7(1)–(2). Article 7(1) addresses “electronic 
communications content,” defined in Article 4(3)(b) as “content exchanged 
by means of electronic communications services, such as text, voice, videos, 
images, and sound.” Id. at art. 4(3)(b). Article 4(3)(c) defines “electronic 
communications metadata” as “data processed in an electronic 
communications network for the purposes of transmitting, distributing or 
exchanging electronic communications content; including data used to trace 
and identify the source and destination of a communication, data on the 
location of the device generated in the context of providing electronic 
communications services, and the date, time, duration and the type of 
communication.” Id. at art. 4(3)(c). 
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The framework is still under negotiation and thus it is not 
clear how the regulation will turn out. The latest Council draft 
has, however, introduced changes that could weaken data 
protection, especially in relation to consent to third party 
tracking and metadata.291  
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for 
the supply of digital content (Digital Content Directive; 
DCD)292 is also unlikely to be helpful in this regard. The 
proposed framework governs the supply of digital content e.g., 
“video, audio, applications, digital games and any other 
software,”293 excluding healthcare, gambling, and financial 
services. Article 3 of the DCD regulates the rights and duties 
of users and suppliers in relation to contracts on the supply of 
digital content for which “a price is to be paid or the consumer 
actively provides counter-performance other than money in 
the form of personal data or any other data.”294 The European 
Parliament supported the draft but changed the wording from 
“counter-performance” to “under the condition that personal 
data is provided by the consumer or collected by the trader or 
a third party in the interest of the trader” to alleviate concerns 
 
291 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of 
Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) – 
Examination of the Presidency Text, 2017/0003(COD) (Sept. 20, 2018), 20, 
26 and 29, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CONSIL:ST_12336_2018_INIT&from=EN [https://perma.cc/6PYR-64HH]. 
292 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital 
Content, COM(2015)634 final, 2015/0287 (COD), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634& 
from=EN [https://perma.cc/8EQY-F8L3]. For an overview of the drafting 
process and the current views of the European Parliament and Council, see 
generally Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 
608.748 (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/ 
2017/608748/EPRS_BRI%282017%29608748_EN.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
293 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 292, at art. 2. 
294 Id. at art. 3. 
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held by the EDPS that personal data should be used as a 
currency.295 
For data to be covered by the DCD, it must be actively 
provided by the data subject either directly or indirectly (e.g., 
access to photos or email addresses). Typical examples are 
“cloud storage services, social media or email accounts.”296  
The interesting segment of the framework concerns actions 
to be taken after a contract is terminated. Following 
termination of a long-term contract (under Article 16(4)b of 
the DCD), or due to a lack of conformity with the contract 
(under Article 13(2)c of the DCD), the consumer is granted the 
right “to retrieve all content provided by the consumer and 
any other data produced or generated through the consumer’s 
use of the digital content,” to prevent the supplier from using 
it,297 and to render it anonymous.298 This right covers deletion 
of user-generated data including “digital images, video and 
audio files, blogs, discussion forums, text-based collaboration 
formats, posts, chats, tweets, logos, podcasting, content 
created on mobile devices, content created in the context of 
online virtual environments, ratings and collections of links 
referring to online content.”299  
Concerning the deletion of inferences, the difficulty is that 
it is unclear whether observed and inferred data are also 
considered “user-generated data.” The DCD explicitly 
excludes data collected to ensure the digital content conforms 
with legal and contractual requirements, including, for 
 
295 Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 
614.707 (2018), at 8 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/ 
2018/614707/EPRS_BRI%282018%29614707_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
N6JD-63LT]. 
296 Press Release, European Commission, A New Deal for Consumers: 
Commission Strengthens EU Consumer Rights and Enforcement (Apr. 11, 
2018) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
297 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 292, at art. 13(2)(b) (“ . . . with 
the exception of the content which has been generated jointly by the 
consumer and others who continue to make use of the content.”).  
298 On the potential impossibility of anonymising data, see Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
299 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 292, at 17. 
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example, geolocation data for mobile applications, tracking 
cookies, and automatically generated data (e.g., IP 
addresses).300 Given these constraints, it seems unlikely that 
inferences will fall in the scope of the law, at least when the 
user is not actively involved in their generation (and not just 
providing the underlying data).301 The DCD’s right to delete 
user-generated data after a contract is terminated thus does 
not appear to offer a right to delete inferences.302 As a result, 
users that have paid for the content or service with their data 
will not be able to delete data that was derived or inferred 
based upon it. 
D. Protections Against Sensitive Inferences 
While inferences appear to be “economy class” personal 
data, the protection of which is contextually bound and 
typically less than sensitive and non-sensitive data “provided 
by” the data subject, this trend does not apply to inferences 
describing special categories of data.303 Compared to non-
sensitive types of personal data, the threshold for collecting 
and processing sensitive personal data is comparatively high. 
As described in the preceding sections, requests to know 
about, transfer, rectify, and delete inferences often require a 
balance to be struck between the interests of data subjects and 
controllers. However, when sensitive data is being processed, 
 
300 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 292, at 16–17. 
301 Note that this framework constitutes a “maximum harmonisation” 
preventing member states to have more consumer-friendly rules, but this 
minimum standard cannot be circumvented via contracts. European 
Parliament, supra note 242, at 11–12. 
302 For a favorable view, see Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Nadezhda 
Purtova, Data Portability and Data Control: Lessons for an Emerging 
Concept in EU Law (Dec. 6, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 
3071875 [https://perma.cc/E7E5-46JV]; see also Gianclaudio Malgieri, 
‘User-Provided Personal Content’ in the EU: Digital Currency Between Data 
Protection and Intellectual Property, 32 INT’L REV. OF L., COMPUTERS & 
TECH. 118 (2018).  
303 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 9. 
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this balance is often not necessary, or at least becomes heavily 
skewed towards the interests of the data subject. 
Take for example the requirements around objecting to 
processing. Objecting to “legitimate interests” of the data 
controller could be trumped by the controller’s compelling 
legitimate grounds.304 However, this is not the case for 
sensitive data.305 Unlike non-sensitive data “legitimate 
interests” of the data controller cannot serve as a lawful basis 
for data processing. Other potential lawful bases (e.g. explicit 
consent or the data subject manifestly making their data 
public) for processing sensitive data or drawing sensitive 
inferences of course remain, but compared to non-sensitive 
data, one less route is available to controllers. 
1. Can Inferences Be Sensitive Personal Data? 
While the special protections for sensitive personal data 
are clear in the GDPR, the extent to which inferences can be 
classified as such is not. Article 9 of the GDPR defines 
sensitive data processing as “Processing of personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the 
processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of 
uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health 
or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual 
orientation.”306 It is important to note that gender, age, 
information about a person’s financial situation, geolocation 
and personal profiles are not considered sensitive data under 
Article 9, despite often serving as grounds for 
discrimination.307 A general prohibition on sensitive data 
 
304 See generally supra notes 259, 261. 
305 See id. (describing further exceptions). Most are coupled with some 
kind of public interest or require that the data was made public by the data 
subject. See id. 
306 Id. 
307 The sensitive nature of some of these categories and an expansion 
of “sensitive data” was discussed by the Article 29 Working Party, but did 
not find its way into the GDPR. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 
Advice Paper on Special Categories of Data (“Sensitive Data”), at 10, 
Ares(2011)444105-20/04/2011 (2011), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
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processing is established with several exceptions, including 
explicit consent, scientific or statistical purposes, and when 
“processing relates to personal data which are manifestly 
made public by the data subject.”308  
Concerns about inferences are implicit in the definition of 
“special categories of personal data.” The phrase “personal 
data revealing” suggests that the definition is intended to 
cover data that both directly discloses and indirectly reveals 
protected attributes.309 In a 2011 opinion, the Article 29 
Working Party supported this position, arguing that the 
definition of special categories covers “not only data which by 
its nature contains sensitive information . . . but also data 
from which sensitive information with regard to an individual 
can be concluded.”310 Similarly, in a later set of guidelines on 
profiling, the Article 29 Working Party noted that profiling 
activities can create sensitive data “by inference from data 





308 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 9. 
309 Sebastian Schulz, Verarbeitung besonderer Kategorien 
personenbezogener Daten, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 
2016/679 11–12 (Peter Gola ed., 2017) (referring to Article 29 Data Prot. 
Working Party, supra note 307, at 6, where it reads, “The term ‘data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership’ is to be understood that not only data 
which by its nature contains sensitive information is covered by this 
provision, but also data from which sensitive information with regard to an 
individual can be concluded.”); see also Edwards & Veale, supra note 272, at 
37 (claiming it is uncertain whether non-sensitive data is transformed into 
sensitive personal data if it can be used to infer or reveal sensitive 
attributes). However, this position does not account for several opinions and 
guidelines from the Article 29 Working Party which include such data 
within the scope of “sensitive data.” See Article 29 Data Prot. Working 
Party, supra note 307; Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81; 
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17.  
310 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 307, at 6.  
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so when combined with other data.”311 While such proxy data, 
such as a postcode, is not sensitive by nature, the Article 29 
Working Party clearly believes it must be treated as such if it 
“indirectly reveals” or can be used to infer sensitive 
attributes.312 
Higher data protection standards afforded to sensitive 
data can apply to inferences in two senses. First, when 
inferred or derived data directly disclose protected 
attributes—for example when a processor infers a person’s 
ethnicity from their education history—they must be treated 
as sensitive data. This is a direct form of application in which 
inferences are treated no differently than sensitive data 
“provided by” the data subject and is not interesting for 
purposes of this Article. Second, when personal data can be 
shown to allow for sensitive attributes to be inferred (i.e., 
‘indirectly revealed’), the source data from which sensitive 
inferences can be drawn can also be treated as sensitive data 
(e.g. last name or location of birth to infer race).  
In light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal313, the 
European Data Protection Board issued a statement 
explaining that data that reveals political opinions should be 
seen as special category data.314 Further, the fact that the 
data subject might have made this data publicly available, 
 
311 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 15 (emphasis 
added). 
312 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 307, at 6.  
313 Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 
Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data 
Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election 
[https://perma.cc/5SCT-7RKV]. 
314 European Data Prot. Bd., Statement 2/2019 on the Use of Personal 
Data in the Course of Political Campaigns (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb-2019-03-13-
statement-on-elections_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BS2-4VJE]. For a similar 
case in Austria where the postal office inferred political opinions about their 
customers without consent, see Austrian Data Protection Authority 
Finalises Investigation into Österreichische Post AG, EUROPEAN DATA 
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which is usually an exception from Article 9 of the GDPR, 
cannot be used as a justification to process data under the 
“legitimate interest” basis and thus without explicit consent. 
The statement also stressed that principles of lawfulness, 
fairness, and transparency also need to be respected.315 This 
process can also fall under the restrictions of Article 22, if it is 
a solely automated process.  
This fluidity of the categorization of personal data as 
sensitive reveals a fundamental problem with the distinction. 
Non-sensitive data can become sensitive if used to infer 
sensitive attributes, yet the content of the data remains the 
same. This suggests that the distinction between sensitive 
and non-sensitive data is fundamentally flawed, at least when 
used to govern the collection of personal data.316 Put simply, 
the distinction is increasingly strained in the era of Big Data 
analytics, as seemingly any data can become sensitive 
personal data if a way can be found to infer information about 
protected attributes from it.317  
2. Intentionality and Reliability 
Despite the fragility of the distinction between sensitive 
and non-sensitive data, the higher level of protection afforded 
to the former in data protection law means it must be taken 
seriously. The fact that non-sensitive data can reveal 
information about sensitive category attributes through 
linkage and inference begs a question: Under what conditions 
should non-sensitive personal data be reclassified as sensitive 
personal data? Much academic discussion has been devoted to 
this question, according to which the classification of proxy 
data as “sensitive data” potentially depends on two conditions: 
(1) the intention of inferring sensitive attributes, and (2) the 
 
315 European Data Prot. Bd., supra note 314. 
316 See Sandra Wachter, Data Protection in the Age of Big Data (2019) 
2 NATURE ELECTRONICS 6 (2019). 
317 See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 23; Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995 
(2017).  
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reliability of the data in question for inferring sensitive 
attributes. 
Regarding intentionality, several legal commentators have 
argued that the classification of data as sensitive depends on 
the stated purpose of processing. Data controllers must have 
the intention of inferring sensitive information from a 
selection of data for it to be classified as sensitive.318 Schulz 
gives the example of a pizzeria delivering to customers in a 
drug abuse center. Transaction records would not be 
considered sensitive data unless the pizzeria intended to infer 
information about the health status of their customers.319 
Similarly, Schiff argues that last names and location of 
birth—even though potentially reliable to infer race—are only 
sensitive if the data controller intends to infer race.320 Nguyen 
goes so far as to argue that sensitive attributes coincidentally 
revealed by non-sensitive data do not require a re-
classification of the source data as sensitive, such as a closed-
circuit television image depicting a person wearing religious 
attire, which was not captured to assess the individual’s 
religious beliefs.321 The same holds true for photos that reveal 
disabilities or wedding photos at the church from which 
religion or sexual orientation can be inferred, unless the 
camera was purposefully placed (e.g. at a known meeting 
point for a particular protected group). 
In contrast, although the Article 29 Working Party has not 
directly addressed intentionality, they have provided some 
indication that certain types of data can be sensitive without 
knowing how they will be processed. Photos, images, traffic 
cameras, and other surveillance devices are seen to raise 
 
318 Alexander Nguyen, Videoüberwachung Insensitiven Bereichen, 35 
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 715 (2011); Alexander Schiff, 
Besonderer Kategorien personenbezogener Daten, in DATENSCHUTZ-
GRUNDVERORDNUNG 20–21 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds. 2017).  
319 Schulz, supra note 309, at 11–14. 
320 Schiff, supra note 309, at 14–15. 
321 Nguyen, supra note 318, at 715. Even though this does not refer to 
the GDPR, Nguyen’s view is relevant as the definition of personal data 
(which includes inferences) has not changed since the Data Protection 
Directive. See Schulz, supra note 309, at 11–12. 
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particular concerns for their capacity to reveal, coincidentally 
or otherwise, sensitive attributes such as ethnic origin or 
health status.322 The classification of these data sources, 
which are not self-evidently intended to reveal ethnicity or 
health status, appears to hinge on their content rather than 
the intention of subsequent processing.323 
Regarding reliability, several of the same commentators 
have argued that the non-sensitive data should only be re-
classified if it provides a reliable or statistically significant 
basis to infer sensitive information.324 Schulz provides two 
examples: attendance records at union events and online 
browsing behavior of pornographic content cannot reveal 
trade union membership or sexual preferences with certainty, 
and thus do not need to be classified as sensitive data 
themselves.325 However, this view is not uncontested. Even 
though Schiff believes that the intention to infer sensitive 
attributes is required, he believes that geolocation and 
browsing history have sufficient disclosive power to reveal 
political views and sexual orientation. He thinks that 
reliability does not equal certainty, but rather a good 
indication (e.g. religious attire).326 
The General Court has similarly affirmed that data must 
reliably reveal sensitive information to be considered 
sensitive data, albeit without appealing to the “certainty” 
threshold advanced by Schulz. Rather, a claim that data 
reveals sensitive information must be substantiated for it to 
be treated as sensitive. The General Court used the example 
of knowing that an individual works as an assistant to a 
member of the European Parliament; this relationship was 
not taken as sufficient to infer the individual’s political beliefs, 
 
322 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 307, at 8.  
323 See Douwe Korff, Comparative Study on Different Approaches to 
New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological 
Developments 41 (European Comm’n Directorate-General Justice, Freedom 
and Security, Working Paper No. 2, 2010). 
324 Nguyen, supra note 318; Schulz, supra note 309, at 13–14. 
325 Schulz, supra note 309, at 12–13.  
326 Schiff, supra note 318, at 26–27. 
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suggesting that reliability is an essential attribute of 
“sensitive data.”327  
Two applications of intentionality and reliability as 
thresholds for classification of personal data as “sensitive 
personal data” should be avoided. Some types of data are 
known to act as a proxy for protected attributes (e.g., 
postcodes revealing ethnicity). Information about these 
attributes contained in proxy data can influence inferences or 
decisions down the line. This influence does not need to be 
intentional, meaning the proxy data was not intentionally 
processed as a proxy for the protected attribute, but revealed 
information about it nonetheless. In the case of proxy data, 
intentionality is thus unnecessary for sensitive attributes to 
influence decision-making.328 Therefore, not even the idea of 
governing the use of potential sensitive data under the 
purpose limitation restriction of Article 5 of the GDPR would 
help. 
Similar concerns apply to reliability. As discussed above in 
relation to the Article 29 Working Party’s three-step model, 
personal data does not need to be verifiable (or accurate) to 
impact the data subject. Inferences that claim to describe a 
sensitive attribute, but in fact are drawn from an unreliable 
source or using unreliable methods would fail to meet the 
reliability requirement. This situation should not result in the 
inference or source data from being classified as sensitive 
personal data, as the accuracy of an inference does not 
constrain its potential impact on the data subject’s life. In 
effect, if this approach were adopted, the burden of data 
protection would shift to the data subject to object, rectify, or 
delete further processing of inaccurate inferences. Successful 
exercise of these rights cannot be taken for granted, as 
inaccurate inferences would fail to be considered sensitive 
 
327 Case T‑190/10, Kathleen Egan & Margaret Hackett v. European 
Parliament, 2012 E.C.R. I-165.  
328 This is one reason why Germany’s data protection law prohibits 
credit scores solely based on postcodes or addresses. See Philipp Richter, Big 
Data, Statistik Und Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, 40 DATENSCHUTZ 
UND DATENSICHERHEIT 581, 583 (2016).  
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personal data due to a lack of reliability, meaning controllers 
could use legitimate interests as a basis for data processing.  
The main issue is not whether the data is a reliable basis 
to infer sensitive information. Rather, the problem is that 
data controllers might start treating people differently based 
on their assumptions about them, even if these sensitive 
assumptions have not been drawn from a reliable source. In 
this regard it does not matter whether the inference is 
accurate or the source data was reliable.  
To summarize, the definition of “special categories of 
personal data” in the GDPR clearly indicates that any 
personal data that directly discloses or contains information 
about a special category must be treated as “sensitive data’.” 
In contrast, the classification of data, which indirectly reveals 
or can be used to infer sensitive information, is not so 
straightforward. The necessity of intentionality and reliability 
are a point of disagreement among commentators, the Article 
29 Working Party, and the ECJ: one,329 both,330 or perhaps 
neither331 condition must be met to re-classify non-sensitive 
source data as sensitive data capable of revealing sensitive 
information.  
E. The Right to Contest Decisions Based on Inferences 
Although there is no consensus about the legal rights over 
inferences, there is an argument to be made that even the 
GDPR goes beyond procedural data control and management 
(informational self-determination), and provides safeguards 
against inferences and decisions based on inferences with the 
right to contest in Article 22(3).332 The following Section will 
 
329 Schiff, supra note 318, at 26–27 (arguing that intention is required, 
but reliability is not); see also Case T‑190/10, Kathleen Egan & Margaret 
Hackett v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2012:165. Here, the ECJ 
affirmed the necessity of reliability, but did not address intentionality. 
330 Schulz, supra note 309, at 11–14; Nguyen, supra note 318.  
331 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 307. 
332 Isak Mendoza & Lee A Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to 
Automated Decisions Based on Profiling (Mar. 9, 2018), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/abstract=2964855 [https://perma.cc/NPK5-MGE2]. 
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call into question that the right to contest can be meaningfully 
implemented without underlying decision-making standards. 
Article 22(3) of the GDPR describes safeguards against 
decisions based solely on automated processing, including 
profiling, that produce legal or similarly significant effects for 
data subjects.333 Data subjects are granted rights to express 
their views, contest decisions, and obtain human intervention. 
These safeguards suggest that the GDPR is moving beyond 
mere procedural data control and management (or 
informational self-determination, e.g. Article 15) to allow data 
subjects to evaluate and challenge automated decisions and 
profiling that can be based on inferences. Even though the 
right “to put his point of view” also featured in the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (Art 15(2) DPD), the two additional 
safeguards in Art 22(3) suggest that data subjects’ interests 
in how their data is evaluated are given increasing 
importance, at least in cases where processing is fully 
automated. Finally, even though not legally binding,334 the 
right to explanation in Recital 71 similarly recognizes data 
subjects’ interests in how they are evaluated.335 This 
recognition of valid interests regarding the output of data 
processing distinguishes Article 22 from the majority of other 
mechanisms in the GDPR, which instead focus on 
management of input data. 
The right to contest effectively provides data subjects with 
the ability to contest automated decisions in sectors where 
human-based decisions may not be contestable, or where 
relevant legal or ethical decision-making standards may not 
exist. But as shown in Part II, the greater protection afforded 
by the GDPR can be justified by the growing and novel risks 
 
333 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 22. 
334 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 11.  
335 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 14. 
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introduced by usage of automated decision-making in areas 
such as “employment opportunities, credit or insurance, or 
targeting [data subjects] with excessively risky or costly 
financial products.”336 
At first glance, the right to contest appears to strengthen 
the protection afforded to data subjects against all types of 
legally or similarly significant automated decision-making in 
data protection law, regardless of whether other locally 
relevant laws apply that would constrain automated decision-
making. Data subjects now have a right to contest fully 
automated decisions regardless of the sector in which the 
decision was made and without reference to its prevailing 
regulations and decision-making standards. However, the 
success of an objection lodged by a data subject turns on its 
ability to appeal to enforceable legal or ethical decision-
making standards which have been violated. The right to 
contest alone offers little protection against automated 
decisions and underlying inferences without such 
complementary standards. 
This weakness of the right to contest reflects—as already 
mentioned—the remit of data protection law, or at least as it 
has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice in prior 
jurisprudence and opinions.337 The ECJ has argued that the 
remit of data protection law does not include assessment of 
the accuracy and content of decision-making. In Nowak, the 
ECJ and AG took this position, referring to both the Data 
Protection Directive and GDPR (which was forthcoming at the 
time of the judgment).338 The ECJ denied data subjects an 
opportunity to assess the results of decision-making 
themselves, explaining instead that this evaluation rests with 
competent sectoral authorities that handle complaints (e.g. an 
examination procedure339 or a higher court340). The 
interpretation of the two data protection rights addressed in 
 
336 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 10.  
337 See supra Sections IV.A–B.  
338 See supra Section IV.B.  
339 See supra Section IV.B. 
340 Joined Cases C–141 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 45–47. 
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these cases (i.e. access and rectification) limited them to 
assessing the accuracy and completeness of input data; for 
example, whether an exam script was complete, but not the 
reasoning behind an assessment.  
If applied to the GDPR’s right to contest (i.e., to nullify or 
amend an automated decision), this interpretation of the 
Directive suggests that a challenge will only be successful if 
the input data was incorrect or incomplete, or other data 
protection principles were infringed (e.g., the controller fails 
to demonstrate a lawful basis for processing). The reasoning 
or parameters behind decisions can only be contested if 
complimentary decision-making standards (e.g., anti-
discrimination law) exist outside of data protection law, which 
itself does not establish standards concerning the content or 
outcomes of decision-making processes.  
The right to contest thus appears to be a mere procedural 
right to reverse decisions or impactful profiling made using 
inaccurate or incomplete input data. It is unlikely to compel 
data controllers to revise automated decisions based on 
inferences unless sector-specific decision-making standards or 
other provisions in data protection law have been infringed. 
As a result, the private autonomy of the decision-maker will 
typically be upheld, meaning the choice of parameters used in 
the decision-making process does not have to be justified to 
the data subject. If this view is continued in the future, the 
protection will likely be an empty shell.  
Future jurisprudence could, of course, adopt the advocated 
teleological approach to extend the rights to contest and to 
rectification to the content of assessments and inferences.341 
In any case, reasonable assessment standards will need to be 
established because contesting decisions or inferences will 
only be successful if a standard or rule is violated.342 If there 
are no standards for making decisions, decision-makers will 
never be in violation of the law. 
 
341 See supra Sections III.C, IV.B. 
342 See supra Part II. 
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VI. RE-ALIGNING THE REMIT OF DATA 
PROTECTION LAW IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A 
RIGHT TO REASONABLE INFERENCES 
As should now be clear, inferences receive less protection 
under data protection law than other types of personal data 
provided by the data subject. In many ways, the lower status 
of inferences reflects the limitations placed on the remit of 
data protection law by the ECJ.343 Specifically, in standing 
jurisprudence the ECJ has argued that data protection law is 
not intended to assess the accuracy of decision-making 
processes or ensure good administrative practices.344 Such 
assessments are instead deferred to sectoral and Member 
State law, and relevant governance bodies. 
While the ECJ plays a key role in defining the remit of data 
protection law, the novel risks introduced by Big Data 
analytics and automated decision-making345 suggest that the 
prescribed remit of data protection law may be too narrow to 
realize the law’s original aims. In this Part, this Article argues 
that continuing to rely on sensitivity and identifiability as 
metrics for the level of protection to grant data is misguided. 
Rather, greater emphasis must be placed on management of 
output data, or inferences and decisions, to reconfigure 
privacy as a holistic concept. A right to reasonable inferences 
is proposed as an accountability mechanism reflecting this re-
configuration of data protection law. 
Tensions between profiling, discrimination, privacy, and 
data protection law have long been acknowledged.346 In this 
regard, the term “data protection” is misleading, as it suggests 
that the laws aim to protect the data, when in fact it is 
 
343 See supra Part IV. 
344 See supra Section IV.C.  
345 See supra Section II.A. 
346 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 10; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
CUKIER, supra note 23; PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN, supra note 61; 
Wachter, Privacy, supra note 54. See generally CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 
ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NON‐DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 674 (Dagmar Schiek, eds., 2007). 
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intended to protect people.347 Data can both directly and 
indirectly reveal aspects of an individual’s private life, which 
then, among other things, offer grounds for discrimination. 
The right to privacy offers protection against such disclosures 
which can lead to discrimination and irreversible harms, “and 
have long-term consequences for the individual as well as his 
social environment.”348  
The current limitations placed on the remit of data 
protection law can be detrimental to its broader aim of 
protecting privacy against the risks posed by new 
technologies. As Bygrave explains, privacy is about 
individuality, autonomy, integrity and dignity.349 The broader 
right to privacy addresses personal and family life, economic 
relations, and more broadly an individual’s ability to freely 
express her personality without fear of ramifications.350 
Protecting this right is a key aim of data protection law. 
Standing jurisprudence of the ECJ351 and ECHR352 has 
recognized that the aim of data protection law is to protect 
these broader aspects of privacy, or, in other words, to restrict 
 
347 See Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling: From Data to Knowledge, 30 
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 548 (2006); Wachter, supra note 54. 
348 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 307, at 4.  
349 LEE A BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS 
RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 128–129 (2002). 
350 See generally Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other 
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007). 
351 See, e.g., Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil 
Lindqvist, 2003 E.R.C. I-12971; Case C‑434/16 Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. 
Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-994; Case C‑582/14, Patrick Breyer v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschlan, 2016 E.C.R. I-779. 
352 Amann v. Switzerland, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20 § 65 (“. . . the 
term ‘private life’ must not be interpreted restrictively. In particular, 
respect for private life comprises the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings; furthermore, there is no reason of 
principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or business nature 
from the notion of ‘private life’ . . . . That broad interpretation corresponds 
with that of the Council of Europe’s Convention of 28 January 1981 [.]”); see 
also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
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the processing of personally identifiable data that impacts 
these areas. Data protection is thus only one segment of 
privacy. 
Reflecting this, privacy and data protection have 
traditionally been seen as individual rights in the EU.353 
Stemming from the idea that an individual should have the 
right to be left alone by the state, the right to privacy was 
originally proposed as a defense mechanism against 
governmental surveillance.354 Legal remedies addressing 
data protection provide tools that prevent individuals from 
being identified or unduly singled out. On the other hand, 
legal remedies against discrimination were created based on 
the experience during the Second World War, seen in Article 
14 of the EU Convention of Human Rights.355 Both aims are 
reflected in the 1995 Data Protection Directive and now the 
GDPR, which restrict processing of personally identifiable 
information to prevent “singling out,” with special provisions 
for processing of sensitive data due to concerns with 
discrimination.356 Sensitive or protected attributes are linked 
to observable variables that have historically proven 
discriminatory (e.g. ethnicity, religion).  
As the novel risks of automated decision-making and 
profiling suggest,357 these systems disrupt traditional 
concepts of privacy and discrimination by throwing the 
potential value and sensitivity of data into question. A 
question thus becomes apparent: Are the fundamental aims of 
data protection law still being met in the age of Big Data, or 
 
353  Alessandro Mantelero, Personal Data for Decisional Purposes in the 
Age of Analytics: From an Individual to a Collective Dimension of Data 
Protection, 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 238, 243 (2016); Alessandro 
Mantelero & Giuseppe Vaciago, Data Protection in a Big Data Society. Ideas 
for a Future Regulation, 15 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 104, 107 (2015). 
354 Mantelero, supra note 353, at 245.  
355 Grabenwarter, supra note 354. 
356 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 9. 
357 See supra Part II. 
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is a re-alignment of the remit of data protection required to 
restore adequate protection of privacy?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to evaluate 
whether individual-level rights can be effectively applied to 
inferences, and whether the distinction between types of data 
in data protection law based on identifiability and sensitivity 
is actually effective when applied to inferences. Concerning 
the first point, the preceding discussion revealed that data 
subjects are often unable to access or evaluate inferences 
drawn about them, as well as the processes that led to these 
inferences. At a minimum, inferences enjoy less protection 
under data protection law due to the necessity of balancing 
requests for access, erasure, or other rights with the interests 
of data controllers (e.g., trade secrets, intellectual property) 
and the rights and freedoms of others. Ironically, inferences 
receive the least protection of all the types of data addressed 
in data protection law, and yet now pose perhaps the greatest 
risks in terms of privacy and discrimination.358 
Concerning the second point, if these distinctions break 
down when applied to inferences, protections under data 
protection law are arbitrarily applied, creating greater 
opportunities for invasions of privacy and related harms (e.g., 
discrimination). Many inferences can be drawn from an 
individual’s personal data, but this is not the only possible 
source. Third party personal data, anonymized data, and 
other forms of non-personal data can also be used to develop 
inferences and profiles. This background knowledge, built 
from anonymized, non-personal, or third-party data, can then 
be applied to individual data subjects.359 The process of 
drawing inferences and constructing profiles can in this way 
be separated from their eventual application to an identifiable 
person.  
 
358 See supra Section II.A. 
359 Wim Schreurs. Mireille Hildebrandt, Els Kindt & Michaël 
Vanfleteren, Cogitas, Ergo Sum. The Role of Data Protection Law and Non-
Discrimination Law in Group Profiling in the Private Sector, in PROFILING 
THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 241, 246 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth 
eds., 2008). 
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As a result, a gap exists between the capacity of controllers 
or devices to collect data and draw inferences about people 
from it, and data protection law’s capacity to govern 
inferential analytics not addressing an identifiable 
individual.360 Ultimately, affected individuals are not (fully) 
able to exercise their data protection rights (e.g. access361 or 
erasure362) until standalone inferences or profiles based on 
anonymized, non-personal, or third party data have been 
applied at an individual level.363 By using data about people 
not linked to a particular individual, or by purposefully 
anonymizing data prior to drawing inferences and 
constructing profiles,364 companies can thus avoid many of the 
restrictions of data protection law. This is not to suggest that 
individuals should have rights over the data of others, or data 
which has not been applied to them. Rather, the difficulty is 
that individuals lack redress against the constituent third 
party or anonymous data and processing that have led to the 
inferences or profiles applied to them, unless relevant sectoral 
decision-making standards apply (e.g. anti-discrimination 
law). Identifiability thus poses a barrier to meaningful 
accountability for inferential analytics. 
As an example, concerns have been raised about the 
classification of data collected by autonomous cars. Sensors 
can scan the road ahead, detecting objects to avoid, which may 
 
360 See supra note 347 (taking the view that data subjects need to 
consent before data is anonymized.) 
361 Hildebrandt, supra note 347, at 550 (explaining “that citizens have 
no legal right to even access the knowledge that is inferred from these 
anonymised data and may be used in ways that impact their lives”). 
362 Rubinstein, for example, doubts that the right to be forgotten would 
apply to profiles built from anonymised or aggregated data. Ira S. 
Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 74, 80 (2013) (“[I]t is not even clear whether Article 17 [of the 
GDPR] would apply to predictive inferences based on personal data that 
may have been anonymized or generalized as a result of analytic techniques 
at the heart of Big Data.”).  
363 See also Hildebrandt, supra note 347, at 550. On why exclusion of 
anonymous data from data protection law is a problem, see Schreurs et al., 
supra note 359, at 241. 
364 See Schreurs et al., supra note 359, at 248. 
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include pedestrians. Such data describing the car’s 
surroundings does not clearly fall within the scope of 
“personal data” in data protection law.365 Although 
undoubtedly data about people, such images do not normally 
allow for unambiguous identification of recorded individuals.  
For data to be “identifiable,” it does not need to identify an 
individual with absolute certainty. Rather, it seems to be 
enough that the person can be singled out from a group, even 
if, for example, his or her name is not known, but other 
characteristics describe the person sufficiently.366 The 
possibility of identifying a person must be evaluated 
reasonably, considering “all the means reasonably likely to be 
used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by 
another person to identify the natural person directly or 
indirectly.”367 
This can have major implications for assessing problematic 
behavior of the car, such as a crash, not least because such a 
definition of “identifiability” is fluid and changes with 
advances in technology.368 Scholars have shown that 
anonymized data can often be linked back to individuals.369 
 
365 See Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, 
Transparent, Explainable, and Accountable AI for Robotics, SCI. ROBOTICS, 
May 31, 2017, at 1, 1. See generally Inge Graef, Raphaël Gellert, Nadezhda 
Purtova & Martin Husovec, Feedback to the Commission’s Proposal on a 
Framework for the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data (Jan. 22, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript). 
366 See Korff, supra note 323, at 45. On why the distinction between 
identifiable and non-identifiable uses is important in the Big Data era, see 
Colin J. Bennett & Robin M. Bayley, Privacy Protection in the Era of ‘Big 
Data’: Regulatory Challenges and Social Assessments, in EXPLORING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA 205, 209–10 (Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders 
& Erik Schrijvers eds., 2016); Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, 
Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (2016). 
367 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 5. 
368 See Korff, supra note 323, at 46. 
369 See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 298, at 1752; Nadezhda Purtova, Do 
Property Rights in Personal Data Make Sense after the Big Data Turn?: 
Individual Control and Transparency, 10 J.L. & ECON. REG. 64, 74 (2017); 
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The driver, pedestrians, insurance companies, regulators, and 
others could all have an interest in accessing non-personal 
sensor data, yet the question of access would fall outside of the 
scope of data protection law.  
On a similar note, data does not need to be linked to an 
identifiable or identified individual to impact his or her life. 
Schreurs et al. give the example of a shopping cart that can 
suggest certain products based only on the products that it 
senses are put in the basket and the speed at which the cart 
is pushed.370 In this case, the customer does not need to be 
identified for choices to be tailored to his or her perceived 
preferences or needs.  
To prevent data harms (e.g., discrimination) and bypass 
the murky issue of what constitutes personal data, it has been 
suggested that the “personal data” classification is 
fundamentally broken and should be abandoned.371 
Abandoning this distinction would, of course, leave a gap in 
data protection law requiring some other classification of data 
to be introduced to constrain the scope of application of the 
law. Without a new classification, all data relating to people 
would effectively become personal data, greatly expanding the 
scope of coverage of data protection law.372 While such a move 
to treat all data as personal data has its merits, such as 
eliminating overlapping boundaries between personal and 
non-personal data, such a radical step is not strictly necessary 
to resolve the specific weaknesses of data protection law 
concerning inferences. Of course, (sensitive) personal data 
should never be collected without the explicit consent of the 
user. But the problem does not lie so much with data 
collection, but rather with what can be read from the data and 
the decisions that are based on this knowledge.  
 
Latanya Sweeney, Only You, Your Doctor, and Many Others May Know, 
TECH. SCI. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015092903 
[https://perma.cc/38L5-ATQ8]; Vijay Pandurangan, On Taxis and 
Rainbows, MEDIUM (June 21, 2014), https://tech.vijayp.ca/of-taxis-and-
rainbows-f6bc289679a1 [https://perma.cc/HW7B-C6UW]. 
370 Schreurs et al., supra note 359, at 246. 
371 See Purtova, note 86, at 58–59; Wachter, supra note 7, at 443. 
372 See Purtova, supra note 86. 
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Therefore, this Article suggests that continuing to rely on 
sensitivity and identifiability, or on the blurry distinction 
among personal data, sensitive data, non-personal, and 
anonymized data as metrics for the level of protection to grant 
to data is misguided. This approach fails to protect privacy in 
the broader sense described above from the novel risks of Big 
Data analytics and automated decision-making. Rather, 
greater emphasis should be placed on managing the outputs 
of data processing, understood here as inferences or decisions, 
regardless of the type of data informing them. This would 
reconfigure privacy as a holistic concept, and be more in line 
with the ECHR,373 the Council of Europe’s “Modernised 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data”374 and their guidelines on AI 
and data protection,375 and the European Parliament’s 
resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on 
artificial intelligence and robotics.376 One could also argue for 
a mediated application of privacy as a human right, and 
advocate for a “positive obligation” of states to implement 
laws. 
However, the immediate political appeal of such a move is 
doubtful, given a recent proposal in the EU to facilitate 
 
373 For an overview of ECHR jurisprudence on privacy to 2017, see 
Council of Europe, supra note 60. 
374 Comm. of Ministers, Modernised Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 128th Sess., 
CM/Inf(2018)15-final (2018), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details. 
aspx?ObjectId=09000016807c65bf [https://perma.cc/RD3F-MVVS?type= 
image]. 
375 Directorate Gen. of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Consultative 
Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108): Guidelines on 
Artificial Intelligence and Data Protection, T-PD(2019)01 (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://rm.coe.int/guidelines-on-artificial-intelligence-and-data-
protection/168091f9d8 [https://perma.cc/H563-X673]. 
376 A Comprehensive European Industrial Policy on Artificial 
Intelligence and Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0081 (2019) 
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exchange of non-personal data.377 Unfortunately, the proposal 
lacks serious consideration of the privacy risks of non-
personal data, along the lines outlined above. To make this 
proposal work, the ECJ would need to redefine the remit of 
data protection law as a tool to ensure accurate and fair data 
driven decision-making.  
Given these challenges, in order to fully meet the aims of 
data protection law in the age of Big Data, a “right to 
reasonable inferences” must be introduced. In response to the 
novel threats posed by “high-risk inferences,” a right to 
reasonable inferences can be derived from the right to privacy 
when viewed as a mechanism intended to protect identity, 
reputation, and capacities for self-presentation. This right 
would offer data subjects additional protections against 
inferences drawn through Big Data analytics that (1) are 
predicted or shown to cause reputational damage or invade 
one’s privacy, and (2) have low verifiability in the sense of 
being predictive or opinion-based while being used to make 
important decisions.  
To make such a right feasible, the ECJ should broaden its 
interpretation of data protection law regarding an individual’s 
rights over inferred and derived data, profiling, and 
automated decision-making involving such information. The 
following Section sketches the scope of this right. To 
implement a “right to reasonable inferences,” new policy 
mechanisms are needed focusing on ex-ante justification and 
ex-post contestation of unreasonable inferences, which can 
likewise support challenges to subsequent decisions. 
Justification would be established by providing evidence of the 
normative acceptability, relevance and reliability of 
inferences and the methods used to draw them. If the right 
were implemented, high-risk inferences would receive 
 
377 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Framework for the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data in the 
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comparable levels of protection to automated individual 
decision-making.378  
A. Justification to Establish Acceptability, Relevance, 
and Reliability 
The ex-ante component of the right to reasonable 
inferences would thus require data controllers to proactively 
establish whether an inference is reasonable. Data controllers 
would need to explain (1) why certain data are a normatively 
acceptable basis to draw inferences; (2) why these inferences 
are normatively acceptable and relevant for the chosen 
processing purpose or type of automated decision; and (3) 
whether the data and methods used to draw the inferences are 
accurate and statistically reliable.379 These requirements 
should be enacted through the introduction of legally binding 
verification and notification requirements to be met by data 
controllers prior to deploying high-risk inferential analytics at 
scale.380  
The current rules in Article 5 around fairness, purpose 
limitation, accuracy, and data minimization (including 
relevance for the pursued purpose) look promising at first 
glance, but seem to be insufficient. Eskens convincingly 
argues that “fairness” as used relates to transparency and 
requires that the user be informed about data processing and 
 
378 See generally Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 11. 
379 On why the immutable attributes rationale for prohibiting 
discrimination on suspect grounds (e.g., ethnicity) is unhelpful because 
talent and intelligence cannot be changed either but are treated as a 
legitimate basis for decision-making, see Janneke Gerards, The 
Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99, 114–115, 115 n.70 (2013). 
380 The caveat “at scale” is included to ensure that data controllers can 
carry out the initial processing necessary to demonstrate normative 
acceptability, relevance, and reliability. Without this condition, data 
controllers would be unable to engage in exploratory analysis or develop 
new methods and types of inferences. The intention is to introduce 
justificatory requirements to be met prior to widespread deployment, not to 
prevent development and deployment themselves. 
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their respective rights.381 The fact that “fairness” is not 
defined in the GDPR and only appears in relation to 
lawfulness or transparency makes it questionable that “the 
fairness principle has any independent meaning at all,” and 
because “fair processing” is never mentioned,382 it seems 
unlikely that the GDPR is intended to govern it. 
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) also recently 
discussed fairness in relation to purpose limitation and 
legitimate interests of data controllers.383 The EDPB stated 
fairness relates to reasonable expectations (e.g. Recital 47 and 
50) for data subjects in relation to potential harms and 
consequences. However, even if this view is followed, “user 
expectation” is not a democratic or normative justification. 
The fact that something has become “normal” or commonplace 
does not necessarily mean it is justifiable or socially desirable.  
Similarly, problems arise with purpose and data 
minimization (including relevance). In the past these 
provisions have not proven effective owing to the fact that very 
vague and broad purposes are named in terms and conditions 
governing data collection and processing. Recent instructive 
examples are the complaints filed relating to forced consent, 
as Article7(4) of the GDPR clarifies that consent can only be 
considered freely given if the data requested is limited to that 
which is necessary for the provision of a service.384 If, as a 
prerequisite of using a service, consent must be given for the 
collection and processing data beyond that which is strictly 
necessary for service provision, the consent cannot be 
 
381 Sarah Johanna Eskens, Profiling the European Consumer in the 
Internet of Things: How Will the General Data Protection Regulation Apply 
to This Form of Personal Data Processing, and How Should it? 27 (Feb. 29, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2752010 [https://perma.cc/W78T-TQZ2]. For a different view, 
see Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine v2.0: The EU General Data 
Protection Regulation and Automated Decision Making, in ALGORITHMIC 
REGULATION (Karen Yeung & Martin Lodge eds.) (forthcoming 2019). 
382 Eskens, supra note 381, at 27 n.125. 
383 European Data Prot. Bd., supra note 2, at 5, 9. 
384 See GDPR: Noyb.eu Filed Four Complaints over “Forced Consent” 
Against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook, NOYB (May 25, 2018), 
https://noyb.eu/4complaints/ [https://perma.cc/6KXJ-P6ZZ]. 
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considered freely given. Critically, “purpose limitation,” 
“accuracy” and “data minimization” (including relevance for 
the pursued purpose) seem to only apply to input data.  
In general, Article 5 is seen as a transparency tool, not a 
justification mechanism. One of the problems is that it is the 
data controllers who define the purpose and relevance of the 
collected data. A right to reasonable inferences, on the other 
hand, would open up a dialogue with individual data subjects 
and society to discuss whether processing practices are 
normatively acceptable. Finally, a right to reasonable 
inferences would apply equally to inferences drawn by the 
data controller and those received from a third party which 
can subsequently be re-purposed. 
In the first instance, the right should apply only to “high-
risk inferences” drawn through Big Data analytics which (1) 
are privacy-invasive or damaging to reputation, or have a high 
likelihood of being so in the future, or (2) have low verifiability 
in the sense of being predictive or opinion-based while being 
used for important decisions. The first condition effectively 
sets a proportionality test for normative acceptability, 
according to which the damage to privacy or reputation caused 
by using a particular data source to draw an inference must 
be proportional to its predicted benefit or utility. Assessments 
of proportionality and the potential invasiveness of a data 
source and processing purpose should not be performed by 
data controllers in isolation.385 Concerning the second 
condition, the right in effect applies to both verifiable and non-
verifiable inferences in different ways, but is most 
immediately concerned with mitigating the potential harms of 
non-verifiable inferences.386  
These two conditions are proposed as a starting point for 
application of the right to reasonable inferences. Inferences 
meeting either condition would meet the threshold for a “right 
to reasonable inferences” to be exercised. Alternatively, the 
both conditions could be seen as necessary for the right to be 
 
385 This type of assessment could conceivably form part of a data 
protection impact assessment, provided for in Article 35 of the GDPR, if a 
sufficient level of external review or governance could be guaranteed.  
386 See infra Section VI.B.  
  
584 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
exercised. However, requiring low verifiability in addition to 
damage to privacy or reputation establishes a threshold that 
is perhaps too high in practice given the novel risks of 
inferential analytics.387 The necessity of each condition for the 
right to apply should remain open to debate to determine their 
impact and assess whether general or sector-specific 
thresholds are preferable.  
Alternative grounds for application or additional 
conditions may also be feasible. For example, the right could 
alternatively be based solely on the notion of “legal or 
similarly significant effects” as prescribed in Article 22(1) 
GDPR.388 In the conditions proposed here, “important 
decisions” are those which have such “legal or similarly 
significant effects.” However, such effects are not limited to 
“solely automated” decisions as is the case in Article 22(1) 
because the risks to private life caused by using non-intuitive 
inferences are not dependent on the extent of automation in 
the decision-making process.  
In any case, basing the right entirely on a threshold of 
“legal or similarly significant” effects would position it as a 
complementary protection for the right not to be subject to 
automated individual decision-making, found in Article 22, 
which may be desirable. The Article 29 Working Party has 
provided examples of such effects in relation to Article 22: 
differential pricing and targeted advertisements that affect 
vulnerable groups, such as children playing online games 
being profiled as susceptible to advertisements or adults 
experiencing financial difficulties.389 The precise scope of 
“legal or similarly significant effects” remains unclear in 
 
387 See infra Part II.  
388 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) art. 22(1). Specifically, “automated decision-making” is 
defined as “a decision based solely on automated processing, including 
profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her.” Id.  
389 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 22, 29. 
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practice, although it will be clarified as the GDPR matures via 
legal commentary, national implementation, and 
jurisprudence.  
These proposals are not arbitrarily chosen; rather, they 
reflect current trends in recent EU policy and offer a solution 
to the worrying weaknesses in data protection law described 
above. With regards to relevance, the Article 29 Working 
Party, for example, argues that disclosures providing 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” in 
automated decision-making, as required by Articles 13–15, 
should include “details of the main characteristics considered 
in reaching the decision, the source of this information and the 
relevance.”390 The Working Party explicitly warns that data 
controllers should prevent “any over-reliance on 
correlations,”391 and explain why a “profile is relevant to the 
automated decision-making process.”392  
The second component of justification—reliability—
requires data controllers to demonstrate that the analytical 
methods and data used to draw inferences (and potentially 
make automated decisions) are reliable, for example via 
statistical verification techniques.393 The need to demonstrate 
reliability aligns with the GDPR’s Recital 71, which suggests 
that in order to ensure fair and transparent processing, data 
controllers are directed to verify the statistical accuracy of 
their systems, ensure that inaccuracies in personal data can 
be corrected, and prevent discriminatory effects of automated 
decision-making.394 Similarly, the Article 29 Working Party 
 
390 Id. at 25–26. 
391 Id. at 28. 
392 Id. at 31. 
393 Schreurs et al., supra note 359, at 253 (“Another matter of concern 
is the fact that group profiles may incorporate falsified presumptions, such 
as statistics that wrongly presume that mobile phones will cause cancer or 
information that people from a certain area have for instance been exposed 
to radioactive radiation. Knowledge of the logic involved could support an 
objection to the use of such profiles, even if no personal data of an 
identifiable person are collected to construct the profile.”). 
394 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
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explicitly calls for “algorithmic auditing” to be implemented to 
assess “the accuracy and relevance of automated decision-
making including profiling[.]”395 Controllers have a similar 
responsibility for input data, which must be shown to not be 
“inaccurate or irrelevant, or taken out of context,”396 and to 
not violate “the reasonable expectations of the data 
subjects”397 in relation to the purpose for which the data was 
collected.398 The right to reasonable inferences would apply 
similar conditions to inferences, understood as a type of 
output data. 
The obligation to demonstrate the reliability of input data 
and methods aligns with the Council of Europe’s views on 
automated data processing and profiling. The Council has 
acknowledged a “lack of transparency, or even ‘invisibility,’ of 
profiling and the lack of accuracy that may derive from the 
automatic application of pre-established rules of inference 
[which] can pose significant risks for the individual’s rights 
and freedoms.”399 It recommends that data controllers “should 
 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 14 (“In order to ensure fair and 
transparent processing in respect of the data subject, taking into account 
the specific circumstances and context in which the personal data are 
processed, the controller should use appropriate mathematical or statistical 
procedures for the profiling, implement technical and organisational 
measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in 
inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is 
minimised, secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the 
potential risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and 
that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the 
basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade 
union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or that 
result in measures having such an effect.”).  
395 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 28, 32. 
396 Id. at 17. 
397 Id. at 11. 
398 Id.; Bart Custers, Simone van der Hof, Bart Schermer, Sandra 
Appleby-Arnold & Noellie Brockdorff, Informed Consent in Social Media 
Use – The Gap Between User Expectations and EU Personal Data Protection 
Law, 10 SCRIPTED 435, 445–46 (2013). 
399 The Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data in the Context of Profiling, at 6, CM/Rec (2010)13 (Nov. 23 
2010), https://rm.coe.int/16807096c3 [https://perma.cc/DDX4-HLKQ]. 
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periodically and within a reasonable time reevaluate the 
quality of the data and of the statistical inferences used.”400 
Acceptability, relevance and reliability requirements for 
inferences are not without precedent in European data 
protection law and policy. Similar requirements for credit 
scoring have existed since 2010 in Germany’s data protection 
law, although it is worth noting that this law is no longer in 
force. Specifically, Section 28b required data controllers 
making predictions or predictive inferences to establish that: 
 
1. The methods being used are sound according 
to the state of the art in science, mathematics, 
or statistics, and that the data being used is 
relevant to the type of prediction being made. 
2. Only legally obtained data is used. 
3. Predictions regarding the probability of an 
event happening are not based solely on a data 
subject’s physical address (e.g., post code). 
4. If physical addresses are used, the data 
subject is informed of this fact, and it has been 
documented that the data subject has been so 
informed.401 
 
These requirements closely align with this Article’s 
proposal for data controllers to establish the normative 
acceptability, relevance and reliability of proposed methods 
and data sources for drawing inferences. In particular, 
requiring data subjects to be notified when known proxies for 
sensitive attributes are used is crucial. 
If legally binding requirements are created along these 
lines, a balance must be struck between data subject and 
controller interests. At a minimum, data controllers should be 
obligated to provide information regarding the intended 
content or purpose of the inferences being drawn, the extent 
to which these inferences rely on proxies for sensitive 
 
400 Id. at 11. 
401 The authors translated this from German. See Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes [Law Amending the Federal Data 
Protection Act], Jul. 29, 2009, BGBL I at 2254, § 28b (Ger.). 
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attributes, and counterintuitive relationships between input 
data and the target inference (e.g., basing creditworthiness on 
clicking behavior). This type of information is intended to be 
the starting point of a dialogue between data subjects and 
data controllers regarding the justifiability of particular 
inferences. One of the greatest risks of inferential Big Data 
analytics and automated decision-making is the loss of control 
over how individuals are perceived, and the predictability or 
intuitive link between actions and the perceptions of others. 
The proposed notification requirements are intended to make 
the process of evaluating the data subject more open, 
inclusive, and discursive, and to provide a new channel of 
remedies for data subjects who believe that unreasonable 
inferences have been drawn.  
B. Contestation of Unreasonable Inferences 
To complement ex-ante notification requirements, the 
second half of a “right to reasonable inferences” should 
provide an effective ex-post accountability mechanism for the 
data subject. The ex-ante justification is bolstered by an 
additional ex-post mechanism enabling unreasonable 
inferences to be challenged.402 This right would allow data 
subjects to contest inferences themselves (e.g., credit score), 
which complements the existing right to contest automated 
decisions found in Article 22(3).403 With the considerations of 
justification in Section VI.A in mind, the right to contest 
would be transformed from a mere procedural tool404 to a 
remedy that allows assessment of the content behind a 
decision.  
In practice, contesting would amount to raising an 
objection with the data controller if an inference drawn is 
found by the data subject to be inaccurate or unreasonable 
 
402 In favor of such a solution, see Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap 
Koops, The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling 
Era, 73 MOD. L. REV. 428, 448–49 (2010). On the need to remedy unjust 
judgments based on inferences, see Leenes, supra note 73, at 298. 
403 Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 332, at 6, 14. 
404 See supra Section V.E. 
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(e.g., if based on non-intuitive, unreliable, or invasive features 
or source data), and to offering supplementary information 
that could lead to an alternative preferred outcome. 
Contesting as imagined here encourages dialogue between the 
data subject and the controller if the accuracy or 
reasonableness of an inference is questioned.  
The ex-post component of the right to reasonable 
inferences is not, however, intended to shift decision-making 
autonomy from private actors to data subjects. Contesting an 
inference and offering supplementary information does not 
guarantee that the inference in question (or subsequent 
decisions challenged under Article 22(3) of the GDPR) will 
also be modified. Data controllers have private autonomy in 
the ways they evaluate data subjects and make decisions 
about them. The right to reasonable inferences is not intended 
to violate this autonomy, but rather to provide the data 
subject with a way to learn more about the data controller’s 
perceptions and decision-making processes, and to potentially 
convince the controller that one or both is wrong.  
For verifiable inferences (e.g., Jessie is a homeowner), it is 
reasonable to assume that offering supplementary 
information demonstrating the original inference is 
inaccurate would lead to rectification of the inference, as 
accurate data is in the interests of both parties. This type of 
right is nothing new, as data subjects can already rectify data 
in this way under Article 16 of the GDPR.405 This proposal 
only suggests broadening the scope of Article 16 from merely 
input data to also output data, which is in line with the Article 
29 Working Party’s view.406 
For non-verifiable or predictive inferences (e.g., Jade will 
default on a loan in the next five years), data subjects 
arguably do not have an equivalent form of rectification. Non-
verifiable inferences cannot be rectified as such due to their 
 
405 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 16. 
406 See supra Part III. 
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inherent uncertainty or subjectivity.407 The data subject may 
nonetheless disagree with the controller’s views or 
assessment if, for example, it does not align with their self-
perception, the source data is perceived as irrelevant, or the 
scope of data considered was incomplete or insufficient. 
Contesting the normative acceptability, relevance or 
reliability of an inference on any of these grounds is distinct 
from rectifying a provably inaccurate inference.  
The right to rectification in Article 16 may arguably 
already offer a remedy for non-verifiable inferences. Whether 
this is the case depends upon one’s view of the necessity of 
verifiability in classifying inferences as personal data408 and 
its impact on subsequent application of data protection rights. 
The ECJ, for example, argues that the right to rectification is 
not intended to apply to the content of subjective (and thus 
non-verifiable) opinions and assessments.409 In contrast, the 
Article 29 Working Party believes predictive inferences can 
also be “rectified” by providing supplementary information 
that would alter the assessment, meaning that verifiability is 
not necessary to exercise the right of rectification.410 
The proposal for an ex-ante right to contest inferences 
made here may thus not represent a radical departure from 
existing law. Rather, if adopted, the right to reasonable 
inferences would effectively enshrine an answer to the 
verifiability question in law, and thus strengthen data 
protection rights over inferences regardless of their 
verifiability. This sort of strengthening is essential if the 
interests of data controllers are to form less of a barrier to 
exercising individual data protection rights against inferences 
than is currently the case.411 In conjunction with the ex-ante 
notification requirements, the data subject’s chances of 
successfully contesting inferences (and automated decision-
making based upon them) would likewise improve, as the 
 
407 See supra Sections III.B, V.B. 
408 See supra Sections III.B, V.B. 
409 See supra Part IV, Section V.B. 
410 See supra Part III. 
411 See supra Part V. 
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subject could draw on the justification disclosure made by the 
controller prior to an inference being drawn.  
VII. BARRIERS TO A RIGHT TO REASONABLE 
INFERENCES: IP LAW AND TRADE SECRETS 
As shown in Parts III and IV, the first hurdles to the 
implementation of a right to reasonable inferences lies with 
determining the legal status of inferences. Once consensus 
has been reached on whether inferences are personal data, the 
rights granted in the GDPR very often need to be 
counterbalanced with the legitimate interests of data 
controllers concerning, for example, trade secrets, intellectual 
property, or third-party privacy.412 
The easiest legal solution to prevent unreasonable 
inferences from being drawn would be to allow data subjects 
to prevent models from being built in the first place, or to 
grant them control over the models used in inferential 
analytics, and how they are applied. Such a solution is of 
course not to be recommended, as it fails to respect the 
substantial public and commercial interests advanced by 
analytics and technological development more broadly. With 
regard to the mechanisms recommended in the preceding 
Section, a more reasonable approach would be to require 
controllers to justify to regulators or data subjects their 
design, choice, and usage of models and particular data types 
to draw inferences about individuals. However, there are an 
alarming number of provisions in the GDPR and other 
(proposed) regulations that could seriously hinder the 
protection afforded to data subjects against inferences. 
In short, the GDPR, new and old IP laws, and the new 
European directive on trade secrets do much to facilitate Big 
Data analytics and the construction of machine learning 
models. This Part considers models to be the outputs of data 
processing involving inferential analytics that uses an 
individual’s personal data. In other words, personal data is 
used to draw inferences which lead to a model, which can then 
be applied to other people, cases, or data to make decisions. 
 
412 See supra Part V. 
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Under the GDPR and the new Copyright Directive,413 data 
subjects’ rights are restricted for the purpose of constructing 
models. For construction that does not meet the requirements 
of the statistical purpose exemptions, data subjects would 
retain these rights. However, once an output (the model) has 
been produced, new regulations dealing with copyright and 
trade secrets would give the individual little say in how the 
model is used, and little to no share in the benefits it produces. 
A. Algorithmic Models and Statistical Purposes in the 
GDPR 
The GDPR may facilitate inferential analytics by granting 
a number of privileges to processing for statistical 
purposes.414 After data is collected based on one of the legal 
bases in Article 6, the strict “purpose limitation” in Article 5 
no longer applies.415 Article 5(1)(b) states that “further 
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be 
considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes[.]”416 
The same privilege applies to the strict principle of storage 
limitation in Article 5(1)(e)417, and thus the data does not need 
to be deleted after it is no longer necessary for the original 
processing purpose. This means as long as data is collected in 
a lawful manner following Article 6, and in accordance with 
 
413 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final 
(Sept. 14, 2016). 
414 Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, supra note 50, at 326–27. But see 
Bertram Raum, Verarbeitung zu Archivzwecken, Forschungszwecken, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG 31–32 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin 
Selmayr eds., 2017) (expressing uncertainty over whether the exemptions 
apply to Big Data). 
415 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 5(1)(b). 
416 Id. 
417 Id. at art. 5(1)(e). 
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“appropriate safeguards” pursuant to Article 83 (e.g., 
pseudonymization) are in place, the subsequent use for 
statistical purposes is lawful and does not require any 
additional legal basis for processing (e.g., consent) to be 
established.  
Mayer-Schönberger and Padova believe that Big Data 
analytics can be considered “processing for statistical 
purposes,” as they are strongly based on statistical 
methods.418 Relatedly, Zarsky argues that Big Data would 
face significant difficulty to fall within this exemption.419 If 
the exemption is applied, Member State law can grant 
controllers numerous privileges and exemptions from other 
rights and duties in the GDPR, as described in Article 89(2). 
These include exemptions from Articles 14(5)(b), 15, 16, 
17(3)(d), 18 and 21, as well as the strict limitations on the use 
of sensitive data in Article 9(2)(j) and Recital 52.420  
These exemptions have two implications for the diffusion 
of inferential analytics. First, they encourage the creation of 
new statistical models and profiles by lowering data 
protection requirements for such processing. Second, 
following from this relaxation of the law, when personal data 
is used for statistical purposes data subjects are unable to 
exercise the majority of their rights, and thus cannot prevent 
statistical uses. Similarly, data subjects lack any claim or 
rights over the resulting models or profiles (i.e., “statistical 
results” in Article 89(1)), despite having been built with their 
personal data.  
It is important to note a further restriction on the Article 
89 privileges. Recital 162 clarifies that statistical results 
generated under the statistical purposes exemption (which 
are aggregate data, not personal data), as well as the input 
 
418 Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, Regime Change, supra note 50, at 
330. 
419 See Zarsky, supra note 317, at 1007–08. 
420 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 10; see also id. at arts. 9(2)(j), 
14(5)(b), 17(3)(d), 89(2). 
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personal data, cannot be used “in support of measures or 
decisions regarding any particular natural person.”421 It is 
difficult to imagine how compliance and enforcement of this 
restriction will be handled (i.e., how to ensure that the model 
is not applied or intended to be applied to a natural person), 
or how to manage the sale of models generated under Article 
89 exemptions to third parties. Presumably, if the results 
(which must not be personal data, per Recital 162) are then 
used to make decisions about individuals, the privileges 
granted by the statistical purposes exemption are no longer 
applicable, meaning normal data processing rules, such as 
Articles 6 and 22, will apply.422  
An important point of contention regarding these 
exemptions is whether they apply to commercial data 
controllers, or only to public and research entities, such as 
government bodies and universities. Mayer-Schönberger and 
Padova argue that these privileges apply to “private 
companies for commercial gain” as well.423 A similar view 
 
421 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 30; see also Zarsky, supra note 317, at 
1008; Schreurs et al., supra 359, at 248. Both Zarsky and Schruers et al. are 
silent on the view of applying profiles after creation but hint that the law 
might prohibit this, albeit without any clear supporting evidence. This view 
translates to the GDPR because the DPD had a similar provision in Recital 
29. For a view that the later application should be covered by Article 6, see 
Richter, supra note 328, at 585 who also warns that this can never be 
sufficiently regulated as there is no way of assessing how the models are 
subsequently used for other processing or by other data controllers.  
422 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 17, at 7 (“For 
instance, a business may wish to classify its customers according to their 
age or gender for statistical purposes and to acquire an aggregated overview 
of its clients without making any predictions or drawing any conclusion 
about an individual. In this case, the purpose is not assessing individual 
characteristics and is therefore not profiling.”); Raum, supra note 414, at 41 
(explaining how further usage of statistical results is no longer covered by 
the privileges, but can be used if the normal requirements for data 
processing in the GDPR are met). For example, to assess individuals with a 
model built under the statistical purposes exemption, a further legitimate 
basis for processing would need to be established, such as consent. 
423 Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, supra note 50, at 326. 
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comes from Richter, who argues that the statistical purposes 
exemption can be used to pursue commercial interests as long 
as the results are not applied to individuals.424 In contrast, 
Raum suggests that the exemptions cannot be used for 
commercial interests, and that any subsequent usage of 
statistical results generated under these exemptions for 
commercial interests would require justification according to 
the GDPR’s standard data processing requirements.425 This 
suggestion is, however, not supported with any further legal 
argumentation.  
Once the model is applied to a person, regardless of 
whether it was built under the statistical purposes exemption, 
the outcome of this application (i.e., an inference or decision) 
becomes the personal data of the person being assessed and 
the restrictions detailed in Part V apply. Members of the 
training set also retain rights over any of their personally 
identifiable data contained within the model, unless 
statistical purposes exemptions apply. However, while the 
model is admittedly applied to a data subject for the purpose 
of assessment, this does not mean the model will be considered 
the personal data of the person being assessed or the data 
subjects represented in the training data. Further, neither 
party will have rights over the model. To understand why this 
is the case, it is necessary to return to the judgements 
discussed in Part IV. 
In Nowak, the ECJ made clear that the exam questions are 
not the candidate’s personal data,426 even if used to assess 
him. The exam questions are comparable with the model that 
is used to assess an individual. The same holds in the case of 
YS and M and S, where immigration law is comparable to a 
statistical model. The fact that immigration law was applied 
 
424 See Richter, supra note 328, at 585 (arguing later application should 
not be lawful even if it fulfills Article 6 requirements due to the possible 
risks). Richter does not, however, offer a legal argument to justify this claim. 
He further warns that the GDPR legalizes many applications that would 
have been illegal in Germany (e.g., private sector uses). See id. 
425 See Raum, supra note 414, at 41–42. 
426 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994, ¶ 58.  
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to the applicant to make a decision on residency does not mean 
the law itself became the applicant’s personal data.427 The 
data subject thus cannot rectify or delete the law. Therefore, 
neither the exam questions nor the applicable law are subject 
to the rights granted in the GDPR. 
The request to access the “legal analysis” in YS and M and 
S further clarifies the distinction between a model and 
application of the model. As already discussed, immigration 
law provides the background framework, or model, in which 
residency applications are assessed. The application of this 
law to the particulars of an applicant’s case, or the “legal 
analysis,” can be considered equivalent to the application of a 
statistical model (i.e., the analysis or reasoning) to a data 
subject to make a decision. This relationship between a model 
and analysis can be equally applied to algorithmic decision-
making models. For example, a decision tree used to make a 
decision on the basis of personal data can be considered a 
model. The analysis in this context would constitute the 
specific path, or branch, followed in the decision tree to reach 
an output or decision. So, in other words, a specific path in the 
decision tree relevant to deciding a specific case constitutes 
“analysis,” whereas the entire tree constitutes a “model.” 
Even if models (e.g., immigration law or exam questions) 
were treated as personal data, the rights in the GDPR must 
be interpreted teleologically to avoid nonsensical results.428 In 
Nowak, this was clearly seen in the determination that 
allowing the candidate to rectify answers on an exam would 
be nonsensical as it would undermine the original processing 
purpose of evaluating the candidate’s performance, despite 
being the candidate’s personal data. The same applies to 
rectification of the exam questions, which are not considered 
personal data. In the case of statistical or algorithmic 
decision-making models, rectification of the model itself would 
 
427 Not even the legal analysis (as an abstract application of the law) is 
personal data, but rather only the personal data undergoing processing is. 
Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 48–49, 59. Therefore, the law 
will also not be seen as personal data. 
428 See supra Part IV. 
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often be equally nonsensical, or at least not constitute a fair 
balance of subject and controller interests, due to its potential 
impact on application of the model to other cases, or research 
and business interests more broadly.  
Finally, the remit of data protection law does not include 
assessment of the accuracy or justifiability of decisions (and 
underlying opinions or evaluations),429 and does not allow 
individuals to decide which models (e.g., exam questions, 
laws) are used to assess them.430 Rather, these choices fall 
within the data controller’s private decision-making 
autonomy. 
An example may help to illustrate why models cannot be 
considered personal data. If a doctor asks about a patients 
height, and she replies 166 centimeters, such an utterance is 
her personal data. This data falls under the GDPR and can be 
rectified, deleted, etc. However, the fact that her height is 
expressed in centimeters does not mean that the metric 
system (i.e., the model used to assess her height) becomes her 
personal data, meaning that she would have rights over it. By 
having her height measured, she will not gain the right to 
rectify or delete the metric system. Similarly, she would not 
have a right to require that a different measuring system or 
 
429 Joined Cases C-141/12 & 372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081, ¶¶ 32, 46–48; Case C–
434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-994, ¶¶ 52–54. 
With regards to the ECJ’s judgment in Nowak, the examples of cases in 
which exam answers or the examiner’s comments could be considered 
“inaccurate” deal with cases in which the input data for a decision is 
somehow incomplete or corrupted (e.g., pages of answers were missing from 
the script assessed by the examiner). A clear distinction is drawn in 
paragraph 54 between the examiner’s comments, and the examiner’s 
evaluation of the candidate’s performance, with the former being treated as 
“recording” the examiner’s evaluation. See id. ¶ 54. The ECJ is thus 
indicating that the examiner’s comments, which can themselves be 
considered inferences or subjective statements of opinion, can be rectified if 
they have been recorded on the basis of incomplete or corrupted input data. 
The candidate is not granted the right to rectify the opinion, analysis, or 
evaluation criteria of the examiner. 
430 See supra Part IV. 
  
598 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
model be used, for example the imperial system, because she 
prefers the imperial system or finds it more accurate.431 
One could argue that this example is not equivalent to 
trained algorithmic models, as personal data was not used to 
construct the metric system. So, while the model would not 
constitute personal data of the individual being assessed, it 
may still conceivably be the personal data of the individuals 
whose data was used to construct it. To address this 
alternative, consider instead a marking rubric as was 
presumably used in Nowak. In addition to the exam questions, 
such a rubric would constitute a model used to make a 
decision about the performance of the candidate. The rubric is 
arguably constructed from personal data, insofar as it is 
derived from the past experiences and opinions of the assessor 
or course leader with other exams, and perhaps specific 
answers provided by candidates in prior years. The rubric 
could even go so far as to include personal data, if for example 
a prior candidate’s answer was copied into the rubric as an 
example response to a question. 
In this case, it would be equally nonsensical to assume that 
the prior candidate whose personal data is contained in the 
rubric would have data protection rights over the rubric as a 
whole. Rather, in line with the ECJ’s stance on the right to 
erasure in relation to exam answers, the prior candidate 
would retain rights over the extract of her responses 
contained in the rubric (assuming she was still identifiable, 
for example if the author of the rubric recalled who provided 
the example in question). In line with her data protection 
rights over personally identifiable data, the candidate could 
justifiably request access or deletion of the extracted 
 
431 For a view that trained models might be personal data, meaning the 
data subject would have rights over the model in its entirety, see Michael 
Veale, Reuben Binns & Lilian Edwards, Algorithms That Remember: Model 
Inversion Attacks and Data Protection Law, 376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y A 1, 1 (2018). This view, however, misinterprets the standing 
jurisprudence of the ECJ addressed here and does not take the remit of data 
protection law and the need to balance individual rights with trade secrets 
and IP law into account. 
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response.432 In the context of a trained algorithmic model, the 
right to erasure could be interpreted as requiring the data to 
be removed from the training set, thus requiring the model to 
be re-trained.433 
Regardless of whether the prior candidate’s requests would 
be successful in the real world, they demonstrate why 
personal data being contained in a model should not be 
thought to automatically grant individual rights over the 
model itself. Rather, the data subject’s rights apply only to the 
specific personally identifiable data contained within the 
model. This approach aligns with the teleological 
interpretation of individual rights described by the ECJ and 
AG in Nowak.434 The purpose of a model is to assess 
individuals; it would be nonsensical to assume that 
individuals whose data was used to train the model would be 
able to modify or delete the model entirely, and thus have an 
unjustifiably significant impact on the individuals being 
assessed by it. The scope of data protection rights must be 
appropriately applied and constrained to reflect the 
relationship between the data subject and the model, and the 
relevant processing purposes. In other words, the mere 
presence of personal data in a model in no way equates to the 
full, unbounded exercise of rights over it. 
Finally, law and policy on IP, copyright, and trade secrets 
also apply to the model which may prevent the exercise of 
individual data protection rights. In particular, these are 
likely to prevent requests to “delete” personal data from a 
model by re-training it from being successful, if doing so 
requires significant effort or is disruptive to business practice. 
The impact of these conflicts between frameworks are 
explored in the next three Sections.  
 
432 See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing erasure of examination 
answers), Part V (outlining necessary conditions). 
433 On the challenges of implementing the right to be forgotten for AI 
systems, see Villaronga, Kieseberg & Li, supra note 260. 
434 See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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B. Algorithmic Models and the EU’s Copyright 
Directive 
The previous Section shows that the GDPR facilitates the 
creation of profiles and models, either built from inferences 
(among other data) or is capable of producing them when 
applied to individuals. When the statistical purpose 
exemption applies, the individual cannot object to its 
construction and has no rights over it, even if the model is 
built using personal data. Further, even if the model is applied 
to a natural person (meaning the statistical purposes 
exemptions no longer apply), no control or rights over the 
model are likely to be granted if the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
is maintained. Similarly, members of the training data set will 
retain data protection rights over any personal data contained 
in the model and may be able to exercise rights in relation to 
it (unless statistical purposes exemptions apply), but this will 
not equate to any control or rights over the model as a whole. 
The facilitation of model constructions and lack of 
individual rights seen in the GDPR can also be seen in IP and 
copyright law. Current discussion of machine learning and 
inferential analytics in the context of IP law focuses broadly 
on two issues: (1) whether the training data used to construct 
a model (e.g., content uploaded or created by their users) is 
protected by IP laws; and (2) whether the outcome of the 
algorithmic process can be protected under IP law.435 
A new EU Copyright Directive436 is currently under 
debate, which will complement the existing legal framework 
 
435 See generally Daniel Schönberger, Deep Copyright: Up- and 
Downstream Questions Related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine 
Learning (ML), 10 INTELL. PROP. J. 35 (2018); Annemarie Bridy, The 
Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395 
(2016).  
436 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final 
(Sept. 14, 2016). 
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on copyright437 and will, among other things, govern the legal 
status of data mining.438 
The Directive is among other things concerned with 
research organizations such as universities and research 
institutes (including public-private partnerships439) that use 
new technologies that “enable the automated computational 
analysis of information in digital form, such as text, sounds, 
images or data, generally known as text and data mining. 
Those technologies allow researchers to process large 
amounts of information to gain new knowledge and discover 
 
437 In order of enactment, see generally Directive 96/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal 
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20–28; Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10–19) (implementing the “WIPO 
Copyright Treaty”); Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Rental Right and Lending Right and 
on Certain Rights to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property , 2006 
O.J. (L 376) 28–35; Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Games, 
2009 O.J. (L 111) 16–22; Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5–12; and Council Directive 2014/26/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial 
Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use in the Internal Market, 
2014 O.J. (L 84) 72–98. Other frameworks are relevant but go beyond the 
scope of this paper. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Annex 1C, 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). For more, see Patents for Software?: European Law and Practice, 
EUR. PATENT OFF., https://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/software.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180613235106/http://www.epo.org/news-
issues/issues/software.html]. 
438 See Amendments by the European Parliament to the Commission 
Proposal Directive (EU) 2019/…of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market 
and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, A800245/271, art. 4, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0245-AM-271-
271_EN.pdf?redirect [https://perma.cc/KC48-HY8M]. 
439 Id. at 10–11. 
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new trends.”440 For text and data mining activities in such 
research environments, the Directive pushes for exceptions to 
the copyright regime (e.g., foregoing a need for license 
agreements441 or remuneration442), as well as for exemptions 
from the Database Directive443 to uses of data to monitor 
trends.444  
These exemptions are concerning when considered 
alongside the GDPR’s exemptions in Articles 85445 and 89, 
which already grant exemptions from most of the rights 
granted in the GDPR (e.g., Articles 14, 15, 16, 18, 17(3)(d) and 
21) for data controllers “processing for archiving purposes in 
the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes 
or statistical purposes.”446 Recital 159 of the GDPR explains 
that “scientific research purposes” should be interpreted 
broadly to include “privately funded research.”447 Universities 
 
440 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final 
(Sept. 14, 2016) at 14. 
441 See id. at 14, art. 3. For arguments in favor of license fees and access 
to data for AI training, see generally Schönberger, supra note 435. 
442 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at art. 15, COM (2016) 
593 final (Sept. 14, 2016). 
443 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20-
28. 
444 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final 
(Sept. 14, 2016) at art. 3(1) (providing exemptions for text and data mining). 
Article 2(2) of the Proposal defines “text and data mining” as “any 
automated analytical technique aiming to analyse text and data in digital 
form in order to generate information such as patterns, trends and 
correlations.” Id. at art. 2(2). 
445 Article 85 addresses the inclusion of journalistic purposes in these 
exemptions. 
446 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 89.  
447 Id. at 30. For a discussion on the legal problems associated with for-
profit research, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using 
Implementation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in 
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and research institutes covered by the new Copyright 
Directive will therefore receive substantial exemptions to data 
protection and IP requirements when constructing 
algorithmic models. 
In fact, the draft of the Copyright Directive recently passed 
by the EP goes even further and states in Recital 11 that:  
Union research policy, which encourages universities 
and research institutes to collaborate with the private 
sector, research organisations should also benefit from 
such an exception when their research activities are 
carried out in the framework of public-private 
partnerships. While research organisations and 
cultural heritage institutions should continue to be 
the beneficiaries of that exception, they should also be 
able to rely on their private partners for carrying out 
text and data mining, including by using their 
technological tools.448  
These privileges cover “access to content that is freely 
available online”449 and there is no longer any clear storage 
limitation.450 At the same time the private partner must not 
have “decisive influence” and research carried-out on a not-
for-profit basis or without public-interest mission does not 
enjoy these privileges.451 
The likely impact of the draft Copyright Directive appears 
to be to exempt research institutions, including public-private 
partnerships from the copyright regime for data mining. 
 
the Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L, REV. 14 (2004). 
For a focus on the GDPR, see Gabe Maldoff, How GDPR Changes the Rules 
for Research, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFS. (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/how-gdpr-changes-the-rules-for-research/ 
[https://perma.cc/PV6J-VGBS]. 
448 Amendments by the European Parliament to the Commission 
Proposal Directive (EU) 2019/…of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market 
and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, A800245/271, at 11, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0245-AM-271-
271_EN.pdf?redirect [https://perma.cc/KC48-HY8M]. 
449 See id. at 14. 
450 See id. at arts. 3(3), 4(3). 
451 See id. at 12. 
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Users will thus have no control over how their data is used to 
build models under the GDPR’s statistical exemptions, and 
under the Copyright Directive’s research exemptions.  
It must be noted that at the moment the actual impact of 
the Directive on inferential analytics and algorithmic models 
remains unclear and the framework is still in Trilogue 
negotiations.452 
C. Algorithmic Models and Outcomes and Intellectual 
Property Law  
Thus far, this Article has determined that data subjects 
are unlikely to have data protection rights over statistical 
models (e.g. those produced by machine learning) applied to 
them or built from their personal data under the GDPR. With 
regard to the EU Copyright Directive, if an algorithm is 
trained in a research environment via data mining, consent, 
license agreements, and remuneration are not required to use 
data as inputs to train the model. Therefore, these regulations 
could also form a new barrier to control over inferences.  
In addition to the legal status of training data addressed 
thus far, there is growing debate on whether the data 
generated or creative “work” performed by algorithms should 
fall under intellectual property law. If IP law is applicable, 
business interests will be pitted against data subjects’ 
rights.453 This means that the new EU Copyright Directive or 
 
452 For all draft reports of the European Parliament, see Draft Reports, 
EUR. PARLIAMENT COMMITTEES, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/ 
en/juri/draft-reports.html?ufolderComCode=JURI&ufolderId=07947& 
urefProcCode=&linkedDocument=true&ufolderLegId=8&urefProcYear=&
urefProcNum [https://perma.cc/T7EH-Z5U7]. For further legal and ethical 
discussion, see Bart W. Schermer, The Limits of Privacy in Automated 
Profiling and Data Mining, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 45 (2011); 
Zarsky, supra 65. 
453 Madeleine de Cock Buning, Is the EU Exposed on the Copyright of 
Robot Creations?, 1 ROBOTICS L.J. 8, 8 (2015) (“It can either be the creator 
of the software who is deemed the owner of the rights; or it could be the 
owner of the software; or it could be both. It can also be the entity or person 
who invested financially in the software.”); see also CHRISTOPHE LEROUX ET 
AL., SUGGESTION FOR A GREEN PAPER ON LEGAL ISSUES IN ROBOTICS: 
CONTRIBUTION TO DELIVERABLE D3.2.1 ON ELS ISSUES IN ROBOTICS (2012), 
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the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC454 could apply to work 
generated by algorithms, in addition to training data.455  
In any case, Directive 2009/24/EC on the protection of 
computer programs applies to software. Here, software is 
interpreted broadly, as Art 1(2) states that the “Directive shall 
apply to the expression in any form of a computer program.”456 
In the ECJ’s judgment in SAS Institute Inc. v. World 
Programming Ltd, this has been interpreted as applying to at 
least preparatory design material, machine code, source code, 
and object code, but not the functionality of the computer 
program or the format of the data files.457 Following this 
judgment, while it remains unclear whether the output of 
software (here, a model or an inference) is protected under 
Directive 2009/24/EC, information about how the output was 
produced will be protected. IP law can thus form an additional 
 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310167745_A_green_paper_on_l
egal_issues_in_robotics [https://perma.cc/8752-NYDD]; Report with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2013 (INL)), EUR. PARL. DOC. A8-0005/2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
[https://perma.cc/P5BB-TFTC]; Malgieri, supra note 302; Autonomous 
Creation – Creation by Robots: Who Owns the IP Rights?, IPKM BLOG (Mar. 
5, 2015), https://law.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ipkm/autonomous-creation-
creation-by-robots-who-owns-the-ip-rights/ [https://perma.cc/85MC-3L2C]. 
454 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 
10. 
455 Note there is also a discussion on whether algorithms should be 
equipped with personhood to be able to hold copyright, or alternatively 
whether copyrights should be transferred to the user or coder of the system. 
For discussion, see Bridy, supra note 435; James Grimmelmann, There’s No 
Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work - And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (2016); Schönberger, supra note 435 (exploring the 
idea that the AI creation and the copyright should be in the hands of the 
public domain). 
456 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs 
(Codified Version) (Text with EEA Relevance), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16. 
457 See Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2012 
E.C.R. I-259. 
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barrier to accessing the reasoning or analysis that has led to 
a model or inference. 
D. Algorithmic Models and Outcomes and Trade 
Secrets 
The final framework to discuss as a potential barrier to the 
right to reasonable inferences is a “catch all” framework that 
may pose a substantial barrier to learning the justification 
behind inferences. Even if the aforementioned frameworks 
were not to apply to inferential analytics, the new EU Trade 
Secrets Directive458 is likely to substantially limit controllers’ 
transparency obligations.459 The framework, which came into 
effect on June 9, 2018, may result in the creation of new data 
being classified as a trade secret. Article 2 of the Directive 
defines a trade secret as any information that is not “generally 
known,” has commercial value due to this secrecy, and has 
been subject to reasonable steps to ensure it remains a 
 
458 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, 
Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1.  
459 See Rembert Niebel, Lorenzo de Martinis & Birgit Clark, The EU 
Trade Secrets Directive: All Change for Trade Secret Protection in Europe?, 
13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 445, 448–49 (2018). 
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secret.460 Recital 1 further adds “valuable know-how and 
business information” to the definition.461 
The definition of a trade secret is so broad as to include 
nearly any data handled by a commercial entity. For example, 
trade secrets could include “shopping habits and history of 
customers,”462 “customer lists and profiles,”463 
“algorithms,”464 and “[information about a] customer’s 
behavior (creditworthiness, lifestyle, reliability, etc.), 
personalized marketing plans (e.g. pricing), or forecasts about 
[a] customer’s future life based on probabilistic studies (life 
expectancy, estimated advancements in career, etc.).”465 
 
460 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, 
Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, art. 2. Article 39(2) of the TRIPS 
agreement has a similar definition of a trade secret. Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) art. 39(2). For discussion of trade secrets as a 
hindrance to due process and algorithmic accountability, see generally 
PASQUALE, supra note 11; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: 
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 
(2018); Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: 
Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411 (2014); 
Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic 
Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models 
Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87 (2011).  
461 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, 
Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 1.  
462 Graef, Husovec & Purtova, supra note 302, at 1381. 
463 Purtova, supra note 369, at 71.  
464 Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-
Making: Algorithmic Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, 
Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. 
& ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 12 (2018).  
465 Malgieri, supra note 273, at 113–14 (internal citations omitted). 
According to Malgieri, disclosing, rectifying, or erasing any of these data 
“can probably adversely affect the ‘dynamic’ trade secret interest of business 
people and of employees.” Id. at 114.  
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An EDPS document commenting on an early draft of the 
Directive466 and a European Commission impact assessment 
accompanying the proposal for the Directive467 further clarify 
the scope of trade secrets. According to these sources, trade 
secrets can consist of “data such as information on customers 
and suppliers, business plans or market research and 
strategies,”468 “list[s] of clients/ customers; internal datasets 
containing research data,”469 “private collations of individual 
items of publicly available information,”470 as well as “data on 
customers and their behaviour and on the ability to collect and 
to monetise those data.” The inclusion of customer data shows 
that personal data, subject to data protection law, can 
nonetheless constitute trade secrets.471 Tension between 
individual privacy interests and business interests, or data 
protection and trade secrets laws, is thus inevitable.  
The EDPS foresaw these possible tensions, urging “greater 
precision on the concept of trade secrets and clearer 
safeguards . . . to address adequately the potential effects of 
the proposal on the rights to privacy and to the protection of 
personal data.”472 The EDPS also recommended amending 
Article 4 of the Trade Secrets Directive to ensure that the data 
subject’s “right to access the data being processed and to 
 
466 European Data Prot. Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How 
and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful 
Acquisition, Use and Disclosure (Mar. 12, 2014), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-12_trade_secrets_ 
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UE9-8WB6].  
467 Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment: 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How 
and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful 
Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, at 107–18, 248–62, COM (2013) 813 final 
(Nov. 28, 2013).  
468 European Data Prot. Supervisor, supra note 466, at 3. 
469 Id.  
470 Id.  
471 Id.  
472 Id. at 2.  
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obtain rectification, erasure or blocking of the data where it is 
incomplete or inaccurate”473 is guaranteed, referring to a case 
involving Facebook474 where requests were denied. This 
suggestion was not adopted but rather moved to Recital 35. 
The final Directive in Article 9(4) only requires that “any 
processing of personal data pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 
shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC,”475 
without any clarification as to resolving the tension between 
trade secrets and data protection law. It is thus unclear how 
these clashes will play out, although Member States may 
implement new rules.  
In any case, given the broad definition of trade secrets and 
the clear inclusion of personal data in its scope, it is safe to 
assume that derived and inferred data will be covered by the 
Trade Secrets Directive.476 Even with this outlook, a fair 
balance between the right of privacy, IP laws, and the rights 
to conduct a business and freedom of expression will be 
necessary; the ECJ’s jurisprudence has long reflected this 
position.477  
 
473 Id. at 5. 
474 Letter from Facebook User Operations—Data Access Request 
Team, to Max Schrems, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.europe-v-
facebook.org/FB_E-Mails_28_9_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3TZ-UK4R]. 
475 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, 
Use and Disclosure, art. 9(4), 2016 O.J. (L 157). 
476 For an overview of the definition of trade secrets according to the 
ECJ and its constituent courts, see Case T-353/94, Postbank NV v. Comm’n 
of the European Cmtys., 1996 E.C.R. II-921, and Case T-198/03, Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt AG v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2006 E.C.R. 
II-1429. 
477 See Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) 
v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271; Case C-70/10, Scarlet 
Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL 
(SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-00000; Case C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v. Tele2 
Telecommunication GmbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-1227; Case C-461/10, Bonnier 
Audio AB, Earbrooks AB, Norstedts Förlagsgrupp AB, Piratförlaget AB & 
Storyside AB v. Perfect Commc’n Sweden AB, ECLI:EU:C:2012:219. 
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Taking into account the novel risks of inferential analytics 
and trends in the European legal landscape that appear to 
place greater emphasis on commercial and research interests, 
implementation of a right to reasonable inferences takes on 
renewed importance to ensure that the level of protection 
against inferences increases to reasonable standards. Data 
subjects require a new right addressing the riskiest type of 
personal data that, ironically, currently receives the least 
protection. 
VIII.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Calls for accountability in Big Data analytics and 
algorithmic decision-making systems are motivated by a 
common concern: Assessments and inferences drawn from 
disparate, often non-intuitive features and data sources 
increasingly drive decision-making about people. These 
inferences are based not only on data individuals have 
provided or has been observed, but also on information 
derived or inferred from it, as well as from anonymous or 
third-party data. Similarly, inferential analytics can be used 
to infer our preferences, weaknesses, sensitive attributes (e.g. 
race or sexual orientation), and opinions (e.g. political 
stances). These can form the basis for micro-targeting, 
nudging, and manipulation, as seen in online 
advertisement478 or the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal. 
Too much emphasis is placed on governing the collection of 
these types of data, while too little is paid to how it is 
evaluated.479 
To illustrate, even if a bank can explain which data and 
variables have been used to make a decision (e.g. banking 
records, income, post code), the decision turns on inferences 
drawn from these sources; for example, that the applicant is 
not a reliable borrower. This is an assumption or prediction 
about future behavior that cannot be verified or refuted at the 
time of decision-making. Thus, the actual risks posed by Big 
 
478 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 
(2014).  
479 See Wachter, supra note 316.  
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Data analytics and AI are the underpinning inferences that 
determine how we, as data subjects, are being viewed and 
evaluated by third parties.  
This Article has considered whether inferences or derived 
data constitute personal data according to the Article 29 
Working Party’s three-step model and jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. If inferences are seen as personal 
data, the rights in the GDPR could apply and allow data 
subjects to know about (Articles 13–14), access (Article 15), 
rectify (Article 16), delete (Article 17), and object to them 
(Article 21). Further, profiling and automated decision-
making, which may include inferences, can already be 
contested (Article 22). The Article 29 Working Party sees 
verifiable and unverifiable inferences as personal data (e.g. 
results of a medical analysis), but leaves open whether the 
reasoning and process behind that inference is seen as 
personal data. The ECJ is still finding its voice on this topic, 
as its current jurisprudence is inconsistent. Future 
jurisprudence will continue to define the scope of personal 
data and the protection afforded to it. It is crucial to note that 
the question of whether inferences are personal data, is not 
the most important one. The underlying problem goes much 
deeper and relates to the tension of whether individuals have 
rights, control, or recourse over how they are seen by others.  
Some scholars are worried that broad interpretation of 
personal data turns data protection law into the “law of 
everything.”480 However, as shown in Section V, inferences 
are treated as “economy class” personal data that are afforded 
little meaningful protection, and certainly less than personal 
data provided by the data subject or sensitive personal data. 
In part, third parties may have an interest in inferences and 
derived data and the techniques used to create it (e.g. trade 
secrets) due to their value or the costs involved. 
The GDPR, the draft e-Privacy regulation, the Digital 
Content Directive, and legal scholars attribute only limited 
rights over inferences to data subjects. At the same time, new 
frameworks such as the EU Copyright Directive and 
 
480 Purtova, supra note 86.  
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provisions in the GDPR push to facilitate data mining, 
knowledge discovery, and big data analytics by limiting data 
subjects’ rights over their data. The new Trade Secrets 
Directive also poses a barrier to accountability, as models, 
algorithms, and inferences may very well fall under this 
framework.  
Even if the ECJ decides to consistently classify inferences 
as personal data, current jurisprudence is a strong indicator 
that the court will offer insufficient protection against 
unreasonable inferences under data protection law. The core 
problem stems from how the ECJ interprets the remit of data 
protection law. In standing jurisprudence, the ECJ (in 
Bavarian Lager,481 YS and M and S,482 and Nowak483) and 
Advocate General (in YS and M and S484 and Nowak485) have 
consistently explained that the remit of data protection law is 
not to assess whether inferences and decisions based upon 
them are accurate or justified. Rather, individuals need to 
consult sectoral laws and governing bodies applicable to their 
specific case to seek possible recourse. More generally, the 
ECJ views data protection law as a tool for data subjects to 
assess whether the (input) data undergoing processing was 
legally obtained, and whether the purpose for processing is 
lawful. To ensure this, data protection law grants various 
rights to individuals, for example the rights of access, 
rectification, and deletion.486 Of course this can change in the 
future, as the definition of personal data and the associated 
rights depend on the purpose for which it was collected. As the 
rights in the GDPR must be interpreted teleologically, it is not 
 
481 Case C-28/08 P, European Comm’n v. Bavarian Lager, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-6055.  
482 Joined Cases C-141/12 & C-372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014 E.C.R. I-2081.  
483 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
994.  
484 Joined Cases C-141/12 & C-372/12, YS, M and S v. Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2013 E.C.R. I-838.  
485 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2017 E.C.R. I-
582.  
486 Case C-553/07, College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van 
Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, 2009 E.C.R. I-3889.  
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unthinkable that future jurisprudence could apply these 
rights to the content of assessments and inferences. A change 
is, however, unlikely in inherently antagonistic situations 
that pose data subjects’ rights to privacy, identity, reputation 
against companies’ rights to freedom of contract and free 
speech. Dialogue is needed to determine the point at which 
the right to privacy must take precedence over the private 
autonomy of decision-makers.  
This situation is ironic, as data subjects are most in need 
of protection from the risks posed by inferences and derived 
data. To close these accountability gaps and promote 
justification of inferences, this Article proposes a new “right 
to reasonable inferences” applicable to “high risk” inferences 
that cause damage to privacy or reputation, or have low 
verifiability in the sense of being predictive or opinion-based 
while being used for important decisions. This right would 
require ex-ante justification to be given by the data controller 
to establish whether an inference is reasonable. This 
disclosure would address (1) why certain data are normatively 
acceptable bases to draw inferences; (2) why these inferences 
are normatively acceptable and relevant for the chosen 
processing purpose or type of automated decision; and (3) 
whether the data and methods used to draw the inferences are 
accurate and statistically reliable. An ex-post mechanism 
would allow data subjects to challenge unreasonable 
inferences, which can support challenges against automated 
decisions exercised under Article 22(3) of the GDPR.  
Of course, a solution outside of data protection law may be 
possible.487 However, few standards exist, especially in the 
private sector, that govern how decisions are made. A right to 
reasonable inferences is an essential response to the novel 
risks introduced by inferential analytics. It is both the essence 
and the extension of data protection law.  
In the same way it was necessary to create a “right to be 
forgotten” in a Big Data world,488 it is now necessary to create 
 
487 See generally Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data 
Protection Law, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 250 (2014).  
488 See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 10; VAN HOBOKEN, 
supra note 8.  
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a “right on how to be seen.” The proposed re-imagining of the 
purpose of data protection law would be more in line with the 
original remit proposed in the ECHR,489 as well as the Council 
of Europe’s Modernised Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data490 
and its guidelines on AI,491 and the European Parliament’s 
resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on 
artificial intelligence and robotics.492 It would reconfigure 
privacy as a holistic concept with a stronger focus on 
adaptable identity, self-presentation, and reputation. One 
could also argue for a mediated application of the human right 
of privacy, and advocate for a “positive obligation” of states to 
implement laws to protect citizens from privacy invasion by 
the public and private sectors.493 
Based on the preceding analysis of the legal status and 
protection of inferences, the following recommendations can 
be made for European policy: 
A. Re-Define the Remit of Data Protection Law 
In order to ensure data protection law protects against the 
novel risks introduced by Big Data analytics and algorithmic 
decision-making, the ECJ should re-define the law’s remit to 
include assessment of the reasonableness of inferential 
analytics and accuracy of decision-making processes. 
However, it has to be noted that the court’s limitation of 
Article 16 made sense in this regard in the discussed case law. 
It would be an odd situation where data protection authorities 
are competent to rule on the accuracy of immigration cases or 
examination disputes. In these cases, procedures are in place 
to deal with complaints. However, the same cannot always be 
said for inferences that the private sector draws. It is often left 
to the private autonomy of industry to assess and evaluate 
 
489 See also ECHR jurisprudence on privacy until 2017, reviewed in 
Council of Europe, supra note 60.  
490 Comm. of Ministers, supra note 374.  
491 Directorate Gen. of Human Rights and Rule of Law, supra note 375. 
492 See Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, supra note 376. 
493 De Hert & Gutwirth, supra note 73, at 61; Wachter, supra note 54.  
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people. Companies are relatively free in how they assess 
people, except where laws exist (e.g. anti-discrimination law) 
that limit this freedom. As discussed in Part II, due to the 
widespread implementation of inferential analytics by 
companies for profiling, nudging, manipulation, or automated 
decision-making, these “private” decisions can to a large 
extent impact the privacy of individuals. Thus, dialogue is 
needed to determine the point at which the right to privacy 
must be given greater weight than the private autonomy of 
decision-makers. In effect, individuals should have a right to 
be reasonably assessed.  
Data protection is only one component of the right to 
privacy, which also includes a right to identity, reputation, 
self-presentation, and autonomy. Big Data analytics produces 
privacy-invasive, unpredictable, and counterintuitive 
inferences that threaten these components of privacy. In 
response, data subjects require greater control over when, 
how, and under what conditions they are being assessed by 
automated systems. 
B. Focus on How Data is Evaluated, Not Just 
Collected 
The categories of personal, sensitive, anonymous and non-
personal data reflect characteristics of data when it is 
collected, and they determine the level of protection granted 
to input data. These characteristics can, however, change over 
time, as data is used for different purposes. The German 
Supreme Court has previously argued that there is no such 
thing as “irrelevant data” when it comes to data protection 
law, as informational technologies might use it for purposes 
that affect the data subject. Seemingly neutral data can be 
turned into data that affects the right to privacy,494 or offers 
grounds for discrimination and other harms.  
 
494 See Ernst, supra note 91 (citing a judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court). 
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Basing protections on these distinctions is thus 
ineffective.495 The damage that can be done by data does not 
depend on any of these categories, but rather on how it is used. 
Inferences or profiles drawn from any of these sources can be 
applied to and harm an individual or group. The belief that 
certain categories of data are fundamentally less harmful or 
risky than others is undermined by Big Data analytics.496  
This Article recommends adopting the position taken by 
the Article 29 Working Party concerning the transformation 
of categories of data based upon processing purposes and 
impact.497 In future European policy-making and 
jurisprudence, levels of protection should be granted to data 
based primarily on its usage and impact, and secondarily on 
its source.  
C. Do Not Focus Only on the Identifiability of Data 
Subjects 
In order for data protection rights to apply, data must be 
suitable to identify the individual. This is misguided,498 
because the identifiability of data is fluid and can change over 
time499 depending on linkage, re-identification attacks, and 
other technological progress.500 
Companies can use anonymization501 techniques to avoid 
many obligations under data protection law. Similarly, 
pseudonymization techniques502 can potentially minimize the 
 
495 Schreurs and others argue that anonymous data can still impact 
data subjects, despite being outside the scope of data protection law. See 
Schreurs et al., supra note 359, at 248–49. Zarsky explains that any data 
could potentially become sensitive data, rendering the classification 
meaningless. See Zarsky, supra note 317, at 1013.  
496 See Wachter, supra note 316, at 6.  
497 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 81, at 8, 10, 11.  
498 See Wachter, supra note 316. 
499 Wachter, supra note 316. 
500 See Korff, supra note 323, at 46.  
501 See Schreurs et al., supra note 359, at 248–49. 
502 See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Singling Out People Without 
Knowing Their Names – Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and 
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requirements to respect individual rights. In such cases, data 
controllers are not required to comply with requests from data 
subjects under Articles 15–20 if they are “not in a position to 
identify” him or her, unless the data subject can provide 
additional information that allows the data to be re-
identified.503 Together, these provisions could create an 
incentive to de-identify data in order to avoid compliance with 
individual rights, which has happened in the past.504  
As argued above, inferences drawn from anonymous and 
non-personal data still pose risks for data subjects.505 As a 
result, identifiability as a prerequisite to exercise individual 
rights creates a gap in the protection afforded to data subjects 
against inferential analytics. The potential and actual harm 
of inferential analytics should be reflected in future European 
policy-making and jurisprudence, regardless of whether the 
affected parties can be identified.506 This is not to suggest that 
data subjects should be granted rights over personal and 
anonymous data which has not been applied to them. Rather, 
improved channels of redress are required against models, 
profiles, and other background knowledge built from third-
party and anonymous data and subsequently applied to 
identifiable individuals. 
D. Justify Data Sources and Intended Inferences Prior 
to Deployment of Inferential Analytics at Scale 
Following the recommendation to implement a right to 
reasonable inferences, data controllers should proactively 
 
the New Data Protection Regulation, 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 256 
(2016). 
503 Se Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 11(2). 
504 For example, there are similar prior experiences where companies 
have claimed “disproportionate effort” to avoid compliance with access 
requests. See, e.g., Letter from Facebook User Operations, supra note 474.  
505 See supra Section II.A. and Part VI. 
506 Mittelstadt, supra note 25; Mantelero, supra note 25; Bygrave, 
supra note 349, at 283–95. 
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justify their design choices for high-risk inferential analytics 
prior to widespread deployment. Inspiration can be drawn 
from the German data protection law’s provisions on 
predictive assessments, such as credit scoring. Controllers 
should pay increased attention to addressing the following 
aspects of the source data and outputs of inferential analytics 
in addressing justification: 
 
• The privacy invasiveness and the counter-
intuitiveness of the data sources used to draw 
inferences, for example clicking behavior, browsing 
behavior,507 or mouse tracking.508  
• The aim of the inference to be drawn should justify the 
means or sources of data being used in terms of 
invasiveness. Inferring gambling or alcohol addiction 
to drive targeted advertising, for example, may 
actively harm the data subject.  
• The usage of known proxy features (e.g. post code) or 
other (potentially) discriminatory data, or the 
intention to infer sensitive attributes (e.g. political 
views509) from non-sensitive data.  
• The normative acceptability and relevance of the 
source data and inference to a particular processing 
purpose, such as, the relevance of Facebook profiles 
and friend networks to loan decisions.510  
• The statistical reliability of the methods used to draw 
inferences. 
 
This is a preliminary list of potential topics and 
information types to be included in justification disclosures 
under the right to reasonable inferences. Extensive debate 
and further research is required to determine which 
information should be included in different sectors. The 
 
507 See Allerhand et al., supra note 41. 
508 See Chen et al., supra note 46.  
509 See Coutts, supra note 34. 
510 See Taylor & Sadowski, supra note 33. 
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myriad applications of inferential analytics demand a sectoral 
approach. 
E. Give Data Subjects the Ability to Challenge 
Unreasonable Inferences  
In line with the implementation of a right to reasonable 
inferences, European policymakers should grant data subjects 
a new right to challenge unreasonable high-risk inferences, 
which can also support challenges to subsequent decisions.511 
Data subjects can raise an objection with the data controller 
on the grounds that the inference or its source data is 
irrelevant or unreliable.512 For verifiable inferences, the data 
subject can provide supplementary information to rectify the 
inaccurate inference. For non-verifiable and subjective 
inferences, supplementary information can also be provided to 
attempt to convince the data controller to change its 
assessment. 
The right to rectification (Article 16 of the GDPR) may 
arguably already offer a remedy for non-verifiable and 
subjective inferences and opinions, depending upon one’s view 
of the necessity of verifiability in classifying inferences as 
personal data.513 Taking this view, the right to reasonable 
inferences would embed an answer to the verifiability 
question in law, and thus strengthen data protection rights 
over inferences regardless of their verifiability and 
subjectivity. Similarly, it would complement the existing right 
to contest solely automated decisions514 and profiling515 with 
legal and significant effects, and potentially transform it from 
a merely procedural tool to a meaningful accountability 
mechanism.516 
 
511 For a favorable view of such a solution, see Hildebrandt & Koops, 
supra note 402, at 449. On the need to remedy unjust judgments based on 
inferences, see Leenes, Hildebrandt & Gutwirth, supra note 73, at 295. 
512 See supra Section VI.B. 
513 See supra Section III.B, Part IV, Section V.B. 
514 For a discussion on this legal loophole, see Wachter, Mittelstadt & 
Floridi, supra note 11; Bygrave, supra note 349.  
515 Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 332.  
516 See supra Section V.E. 
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The intention of an ex-post right to contest unreasonable 
inferences is, however, not to guarantee that a data controller 
must change its inference or assessment at the data subject’s 
request. Rather, it aims to establish a dialogue between data 
controllers and subjects in which the former share details and 
justifications for the proposed inferential processing that are 
open to comments and interrogation by the latter.517 This will 
be fruitful for both sides, as accurate assessment is in the 
interests of both parties. To achieve this, it will be necessary 
to redefine the purpose of data protection law (as suggested 
above) to include justification of assessments. Strengthening 
the position of the data subject in relation to controllers is 
necessary to sufficiently mitigate the novel risks of inferential 
analytics.518 
Given the novel risks of Big Data analytics and algorithmic 
decision-making, inferences cannot justifiably remain 
“economy class” personal data. Data subjects’ privacy 
interests require renewed protection to restore the fair 
balance between individual, public, and commercial interests 
that inspires data protection law. The current remit of data 
protection law works well to govern input data, but fails to 
provide meaningful control over how personal data is 
evaluated. A right to reasonable inferences is a first step to 
correct this imbalance. 
 
517 Article 22(3) of the GDPR also allows data subjects to express their 
views and human intervention (in addition to the right to contestation) if a 
solely automated decision has been made. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) art. 22(3). 
518 See supra Section II.A. 
